Five ways Russia and China could sink American aircraft carriers. Five ways Russia and China could sink American aircraft carriers Is it possible to sink an aircraft carrier

What can the Russian Federation oppose to the “invincible armada”.

Once, while still the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta, stated: “Any fifth-grader knows that the US AUG (carrier strike group) cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers in the world,” writes blogger Anton Rumata.

Wait! What about Russia! Personally, I was always and everywhere told that the Russian army could deal with the US Navy - somehow, but it could. Those more advanced in this matter stated: well, with the entire fleet, maybe not, it’s even possible that we won’t defeat an aircraft carrier force, but we can definitely send one AUG to the bottom. Well, very few still agreed with the Americans in their bravado.

Let's look into this issue (it's interesting - it's true).

I’ll say right away that I won’t overload the post with numbers and enumerations, there will be a lot of links, by going through them, you can get all the data and performance characteristics from different sources. I also won’t elaborate ad infinitum. Those. I count on visitors to be somewhat well-read on this issue; the rest, if something is unclear in the names or terms, can freely get definitions through a search engine. Although I will try to provide almost all links.

A typical US AUG is a group consisting of:

Flagship aircraft carrier groups with a Nimitz (or Enterprise) nuclear power plant with a carrier-based aviation regiment based on it (60-80 aircraft). According to usual practice, an aircraft carrier, as well as a carrier-based aviation regiment of a group, are separate military units of naval aviation and are under the command of naval aviation officers with the rank of U.S. Naval aviation Captain.

Air defense division of the group- 1-2 CR URO of the Ticonderoga type. The basic armament complex of the missile cruiser division includes the Standart air defense missile launcher (SM-2, SM-3) and the sea-based Tomahawk missile launcher. All Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers are equipped with the Aegis naval weapon control and missile firing system (AEGIS). Each of the division's cruisers is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Captain.

PLO division of the group- 3-4 EM URO of the Arleigh Burke type with depth charges and torpedoes to combat submarines, as well as (some ships) with Tomahawk missile launchers on board. The commander of an ASW division is a Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Captain, while each of the division's destroyers is under the command of a U.S. Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Commander.

Multi-purpose submarine division- 1-2 submarines of the “Los Angeles” type with torpedo armament and the Tomahawk cruise missile (with launch through the submarine’s TA) on board with the tasks of both ASW groupings and strikes against coastal (surface) targets.

Supply vessel division - 1-2 Sepla type transports, ammunition transports, tankers, and other auxiliary ships.

OAP Navy- up to 60 US Navy aviation aircraft, consolidated into attack aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft, anti-aircraft warfare aircraft, military aviation aircraft, etc. The Navy air force is a separate military unit of the US Navy aviation. The Navy OAP, like the AVMA, is under the command of a Navy aviation officer with the rank of captain first rank or a USMC aviation officer with the rank of colonel (USMC Colonel).

So what can Russia counter to such impressive power? Russia does not have the resources to compete with the United States on equal terms in terms of the number of ships. In terms of aircraft carriers, the US advantage is overwhelming; now the Americans have 10 aircraft carriers, the Russian Federation has one aircraft-carrying cruiser, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, which can be qualified as a light aircraft carrier, but actually without aircraft. There are ten Su-33s in service out of the planned twenty-five, which they already want to replace with the MiG-29K. In 2013, in addition to the existing “dryers”, two MiGs were added. The situation with escort ships is also not the best.

Many will now say, what about aircraft carriers, Russia has a lot of other things to destroy AUGs. I agree, in a situation of total superiority in ships, an asymmetrical response is needed. So what is he like?

The Russian Armed Forces see it in missile weapons, specifically in anti-ship missiles. Those. in the effective delivery of a conventional or nuclear charge directly to AUG ships.

First, I suggest you familiarize yourself with the carriers of anti-ship missiles: the Project 1164 Atlant missile cruiser, the Project 949A Antey submarine, the Project 1144 Orlan heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser, and the actual heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov.

There are also small missile ships, aircraft and coastal missile systems.

Since the US AUG has a serious missile defense and air defense system, and naturally a powerful aviation fist, the main characteristics for combating and defeating it are the detection and possible attack distance.

In order to hit an AUG composition: aviation, ships or submarines must ensure timely detection of an aircraft carrier group, classify it, approach within missile strike range, while maintaining combat effectiveness, and launch missiles that, having overcome air defense and electronic warfare systems, must destroy the ships in the composition AUG.

Let's consider the option of attacking AUGs by surface ships of the Russian Navy in the world's oceans:

The capabilities of Russian ships in the matter of detection are actually limited by the radio horizon; the helicopters on board the ships are of little use for solving this problem, due to the small number of these machines and their short range. They can be effectively used only in the interests of issuing target designation for missile weapons, but before that the enemy must still be detected.

Of course, when missile cruisers were created, i.e. under the Soviet navy, their activities were to be carried out with the support of a naval reconnaissance system in the ocean theater. It relied on a developed system of radio-technical intelligence, the basis of which was ground-based centers located not only on the territory of the USSR, but also in other states. There was also effective space naval reconnaissance, which made it possible to detect and monitor naval formations of a potential enemy, and provide target designation for missile weapons throughout almost the entire territory of the World Ocean. Russia at the current moment in time does not have all this. In 2006, they began to revive the system, but it is still very, very far from completion.

Therefore, the AUG will see Russian ships long before it itself is detected. The group constantly provides air control to a depth of 800 km, with the help of Grumman E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, we will be attacked by 48 aircraft, of which 25 will carry the GARPUN anti-aircraft missile system, and electronic warfare will be provided by almost 8 Boeing EA-18 Growlers.

It is impossible to fight off the cruisers with their air defense, and even the Kuznetsov with a dozen aircraft.

The Russian Federation will not be allowed to use the main weapon in the fight against AUG, namely the P-1000 Vulcan, a range of 550 km and the P-700 Granit, a range of up to 625 km, as you can see, the Russian Federation cannot aim these missiles, even at launch range, it is extremely unlikely that will do.

But if, by some miracle, the Russian Federation still shoots down enemy planes. There will be a duel of anti-ship missiles, and a fight between electronics; if in anti-ship missiles we are superior to the Americans, then in electronic warfare there is again almost no chance. In the best case, the Russian anti-ship missiles, some of which will pass the AUG missile defense system, will be able to damage the aircraft carrier and, in extreme cases, sink several ships of the group, but all this based on the above, unfortunately from the realm of science fiction.

Also, a strike on the AUG with nuclear weapons is also unlikely, again due to the fact that the Russian Federation simply will not have time to strike, since they will be discovered first.

The most advanced Russian anti-ship missile system today is Granit. Currently, there are no analogues to this rocket in the world. Its flight range is 625 km. This is one hundred kilometers greater than the range of the Tomahawk anti-ship modifications, almost three times the flight range of the main American Harpoon anti-ship missile, and approximately corresponds to the range of the F/A-18 carrier-based fighters. The Granit's marching speed is 660 meters per second, in the last part of the trajectory - a kilometer per second, which is three times the speed of the Harpoon and Tomahawk and twice the maximum speed of the F/A-18 fighter. “Granit” carries a warhead containing 500 kilograms of powerful explosives, the TNT equivalent of which, according to various sources, is from 1000 to 1500 kilograms. The power of the Granit warhead significantly exceeds the 454-kilogram TNT warhead Tomahawk and the 227-kilogram Harpoon. The power of "Granit" allows you to destroy any destroyer or cruiser with one hit. In addition, missiles of this type can be equipped with nuclear warheads, which do not require a direct hit to destroy a ship.

Breaking through the enemy's air defense "Granit" makes it easier to armor the warhead and important nodes, which reduces the likelihood of destruction of anti-ship missiles by a close explosion of an anti-aircraft missile, and low flight altitude. The Granit anti-ship missile system is a highly intelligent weapon capable of carrying out “collective” actions, countering enemy air defense and independently selecting the most important target. In the computer memory of missiles there are so-called “portraits” of radar for all ships, and information about all possible options orders. The missiles attack along the most rational trajectory, forming a combat order and exchanging information among themselves. A salvo of one Project 949A submarine contains 24 missiles, each of which also carries its own decoys to break through the missile defense system. 23 missiles fly low over the water, one rises higher, periodically turning on the radar to aim at targets. It determines the number of targets and distributes them among other missiles. If the “leader” is destroyed, the next missile takes its place. The largest target, that is, an aircraft carrier, is automatically identified by missiles in the order of ships. After a breakthrough, the missiles rank targets in order of importance to ultimately ensure the destruction of the aircraft carrier. First, the cover ships in the path of the missiles are destroyed, and then the aircraft carrier is struck. But there is one big BUT, the missile requires precise target designation until the seeker locks onto the target, and this targeting is achieved only with the help of aviation or spacecraft.

Conclusion: missiles are good, and they are much better than American ones, but unfortunately flying electronics and AUG fighters nullify this advantage.

Now consider the option with a submarine, the Project 949A Antey missile boat can, using its hydroacoustics, detect AUG noises at a distance of more than 100 miles, i.e. being in the far zone of the anti-submarine defense of an aircraft carrier group, where the likelihood of its detection and destruction is very low. The boat is armed with 24 P-700 Granit, respectively, the boat is already in a state of striking the AUG, since the Granit’s range is up to 625 km, and we remind you that it is 100 miles from the escorted aircraft carrier. But here again the problem arises of insufficient awareness, again we need a specific system for issuing target designation, which can be provided either from space or by aviation, and at the moment Russia, I repeat, does not have this, and what is available from aviation sources of target designation quickly will be destroyed by AUG fighters. Based on all of the above, “Antey” is an excellent machine, but it will not be able to classify, let alone determine, the battle formation of the enemy formation with the identification of the main order. To do this, it will be necessary to enter the middle anti-submarine defense zone of the group, where the probability of detection and, accordingly, destruction is already significant.

But that’s not all, in order to destroy an aircraft carrier, it is necessary to hit it with 8-10 Granit anti-ship missiles with conventional equipment. When missiles break through to an aircraft carrier, it is also necessary to destroy up to half of the escort ships. Taking into account air defense countermeasures, to guarantee the destruction of the AUG it is necessary to use 70-100 anti-ship missiles from all types of carriers in one strike.

Conclusion: one or even three submarines (Russia currently has only five of them afloat) will not be able to destroy the AUG alone; they can only work together with surface ships and aircraft. Which, again, in the current conditions of the state of the system for detecting and issuing information of the Russian Navy, is impossible. By the way, some refer to the miracle weapon, the Shkval missile-torpedo, which has no prospects for fighting a group of Americans, you just have to read its characteristics.

Coastal anti-ship missile systems can not be considered because the AUG will not approach the shore within the range of the anti-ship missiles.

All that remains is aviation: the Tu-22M, which can strike the X-22 anti-ship missile system against a group, and this is perhaps the most promising option for causing damage to the AUG, but out of the 150 Carcasses in service, only 40 can fly throughout Russia. Even if we assume that they all reach the enemy ships and strike, then this is only 40 missiles, which is clearly not enough to destroy an aircraft carrier with an escort. But if you reduce the range from 2000 km to 1500 km and hang two missiles on the “Tushki”, then again, you can take out the AUG only if all the planes and missiles break through to the enemy, which is again unlikely, the group’s air defense very much.

Based on all of the above, in the current situation of the Russian army, Leon Edward Panetta is most likely right that there is really not one country in the world that is unable to sink a US aircraft carrier strike group. With the possible exception of a massive air strike by Tu - 22 X-22 missiles with a nuclear warhead, but do not forget: the United States has more than one AUG, and the Russian Federation is capable of such a strike only once.

A swarm of missiles flies past the main target

Heavy anti-ship missiles (ASMs) have a number of important advantages that lighter and simpler missiles do not have. The balanced development of light and heavy anti-ship missiles will significantly increase the capabilities of our fleet in the fight against the most powerful formations of a potential enemy, primarily aircraft carriers.

Military-technical policy in this area has recently been focused on equipping combat surface ships, submarines and attack aircraft with relatively small-sized missiles. The development of complexes with heavy anti-ship missiles has been curtailed, although Basalt, Vulcan and Granit are still in service. Long-range aviation (and naval missile-carrying aviation if it is recreated, which is undoubtedly a necessary step) has the X-22 missile system as its main anti-ship weapon. However, all these systems are relatively outdated, as they were developed in the 60s and 70s. New heavy-class anti-ship missiles are not being created at present and are not expected in the future.

Among the recently adopted long-range anti-ship missile systems, Onyx has the greatest capabilities to destroy modern surface ships. Launch weight is about 3000 kilograms (with a transport and launch container - 3900 kg), warhead - about 200 kilograms. The homing head is capable of tracking cruiser-class surface targets at a distance of up to 75 kilometers and has two flight path options. The first is at high altitudes up to 14–15 thousand meters with a decrease to 3–10 meters in the target area. This achieves a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers. The second option involves flying on the march and in the target area at extremely low altitudes: from 3–10 meters in the target area to 10–15 meters on the march. However, the maximum firing range in this case is reduced to 120 kilometers. The missile's flight speed is supersonic - from 2.0 M on the cruising section to 2.5 M in the target area. When flying along a combined trajectory, the missile initially locks onto a target at a high altitude, after which it turns off the radar station and descends to extremely low altitudes. As a result, in the middle section the flight is carried out under the lower border of the air defense zone. Subsequently, after the anti-ship missile reaches the radio horizon range, the homing head (GOS) is turned on again, captures and tracks the target at which the missile is aimed. In this relatively short area (no more than 20–30 km), the supersonic speed of the Onyx makes it difficult to defeat it with short-range air defense systems, as well as to jam the homing head. This anti-ship missile system is universal and can be used from surface ships and submarines, as well as from aircraft and coastal missile launchers.

Another system belonging to long-range complexes is the Caliber family. These are subsonic missiles with a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers. The flight to the target is carried out at an extremely low altitude. The energy of the homing head makes it possible to auto-track cruiser-type targets at a distance of up to 65 kilometers. However, the actual range will be limited by the radio horizon (30 - maximum 40 km, depending on the size of the target and its height above the water surface). The missile warhead is about 400 kilograms. This universal system allows the use of missiles both from surface ships and submarines, and from coastal installations.

In addition to long-range missile systems, there are also short-range systems that can fire up to 50–130 kilometers. Of these, the most common is the RK X-35. This is a subsonic missile with a low-altitude trajectory (10–20 m), which, with a launch weight of 600 kilograms, has a warhead weighing about 150 kilograms.

Many small or few powerful

All these missile systems appeared in accordance with the concept of creating an inexpensive and high-density missile salvo - a kind of “missile swarm” that makes it possible to oversaturate the air defense system of a naval formation or an individual enemy ship and thereby guarantee its defeat with several missiles. It is believed that although the relatively small warhead of each missile is not capable of reliably disabling or destroying an enemy ship, the possibility of placing a large number of missiles on a carrier and using them in a salvo will make it possible to inflict the required damage on the target. Such missiles should be relatively simple, which ensures their low cost and, accordingly, reduces the cost of a salvo.

Previously, the development of anti-ship missiles, especially long-range ones, was based on a different concept. It was based on the idea of the possibility of destroying or incapacitating a large ship if even one missile hits it. Accordingly, its warhead should be quite powerful - 500–700 kilograms or more. This is exactly what distinguished the “Basalt”, “Vulcan”, “Granit” and the Soviet-designed X-22. It is clear that it is impossible to place a large number of large missiles on the carrier. Consequently, they are required to have high selectivity and additional capabilities to overcome the air defense of a ship's formation. This means that they need to be equipped with sufficiently powerful radar homing heads, allowing them to detect and track naval targets at a distance of 100 kilometers or more, and highly effective onboard recognition systems in order to highlight the main object in the enemy’s naval order. At the same time, the seeker must have high noise immunity, and the missile itself, if possible, must have its own electronic warfare systems to break through enemy air defenses. That is, the rockets are both heavy and expensive. “Basalt”, “Vulcan” and “Granite” have a starting weight from 6000 to 8000 kilograms and corresponding dimensions. But their firing range significantly exceeds that of the newest “Onyx” and “Caliber”, ranging from 500 kilometers for “Basalt” and “Granite” to 700 kilometers for “Vulcan”.

So is the concept of a heavy, powerful, and therefore large and expensive anti-ship missile outdated? Or is it premature to abandon the development of this direction?

Advantages and disadvantages

Undoubtedly, the strength of the “missile swarm” concept is the ability to place a large number of missiles on one carrier (even relatively small ones). This significantly increases the flexibility of use: it allows you to create a reserve, more rationally distribute work among targets, and avoid allocating excessive destructive potential to weakly protected objects.

When modern ships are equipped with powerful multi-channel air defense systems, the “missile swarm” concept provides a high-density salvo that is guaranteed to overcome the air defense systems of even heavily protected formations, such as American carrier battle groups.

The low cost of such weapons allows them to be produced in large quantities, create in a short time sufficient reserves for combat operations. Another advantage is the simplicity of both the missiles themselves and the complex as a whole. This promotes universalization and allows the complexes to be placed on ships of all main classes and even on civilian ships in the event of their mobilization. The strike capabilities of the fleet are significantly increasing.

The weaknesses of the “missile swarm” concept include, first of all, the fact that strict weight and size restrictions exclude the placement on missiles of powerful radars and other systems, in particular electronic reconnaissance, high-performance on-board computers, which would allow the main target to be identified as accurately as possible. At a maximum range of 300 kilometers, the Onyx will fly for about 10 minutes, the Caliber - more than 20 minutes. Target distribution is carried out on board the carrier based on data received from external sources. After launch, correction of the flight mission is impossible. With a relatively high probability, the enemy will identify preparations for a strike and the moment of the salvo based on indirect and direct signs. During the missiles' flight time, the enemy's naval formation will be able to rearrange the order and create a jamming environment. Targeting the main target will be significantly more difficult - the missiles will be distributed among all ships.

The short target acquisition range of low-altitude and low-speed anti-ship missiles creates the danger of the target leaving the viewing range of their homing head (GOS) when firing at extreme distances. It is for this reason that American Tomahawks provide the ability to additionally search for a target by moving along a snake in the area of its intended location when firing at maximum range, when target designation is given with low accuracy. A salvo of “Caliber” missiles, when fired at maximum range in conditions of enemy movement in a tactical zigzag and when issuing target designation from sources with low accuracy in determining the target location, can with a relatively high probability (up to 0.2–0.4) miss the designated target.

The warhead weighing about 200 kilograms is capable of reliably disabling ships of no higher than the frigate class. It will take at least three or four hits to destroy the cruiser. This is evidenced by the experience of World War II (to sink a ship of this class, an average of three to four hits from 250 kg aerial bombs were required). The death of the destroyer Sheffield from being hit by an Exocet anti-ship missile during the Falkland Islands War is atypical and indicates rather the ineffectiveness of the crew’s struggle for survivability rather than the power of the missile’s warhead, which did not even explode: the fire caused by the missile’s engine could not be extinguished. To disable an American aircraft carrier, such missiles will require significantly more – 10–15. This is due to the fact that the zone of destruction from the explosion by the warhead is relatively small and does not allow the vital parts of a large ship to be reliably hit. Its failure or death will follow not so much from the explosion of missile warheads itself, but from subsequent secondary destruction, which in turn is countered by a highly effective system for combating the survivability of a modern aircraft carrier.

Finally, a target acquisition range of 75–80 kilometers, achieved at high missile altitudes, will not help to avoid being hit by the air defense system of modern ships, whose anti-aircraft fire weapons (AAF) can hit similar air targets at a distance of up to 120–180 kilometers or more. This means that the salvo’s missiles will be destroyed at the most vulnerable part of the trajectory.

These disadvantages are absent in severe RCC. Among their main strengths is, first of all, the ability to place powerful, highly efficient radio-electronic equipment (RES) on board. With a target acquisition range of more than 100–120 kilometers, the possibility of an enemy order going beyond the viewing range of the seeker of salvo missiles is virtually eliminated, even with low target designation accuracy.

Less stringent weight and size restrictions make it possible to place on them a seeker with a target acquisition range that exceeds the capabilities of existing and future anti-aircraft missile systems (AAMS), that is, 150–200 kilometers, and thereby avoid destruction at the high altitude part of the flight path. This also allows for the placement of our own active electronic warfare systems on heavy anti-ship missiles, which ensure a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense system. In this case, information exchange between salvo missiles is possible, as well as further automatic selection of their combat order, optimal from the point of view of overcoming air defense. We are talking about actively countering enemy electronic missiles and radically increasing the reliability of missiles firing a salvo at the main target in automatic mode. Thus, heavy anti-ship missiles have a significantly higher selectivity of hitting designated targets than light-class missiles.

Low requirements for the target designation system create favorable conditions for the development of especially long-range anti-ship missile systems - 1000–1200 kilometers or more, which allows them to be taken beyond the effective range of carrier-based aircraft and anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier groups and formations. Accordingly, the combat stability of carriers of such weapons increases. Reducing the requirements for the target designation system is very important for the Russian Navy, especially in areas of the far sea and ocean zones.

The warhead of heavy anti-ship missiles, weighing more than 700–800 kilograms, is guaranteed to penetrate the structural protection system and ensure the destruction of vital elements deep in the hull of the largest warships. This means that it would take two or three or four or five such missiles to disable or sink an aircraft carrier.

Disadvantages include high cost, limited on-board carrier kit and, as a consequence, the difficulty of creating a high-density salvo.

Develop both classes

Analysis of strengths and weaknesses two conceptual approaches to the development of anti-ship weapons gives reason to say that they are complementary. The disadvantages of one become strengths another. Thus, the low selectivity of light anti-ship missiles (in conditions of a limited target designation system) combined with the ability to create a high-density salvo allows one to count on a significant weakening of the air defense system of an enemy naval formation. At the same time, the relatively small destructive power of the warheads of such missiles is quite consistent with the targets of attack - cruisers, destroyers and frigates from the escort of the main forces.

After the enemy’s air defense system has been weakened, when a high-density salvo is no longer required, but reliable, with a high degree of selectivity, destruction of the main ships of the order is necessary, heavy anti-ship missiles come into play, which can solve the problem of disabling or destroying core ships, in particular aircraft carriers.

That is, the feasibility of the integrated use of different classes of anti-ship weapons is visible, which will significantly increase their effectiveness compared to the use of any one class.

The concept of heavy anti-ship missiles was abandoned too early. It makes sense not to rely only on the light class and return to work on heavy-type anti-ship missile weapons. The balanced development of both directions will significantly increase the capabilities of our fleet in the fight against the most powerful naval formations of a potential enemy, primarily aircraft carriers.

...The Americans still managed to put into operation their last remaining AUG in the North Atlantic, which threatened considerable losses to our merchant fleet with its outdated weapons. At this time, the flagship of the Northern Fleet, the battleship Invulnerable (captured modernized Zamvolt) was deeply bogged down in supporting the landing on the Yucatan Peninsula. Autonomous artillery modules were forced to separate from the ship and accompany the landing by land - the resistance of the Nicaraguan contras was so intense. The capacitors of the laser battery had already begun to discharge: no one expected that its installations would have to single-handedly shoot down the entire NATO satellite constellation and repel countless drone attacks.

...In the current situation, Admiral Ivanov gave the go-ahead for the separation of the missile module for a strike on the US AUG. The decision turned out to be justified: in a couple of hours the ekranoplan was able to cross the ocean and reach attack range. A massive missile strike from hypersonic “Flails” almost completely sunk the Sixth Fleet of the “probable enemy.” However, what happened already smacked of an international scandal.

After the modules returned to the ship, “Invulnerable” made an emergency launch of the nuclear propulsion system and an hour later reached the geostationary station. There, having refueled from the Yuri Gagarin station, the battleship headed for the Lagrange point, to connect with the 2nd Strategic Tank Army, which had long been hiding in the Kordylevsky clouds from the telescopes of the Hague Tribunal...

Based on the dispute on alternahistory.ru.

X-47B drone on the deck of the aircraft carrier "Harry Truman"

This funny opus is a response to two other articles devoted to methods of combating American aircraft carriers. The author of the article “The bitter truth about the instant strike of the AUG” is full of optimism - everything that floats will someday drown, we will shoot everyone at once, the sea is ours. His opponent (the article “Is the Russian fleet capable of fighting US aircraft carriers?”) gives a more balanced assessment of the events, rightly pointing out the obvious difficulties in the fight against such a mobile and combat-ready squadron as the AUG of the US Navy.

Dear Yu. Nikiforov and S. Linnik, why was it necessary to ask the obvious question again? After all, everything is already obvious. The naval power of the United States surpasses the navies of all other countries in the world combined. There, the number of aircraft carriers alone exceeds the number of all carriers of long-range anti-ship missiles in the domestic fleet (nuclear-powered Orlans, Atlant-class missiles and SSGNs of Project 949A). We have only 4 ships capable of providing zonal air defense for a squadron; the Yankees have 84 such ships (cruisers and destroyers with long-range anti-aircraft systems). Moreover, the American fleet has a multinational format - dozens of technically developed allied countries with their own bases and ships, ready at any time to strengthen the fleet of their overlord. Fighting such a force with the help of a handful of rusty submarines and cruisers from the Cold War era is completely unacceptable, useless, and in fact no one needs it.

On board TARKR "Peter the Great"

If we talk only about AUGs, then the point is not only in their quantity, but also in their quality. The Yankees managed to create a balanced squadron (aviation, air defense and anti-aircraft defense, submarine forces), practically invulnerable on the high seas. It is extremely difficult to detect and track. It does not approach close to the shore, continuously changing its position at a speed of 500 miles per day. The reconnaissance aircraft sent to search for her would inevitably be intercepted by combat air patrols patrolling at a distance of a hundred miles from the main AUG warrant.

Tu-95RTs escorted by Phantoms

The well-known space “Legend” (marine reconnaissance satellites), even in its heyday, was only a technically beautiful experiment that showed the incredible depth and complexity of this problem. Even leaving out the scary technical aspects of Legend-M (satellites with a nuclear reactor), it is worth noting that a low-orbit satellite flies in a circular orbit, making one revolution around the Earth in just over 80 minutes. However, having completed one revolution, the satellite will already be over a completely different area of the planet, thousands of kilometers away from the place over which it flew for the first time. The Earth has its own rotation - as a result, the satellite has a complex motion in relation to an observer on Earth, and its trajectory resembles a zigzag on the oscilloscope screen. To be able to inspect any given area of the World Ocean with proper regularity (at least once an hour), a hell of a lot of space reconnaissance would be required; the creation and operation of such a system is pure fantasy.

The only one who has a chance to detect the AUG and strike without wasting time is a submarine, which, by chance, finds itself in the path of the aircraft carrier group. However, taking into account the fact that the number of combat-ready multi-purpose nuclear submarines in the Russian Navy is currently less than the number of aircraft carrier groups of the “probable enemy”, the theory of probability gives a meager forecast for their meeting in the vast ocean. It is worth noting that the AUG moves quickly, and the boat is constrained in maneuver. An attempt to give full speed, catch up with the squadron and take an advantageous position for an attack is associated with the risk of loss of stealth and failure of the attack/destruction of the submarine. The AUG includes at least 4-5 surface ships with powerful hydroacoustic stations and RUM-139 ASROC-VL missile torpedoes, not counting multi-purpose nuclear submarines covering the aircraft carrier from under water. Anti-submarine “turntables” are actively used (a couple of dozen per squadron), while the aircraft carrier does not disdain assistance from base aviation. “Orions” and “Poseidons” (marine patrol/anti-submarine aircraft based on civil airliners) are constantly prowling the AUG heading angles.

As a result, the AUG can continuously evade contact with the enemy, at the same time, thanks to the presence of " long arm”, counterattacking enemy ships trying to approach the squadron within the launch range of their missiles (or at least detect the approximate location of the AUG).

What can be countered to such a threat? Equip and send your own AUG to search for her - two “Elusive Joes” will run after each other across the ocean, periodically getting involved in air battles. Someday, one of the sides will be lucky: a coordinated attack will take the enemy by surprise, the planes will break through and destroy the enemy order (the battle in the Coral Sea, Midway - distant echoes from the past).

The Legend of Elusive Joe

The facts from the first part of the article can make you feel despondent, but you shouldn’t despair!

The last carrier-based aircraft carrying nuclear weapons (A-5 Vigilante) was removed from service by the Yankees in 1963. The reason was the emergence of a much more reliable and efficient system - submarines with ballistic missiles. Since then, the Yankees have never experimented with nuclear weapons on board their aircraft carriers, giving them the role of a naval tactical system for dominance at sea in the event of a non-nuclear version of World War III. The world war did not happen; as a result, the “air waffles” wandered aimlessly across the oceans, periodically trying to participate in local conflicts. Where they were of little use - in the air everything was decided by Air Force aviation.

The aircraft carrier is invulnerable in the open ocean, but its strength rapidly decreases as it approaches the shore. Hawkeyes and Super Hornets face competition from shore-based fighters, whose performance characteristics are head and shoulders above those of carrier-based aircraft. What can a small Hawkeye AWACS aircraft do against an E-3 Sentry or a domestic AWACS A-50U, where the weight of one equipment and antenna exceeds the max. take-off weight of the Hawkeye! It is equally ridiculous to compare the combat load of the Super Hornet (when taking off from a catapult) with some land monster like the Su-34 or F-15E.

The same problem with quantity - even the largest aircraft carrier can simultaneously carry no more than four dozen combat aircraft. While on the shore they are waiting for an aviation group consisting of many dozens, if not hundreds of units of first-class aircraft.

The fact that the air forces of most countries have fewer combat aircraft than one American aircraft carrier is a problem for the air forces of these very countries. There is aviation - there are no problems with aircraft carriers. The Falkend epic (1982) clearly showed how cruelly the squadron was “ragged” by shore-based aviation (despite the fact that the Argentine clowns had 6 anti-ship missiles for the entire theater of operations, a single tanker aircraft, and a passenger Boeing flew for reconnaissance).

The third problem is geography. American AUGs are not capable of directly threatening Russia, because all important cities and industrial centers are located in the depths of the coast, and it’s easier and closer to fly to Crimea from the Turkish Incirlik airbase than to drive an aircraft carrier into the Black Sea. AUGs have nothing to do in the “marquise puddles” of the Baltic or Black Sea. On the other hand, continental Russia has no strategic interests in the oceans; we have never depended on sea communications. Even during the most difficult years of the Second World War, it didn’t make much difference to us how the battles took place in the vast Atlantic. There was nothing we could do to help the allies. And the sea - a boundless blue-green expanse - is still nobody's land.

Modern nuclear aircraft carriers could be justified in a serious non-nuclear conflict of the “USSR vs. USA” format, when the Yankees would need to transfer reinforcements across the ocean to Europe, fighting off Soviet submarines and aircraft attacking from all sides. In this case, AUGs could play their role - their combat stability is truly enviable. Alas (or rather, fortunately) such stories are just plots for books in the alternative history genre.

The AUG is invulnerable while it wanders aimlessly across the ocean. But its strength in real operations is expressed in symbolic percentages. The result of all the searches - from ordinary discussions on the Internet to serious scientific research in the field of marine, rocket and space technology - was the understanding of a simple fact: there is no need to catch “Elusive Joe” in the vast expanses of the sea, uselessly wasting trillions of full-fledged rubles. If there is a real use of the AUG, “Elusive Joe” will come on his own and immediately get hit in the face by coastal aviation and air defense systems (as happened in Lebanon in 1983).

SSGN pr. 949A, armed with Granit anti-ship missiles. Currently, the Russian Navy has 4 operational boats of this type. 4 more boats are being repaired

Once, while still US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta said: “Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers in the world.”

The photo shows the US Navy Carrier Strike Group, at the moment, this is the most effective intimidation tool in the world, after nuclear weapons.

Once, while still the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta said: “Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers in the world.”

Let's look into this issue (it's interesting - it's true).

Begin:

A typical US AUG is a group consisting of:

The flagship aircraft-carrying ship of the group with a nuclear power plant of the Nimitz type (or Enterprise) with a carrier-based aviation regiment based on it (60-80 aircraft). According to usual practice, an aircraft carrier, as well as a carrier-based aviation regiment of a group, are separate military units of naval aviation and are under the command of naval aviation officers with the rank of U.S. Naval aviation Captain.

The air defense division of the group is 1-2 Ticonderoga-type missile defense systems. The basic armament complex of the missile cruiser division includes the Standart air defense missile launcher (SM-2, SM-3), and the sea-based Tomahawk missile cruiser. All Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers are equipped with the Aegis naval weapon control and missile firing complex ( AEGIS). Each of the division's cruisers is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Captain.

The group's anti-submarine warfare division is 3-4 EM URO of the Arleigh Burke type with depth charges and torpedoes to combat submarines, as well as (some of the ships) with Tomahawk missile launchers on board. The commander of an ASW division is a Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Captain, while each of the division's destroyers is under the command of a U.S. Navy officer with the rank of U.S. Navy Commander.

Multi-purpose submarine division - 1-2 Los Angeles-type submarines with torpedo armament and Tomahawk cruise missiles (launched through the TA boats) on board with the tasks of both PLO groupings and strikes against coastal (surface) targets.

Supply vessel division - 1-2 Sepla type transports, ammunition transports, tankers, other auxiliary ships

Naval air force - up to 60 US Navy aviation aircraft, consolidated into attack aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft, anti-aircraft warfare aircraft, military air force, etc. The Navy air force is a separate military unit of the US Navy aviation. The Navy OAP, like the AVMA, is under the command of a Navy aviation officer with the rank of Captain 1st Rank, or a US Marine Corps aviation officer with the rank of Colonel (USMC Colonel).

For reference:

So what can we oppose to such impressive power? Unfortunately, Russia does not have the resources to compete with the United States on equal terms in terms of the number of ships. In terms of aircraft carriers, the US advantage is overwhelming, now the Americans have 10 aircraft carriers, we have one aircraft-carrying cruiser, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, which can be qualified as a light aircraft carrier, but unfortunately, actually without aircraft. There are ten Su-33s in service out of the planned twenty-five, which they already want to replace with the MiG-29K. In 2013, in addition to the existing “dryers”, two MiGs were added. The situation with escort ships is also not the best.

The Russian Armed Forces see it in missile weapons, specifically in anti-ship missiles. Those. in the effective delivery of a conventional or nuclear charge directly to AUG ships.

First, I suggest you familiarize yourself with the carriers of anti-ship missiles:

1. Project 1164 missile cruiser:

2. Project 949A submarine “Antey”

In July 2011, a tripartite agreement was reached between Russia, the United States and Italy on the dismantlement of the Krasnodar nuclear submarine.
According to it, the United States is allocating funds for the transportation of unloaded spent nuclear fuel to the Mayak Production Association. Russia is financing all preparatory and final work related to the dismantling of the Krasnodar nuclear submarine.

The dismantling of the submarine is financed by Rosatom and Italian company Sojin, which allocated over five million euros within the framework of the international Global Partnership program to dismantle the nuclear cruiser.

3. Project 1144 heavy missile cruiser

Launch of the "Granit" missile from the missile cruiser "Peter the Great" pr.1144.2

4. Project 1143.5 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser

Launchers SM-233A anti-ship missile "Granit" on TAKR pr.1143.5 ("Arsenal", No. 1 / 2008)

Please note that on the deck of the Kuznetsov there are all the aircraft that are available, although according to the plan, it should look no less filled than American aircraft carriers, although it is smaller - let’s compare:

There are also small missile ships, aircraft and coastal missile systems.

Let's consider the option of attacking AUGs by surface ships of the Russian Navy in the world's oceans:

Unfortunately, the detection capabilities of Russian ships are actually limited by the radio horizon; the helicopters on board the ships are of little use for solving this problem, due to the small number of these machines and their short range. They can be effectively used only in the interests of issuing target designation for missile weapons, but before that the enemy must still be detected.

Of course, when missile cruisers were created, i.e. under the Soviet navy, their activities were to be carried out with the support of a naval reconnaissance system in the ocean theater.

It relied on a developed system of radio-technical intelligence, the basis of which was ground-based centers located not only on the territory of the USSR, but also in other states.

Radio interception post of the 16th Directorate at the GRU base in Lourdes, Cuba.
The post, called "Termite P", began operating in December 1976 and was equipped with a 12-meter stationary parabolic antenna and a 7-meter mobile parabolic antenna mounted on an open truck. They made it possible to intercept messages in the microwave range transmitted from American satellites, as well as monitor negotiations between microwave communication towers. Later, the same posts were equipped at the Cam Ranh military base (Vietnam) and in South Yemen. On October 16, 2001, Moscow unexpectedly notified Havana of its intention to close the electronic intelligence center located in Lourdes. The next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting at the Russian Ministry of Defense, confirmed this decision, adding that the Russian Navy base in Cam Ranh (Vietnam) and the electronic intelligence post located there would also be liquidated.

There was also effective space naval reconnaissance, which made it possible to detect and monitor naval formations of a potential enemy, and provide target designation for missile weapons throughout almost the entire territory of the World Ocean.

In the late 70s, the USSR created the Legend naval space reconnaissance and target designation system, which could point a missile at any ship in the World Ocean.
In 1982, the unified system was tested in action.

During the Falklands War, data from space satellites allowed the command of the Soviet Navy to monitor the operational-tactical situation in the South Atlantic, accurately calculate the actions of the British fleet, and even predict with an accuracy of several hours the time and place of the landing of the British landing force in the Falklands. The orbital grouping, together with the ship's information receiving points, ensured the detection of ships and the issuance of target designation for missile weapons.

Due to the fact that high-resolution optical technologies were not available at that time, these satellites had to be launched into a very low orbit (400 km) and powered by the BES-5 Buk nuclear reactor, with a thermal power of 100 kW ( electric power– 3 kW, estimated operating time – 1080 hours.

The complexity of the energy scheme predetermined the fate of the entire program - in 1993, “Legend” ceased to “cover” even half of the maritime strategic directions, and in 1998 the last device ceased service.

Russia at the current moment in time does not have all this. In 2006, they began to revive the system, but it is still very, very far from completion.

Currently part of the space group Russian Federation There are only passive signals intelligence satellites US-P. The last of them, Kosmos-2421, was launched on June 25, 2006, and was unsuccessful. According to official information, minor problems occurred on board due to incomplete deployment of the solar panels.

Therefore, the AUG will see our ships long before it itself is detected. The group constantly provides air control to a depth of 800 km, with the help of Grumman_E-2_Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, we will be attacked by 48 aircraft, of which 25 will carry the GARPUN anti-aircraft missile system, and electronic warfare will be provided by almost 8 Boeing_EA-18_Growler.

It is impossible to fight off the cruisers with their air defense, and even the Kuznetsov with a dozen aircraft.

We will not be allowed to use the main weapon in the fight against AUG, namely the P-1000 Vulcan, a range of 550 km and the P-700 Granit, a range of up to 625 km, as you can see, we will not be able to aim these missiles, even at launch range, it is extremely unlikely that let's come.

But if, by some miracle, we still shot down the enemy planes. There will be a duel of anti-ship missiles, and a fight between electronics; if in anti-ship missiles we are superior to the Americans, then in electronic warfare there is again almost no chance. At best, our anti-ship missiles, some of which will pass the AUG missile defense system, will be able to damage the aircraft carrier and, in extreme cases, sink several ships of the group, but all this based on the above, unfortunately from the realm of science fiction.

Also, a strike on the AUG with nuclear weapons is also unlikely, again due to the fact that we simply will not have time to strike, since we will be discovered first.

Abroad, not a single anti-ship missile system has been created that is equal in size and combat capabilities to the 7-ton Granit! The only American anti-ship missile "Harpoon" has a 10 times smaller launch weight - only about 700 kg, and as a result - a warhead 3 times smaller in mass, 2 times less speed and 5 times less range. The French Exocet had even more modest characteristics. Perhaps someone will remember the Israeli anti-ship missile "Gabriel" or the Chinese S-802 missile - all of them are subsonic missiles with warheads that are rather weak in power and a launch weight in the range of 600-700 kg. topwar.ru/23526-demony-treh...

The Granit's marching speed is 660 meters per second, in the last part of the trajectory - a kilometer per second, which is three times the speed of the Harpoon and Tomahawk and twice the maximum speed of the F/A-18 fighter. “Granit” carries a warhead containing 500 kilograms of powerful explosives, the TNT equivalent of which, according to various sources, is from 1000 to 1500 kilograms.

The power of the Granit warhead significantly exceeds the 454-kilogram TNT warhead Tomahawk and the 227-kilogram Harpoon. The power of "Granit" allows you to destroy any destroyer or cruiser with one hit. In addition, missiles of this type can be equipped with nuclear warheads, which do not require a direct hit to destroy a ship. Breaking through the enemy's air defense "Granit" is facilitated by the armoring of the warhead and important components, which reduces the likelihood of the destruction of anti-ship missiles by a close detonation of an anti-aircraft missile, and the low flight altitude.

The Granit anti-ship missile system is a highly intelligent weapon capable of carrying out “collective” actions, countering enemy air defense and independently selecting the most important target. In the computer memory of the missiles there are so-called “portraits” of radar for all ships, and information about all possible variants of orders is also stored.

The missiles attack along the most rational trajectory, forming a combat order and exchanging information among themselves. A salvo of one Project 949A submarine contains 24 missiles, each of which also carries its own decoys to break through the missile defense system. 23 missiles fly low over the water, one rises higher, periodically turning on the radar to aim at targets. It determines the number of targets and distributes them among other missiles. If the “leader” is destroyed, the next missile takes its place.

The largest target, that is, an aircraft carrier, is automatically identified by missiles in the order of ships. After a breakthrough, the missiles rank targets in order of importance to ultimately ensure the destruction of the aircraft carrier. First, the cover ships in the path of the missiles are destroyed, and then the aircraft carrier is struck. But there is one big BUT, the missile requires precise target designation until the seeker locks onto the target, and this targeting is achieved only with the help of aviation or spacecraft.

Conclusion: missiles are good, and we have them much better than American ones, but unfortunately flying electronics and AUG fighters reduce this advantage to nothing.

The boat is armed with 24 P-700 Granit, respectively, the boat is already in a state of striking the AUG, since the Granit’s range is up to 625 km, and we remind you that it is 100 miles from the escorted aircraft carrier. But here again the problem arises of insufficient awareness, again we need a specific system for issuing target designation, which can be provided either from space or by aviation, and at the moment Russia, I repeat, does not have this, and what is available from aviation sources of target designation quickly will be destroyed by AUG fighters.

Based on all of the above, “Antey” is an excellent machine, but it will not be able to classify, let alone determine, the battle formation of the enemy formation with the identification of the main order. To do this, it will be necessary to enter the middle anti-submarine defense zone of the group, where the probability of detection and, accordingly, destruction is already significant.

Conclusion: one or even three submarines (Russia currently has only five of them afloat: K-132 Irkutsk, K-119 Voronezh, K-410 Smolensk, K-456 Tver, K- 186 "Omsk"), will not be able to destroy the AUG alone; they can only work together with surface ships and aircraft. Which, again, in the current conditions of the state of the system for detecting and issuing information of the Russian Navy, is impossible. By the way, some refer to the miracle weapon, the Shkval missile-torpedo, which has no prospects for fighting a group of Americans, you just have to read its characteristics.

Coastal anti-ship missile systems can not be considered because the AUG will not approach the shore within the range of the anti-ship missiles.

Based on all of the above, in the current situation of the Russian army, Leon Edward Panetta is most likely right that there is really not one country in the world that is unable to sink a US aircraft carrier strike group. With the possible exception of a massive air strike by Tu - 22 X-22 missiles, with a nuclear warhead, but do not forget: the United States has more than one AUG, and we are capable of such a strike only once.

Therefore, for Russia, it is extremely important to develop all kinds of tracking, target designation and electronic warfare systems. Because we have the power to strike, but unfortunately we cannot hit and/or hit.

The launcher and warhead of the Granit complex missile on the Kursk SSGN after lifting, the ZM-45 missile is fixed with polyurethane. A total of 16 missiles out of 23 were unloaded (including 1 training missile, another training missile was launched shortly before the accident), the remaining launchers with missiles are filled with polyurethane and are subject to disposal at the Nerpa shipyard along with the remains of the SSGN.

I decided to consider an issue that has long been widely discussed on the Internet: the confrontation between Soviet anti-ship missiles and American naval air defense systems. They are usually compared using the example of the P-700 "Granit" and the AEGIS system. Unfortunately, discussions of this kind are usually held on forums, have the nature of a debate, and isolating the information itself is a clear problem.

Therefore, I decided to conduct an analytical review (within the framework of the information available, of course) and make a compilation of conclusions:

The weapon of attack, in this case, is the P-700 "Granit". The missile is truly impressive - it is almost the crowning achievement of the development of the Soviet line of heavy supersonic ship-based anti-ship missiles. Its length is 10 meters, its wingspan is 2.6 meters, i.e. The dimensions of the rocket are close to that of light aircraft.

The maximum speed of the rocket is almost 2.5 Mach (about 763 meters per second) when flying at high altitude. Over water, the rocket's speed is approximately 1.5 Mach (about 458 meters per second). Let's remember these numbers, they matter.

The defense is based on the AEGIS system: a combat information system that coordinates the actions of AN/SPY-1 general detection radars, AN/SPG-62 target designation radars, and SM-2 missile defense systems.

AEGIS defense on the outer border

This part discusses counteraction to flying Granites by AEGIS at long range. To be even more precise - at the distance at which "Granit" is kept on the high-altitude section of the trajectory.

Attention, this is important! Although in all sources the range of action of the Granit is simply stated as 550 km, this is the maximum radius along the combined trajectory. Those. along a trajectory in which the rocket most along the way, it flies high above the water - where there is less air resistance and fuel costs for flight are significantly reduced - and then, when approaching the target, it dives down and covers the rest of the distance at a low altitude.

A: The flight altitude of the P-700 "Granit" in the high-altitude section of the trajectory is about 14,000 meters. A number of sources indicate even more, but they are doubtful. The later "Onyx", in any case, climbs to a height of about 14,000 meters in the high-altitude section of the trajectory, so I think that by taking 14,000 meters we will not be mistaken.

Taking into account the altitude of the AN/SPY-1 radar above sea level at 20 meters, and the rocket’s flight altitude at 14,000 km, we get a distance to the radio horizon of about 438 km. The detection radius of the AN/SPY-1 radar (tabular) is approximately 360 km. Those. you can be sure that AEGIS will be able to monitor approaching Granites from a distance of more than 250 km.

P.S. It should be taken into account that, other things being equal, most likely, a missile salvo will be detected by an AWACS aircraft at a greater distance. Those. the figure of 250 km is not the detection radius, but the tracking radius, the distance from which AEGIS itself monitors approaching anti-ship missiles.

B: Now we know that the missile will be tracked by the AEGIS system somewhere at a distance of 200-250 km. Go ahead.

The Granit missile's radar has a detection radius for a cruiser-sized target of about 70 km under normal conditions. Considering that the cruiser does not at all want to be discovered and is actively using electronic warfare, let’s take the actual capture radius to be 55 km.

At this distance - 55-70 km - the Granit missile will capture the ship and make a “dive” from a height of 14,000 meters to low altitudes to get closer to the target. Those. we get that 200-55=145 km. This is the interval during which a Granit flying at high altitude will be confidently accompanied by the cruiser's radar. And, accordingly, it can be attacked by missile defense systems controlled by AEGIS.

This is the finest hour for the SM-2ER "Standard" carriers (ER - extendent range, large radius). The range of these missiles is about 150-180 km. Consequently, missile attacks on flying anti-ship missiles can begin from the moment the missiles enter a 150-kilometer radius.

How long will Granit remain under fire from the cruiser's missile defense system? The distance is 150-55=105 km, the speed of "Granit" is 0.763 km/s, i.e. the missile will remain under fire for about 125 seconds. A little over 2 minutes.

During this time, a ship equipped with the AEGIS system will be able to fire from 50 missile shots (for 2 double-boom Mk-26 launchers with a reload cycle of 10 seconds, which were installed on the first 4 Ticonderoga-class cruisers) to 65 missile shots (for Mk-41 with a firing cycle of 1 missile per 2 seconds, found on the late Ticonderogas and Arleigh Berks). Although the ships carry a limited number of AN/SPG-62 radars used for target designation, this is not a limiting parameter in this case, because the design of the Standard allows it to “wait” in line, flying on inertial guidance to the target area.

What is the probability of one Granit being shot down by one Standard? The 62-kilogram fragmentation-fragmentation SM-2ER has quite enough power to destroy or severely damage the Granit (which at this stage of the flight is equivalent to being shot down - a heavily damaged missile will not reach the target). Therefore, the only problem is getting there.

How to estimate the probability of being hit by a missile? From the experience of Vietnam, we know that the probability of hitting a fighter under conditions of active use of electronic warfare equipment by one missile was about 20%. But the SM-2ER is still somewhat smarter than the radio command air defense systems used in Vietnam, and the electronic warfare capabilities of an unmanned missile are much weaker. For simplicity, let’s take a probability of 40% as the probability of one P-700 being shot down by one “Standard”

Taking this figure, we get that about 15-22 missiles can be shot down at the outer line. Already some result.

AEGIS defense on the internal frontier

At a distance of 55 km, the P-500 missile will make a sharp dive down and exit the vulnerable mode. It will go beyond the radio horizon and out of the visibility radius of AEGIS radars. Moving at an altitude of about 20 meters, it flies to the target in low-altitude mode, at a speed of about 1.5 Mach.

How soon will the P-700 reappear over the AEGIS radio horizon? This distance is approximately 30 km. At a speed of 1.5 Mach or 458 meters per second, the P-700 will fly this distance in 65 seconds, i.e. about a minute.

At this distance, the missile will be fired by SM-2MR salvoes (MR - medium radius). Since in this case the missile is NOT VISIBLE until it leaves the radio horizon, AEGIS cannot open fire in advance by launching inertial-guided missiles in its direction and “meet” the approaching P-700 at the maximum radius of the missile defense system.

Assuming that the system is completely ready to fire, we get that AEGIS will open fire at the same moment when it notices the P-700 emerging from behind the radio horizon. Considering that the SM-2MR has a speed of about 3.5 Mach (about 1000 m/s), the first salvo of missiles will meet the enemy somewhere in the 20th second of the P-700’s flight from the radio horizon, and then the anti-ship missiles will be continuously fired upon for 25 seconds (until they get within 5 km, within a radius beyond the reach of the SM-2MR)

How many salvos will AEGIS have time to fire? Ships with Mk-26 installations will have time to fire two full salvos (i.e., launch 8 anti-ship missiles), ships with Mk-41 will have time to launch 12 anti-ship missiles.

Of course, the probability of a hit will be much lower - against a low-flying target - and, according to calculations, will be somewhere around 25%.

Thus, we get that about 2-3 P-700 anti-ship missiles can be shot down in a low-altitude area.

Defense close

Defense options in this phase are limited. For ships with Mk-26 at this stage, the only adequate means of self-defense is a universal 127-mm autocannon (2 on Ticonderoga). The probability of a missile being shot down is estimated to be approximately 0.8 per autocannon. Ships with the Mk-41 can add RIM-7VL "Sea Sparrow" short-range missiles to their autocannons. CIWS "Vulcan" should be considered generally of little use in this case.

Although formally these air defense systems have a radius of up to 25 km, previously there was no particular point in firing them, because this would only take away guidance channels from the more effective SM-2MR. At point blank range, however, they are much more effective. Considering that the number of targetable "Sea Sparrows", just like the SM-2MR, is limited by guidance channels - i.e. 4 - in the remaining time, the cruiser manages to fire about 8 missiles. The probability of a hit should be considered similar - 0.25.

Thus, using autocannons and missiles, the Ticonderoga class can stop up to 4 P-700 class missiles on the internal line.

Electronic warfare equipment:

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of electronic warfare systems. Typically, Ticonderoga-class ships are equipped with an AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system integrated with Mark 36 SRBOC jamming systems. The effectiveness of the system is difficult to assess. But in general, we can assume that against an anti-ship missile like the P-700, the probability of a missile successfully evading a false target will be no more than 50%.

The capabilities of the AEGIS system to counter the P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles are quite high. On 3 lines of defense, the cruiser can effectively repel an attack of 19-25 missiles. The presence of effective electronic warfare means can dramatically increase this parameter, since there is a high probability of the missile being diverted by interference.

In general, the theoretical calculation confirms the Soviet conclusion that the effectiveness of AUG shipborne air defense has increased significantly with the advent of AEGIS. A full broadside salvo of a Project 949A submarine (24 P-700 missiles) DOES NOT GUARANTEE a breakthrough of the AUG’s air defense even at the level of having only one Ticonderoga in it and the absence of successful interceptions of anti-ship missiles by patrolling fighters.

Military-technical policy in this area has recently been focused on equipping combat surface ships, submarines and attack aircraft with relatively small-sized missile weapons. The development of complexes with heavy anti-ship missiles has been curtailed, although Basalt, Vulcan and Granit are still in service. Long-range aviation (and naval missile-carrying aviation if it is recreated, which is undoubtedly a necessary step) has the X-22 missile system as its main anti-ship weapon.

However, all these systems are relatively outdated, as they were developed in the 60s and 70s. New heavy-class anti-ship missiles are not being created at present and are not expected in the future.

Among the recently adopted long-range anti-ship missile systems, the greatest capability of destroying modern surface ships has "Onyx". Launch weight is about 3000 kg (with a transport and launch container - 3900 kg), warhead - about 200 kg. The homing head is capable of tracking cruiser-class surface targets at a distance of up to 75 km and has two flight path options. The first is at high altitudes up to 14–15 thousand meters with a decrease to 3–10 meters in the target area. This achieves a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers.

The second option involves flying on the march and in the target area at extremely low altitudes: from 3–10 meters in the target area to 10–15 meters on the march. However, the maximum firing range in this case is reduced to 120 km. The missile's flight speed is supersonic - from 2.0 M on the cruising section to 2.5 M in the target area.

When flying along a combined trajectory, the missile initially locks onto a target at a high altitude, after which it turns off the radar station and descends to extremely low altitudes. As a result, in the middle section the flight is carried out under the lower border of the air defense zone.

Subsequently, after the anti-ship missile reaches the radio horizon range, the homing head (GOS) is turned on again, captures and tracks the target at which the missile is aimed. In this relatively short area (no more than 20–30 km), the supersonic speed of the Onyx makes it difficult to defeat it with short-range air defense systems, as well as to jam the homing head. This anti-ship missile system is universal and can be used from surface ships and submarines, as well as from aircraft and coastal missile launchers.

Another system related to long-range complexes is the family "Caliber". These are subsonic missiles with a maximum firing range of 300 km. The flight to the target is carried out at an extremely low altitude. The energy of the homing head makes it possible to auto-track cruiser-type targets at a distance of up to 65 km.

However, the actual range will be limited by the radio horizon (30 - maximum 40 km, depending on the size of the target and its height above the water surface). The missile warhead is about 400 kg. This universal system allows the use of missiles both from surface ships and submarines, and from coastal installations.

In addition to long-range missile systems, there are also short-range systems that can fire up to 50–130 km. Of these, the most common is the RK X-35. This is a subsonic missile with a low-altitude trajectory (10–20 m), which, with a launch weight of 600 kg, has a warhead weighing about 150 kg.

Many small or few powerful

It is believed that although the relatively small warhead of each missile is not capable of reliably disabling or destroying an enemy ship, the possibility of placing a large number of missiles on a carrier and using them in a salvo will make it possible to inflict the required damage on the target. Such missiles should be relatively simple, which ensures their low cost and, accordingly, reduces the cost of a salvo.

It is clear that it is impossible to place a large number of large missiles on the carrier. Consequently, they are required to have high selectivity and additional capabilities to overcome the air defense of a ship's formation. This means that they need to be equipped with sufficiently powerful radar homing heads, allowing them to detect and track naval targets at a distance of 100 km or more, and highly effective onboard recognition systems in order to highlight the main object in the enemy’s naval order.

At the same time, the seeker must have high noise immunity, and the missile itself, if possible, must have its own electronic warfare systems to break through enemy air defenses. That is, the rockets are both heavy and expensive. “Basalt”, “Vulcan” and “Granite” have a starting weight from 6000 to 8000 kg and corresponding dimensions. But their firing range significantly exceeds that of the newest “Onyx” and “Caliber”, ranging from 500 km for “Basalt” and “Granite” to 700 km for “Vulcan”.

So is the concept of a heavy, powerful, and therefore large and expensive anti-ship missile outdated? Or is it premature to abandon the development of this direction?

Advantages and disadvantages

The low cost of such weapons allows them to be produced in large quantities and to create sufficient reserves for combat operations in a short time. Another advantage is the simplicity of both the missiles themselves and the complex as a whole. This promotes universalization and allows the complexes to be placed on ships of all main classes and even on civilian ships in the event of their mobilization. The strike capabilities of the fleet are significantly increasing.

Target distribution is carried out on board the carrier based on data received from external sources. After launch, correction of the flight mission is impossible. With a relatively high probability, the enemy will identify preparations for a strike and the moment of the salvo based on indirect and direct signs. During the missiles' flight time, the enemy's naval formation will be able to rearrange the order and create a jamming environment. Targeting the main target will be significantly more difficult - the missiles will be distributed among all ships.

A salvo of “Caliber” missiles, when fired at maximum range in conditions of enemy movement in a tactical zigzag and when issuing target designation from sources with low accuracy in determining the target location, can with a relatively high probability (up to 0.2–0.4) miss the designated target.

The warhead weighing about 200 kg is capable of reliably disabling ships of no higher than the frigate class. It will take at least three or four hits to destroy the cruiser. This is evidenced by the experience of World War II (to sink a ship of this class, an average of three to four hits from 250 kg aerial bombs were required).

The death of the destroyer Sheffield from being hit by an Exocet anti-ship missile during the Falkland Islands War is atypical and indicates rather the ineffectiveness of the crew’s struggle for survivability rather than the power of the missile’s warhead, which did not even explode: the fire caused by the missile’s engine could not be extinguished.

To disable an American aircraft carrier, such missiles will require significantly more – 10–15. This is due to the fact that the zone of destruction from the explosion by the warhead is relatively small and does not allow the vital parts of a large ship to be reliably hit. Its failure or death will follow not so much from the explosion of missile warheads itself, but from subsequent secondary destruction, which in turn is countered by a highly effective system for combating the survivability of a modern aircraft carrier.

Finally, a target acquisition range of 75–80 km, achieved at high missile altitudes, will not help to avoid being hit by the air defense system of modern ships, whose anti-aircraft fire weapons (AAF) can hit similar air targets at a distance of up to 120–180 km or more. This means that the salvo’s missiles will be destroyed at the most vulnerable part of the trajectory.

These disadvantages are absent in severe RCC. Among their main strengths is, first of all, the ability to place powerful, highly efficient radio-electronic equipment (RES) on board. With a target acquisition range of more than 100–120 km, the possibility of an enemy order going beyond the viewing range of the seeker of salvo missiles is virtually eliminated, even with low target designation accuracy.

In this case, information exchange between salvo missiles is possible, as well as further automatic selection of their combat order, optimal from the point of view of overcoming air defense. We are talking about actively countering enemy electronic missiles and radically increasing the reliability of missiles firing a salvo at the main target in automatic mode. Thus, heavy anti-ship missiles have a significantly higher selectivity of hitting designated targets than light-class missiles.

Low requirements for the target designation system create favorable conditions for the development of particularly long-range anti-ship missile systems - 1000–1200 km or more, which allows their carriers to be taken beyond the effective range of carrier-based aircraft and anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier groups and formations. Accordingly, the combat stability of carriers of such weapons increases. Reducing the requirements for the target designation system is very important for the Russian Navy, especially in areas of the far sea and ocean zones.

The warhead of heavy anti-ship missiles, weighing more than 700–800 kg, is guaranteed to penetrate the structural protection system and ensure the destruction of vital elements deep in the hull of the largest warships. This means that it would take two or three or four or five such missiles to disable or sink an aircraft carrier.

Disadvantages include high cost, limited on-board carrier kit and, as a consequence, the difficulty of creating a high-density salvo.

Develop both classes

An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the two conceptual approaches to the development of anti-ship weapons gives reason to say that they are complementary. The weaknesses of one become the strengths of the other. Thus, the low selectivity of light anti-ship missiles (in conditions of a limited target designation system) combined with the ability to create a high-density salvo allows one to count on a significant weakening of the air defense system of an enemy naval formation.

At the same time, the relatively small destructive power of the warheads of such missiles is quite consistent with the targets of attack - cruisers, destroyers and frigates from the escort of the main forces.

That is, the feasibility of the integrated use of different classes of anti-ship weapons is visible, which will significantly increase their effectiveness compared to the use of any one class.

Five ways Russia and China could sink American aircraft carriers. Five ways Russia and China could sink American aircraft carriers Is it possible to sink an aircraft carrier

Many small or few powerful

Advantages and disadvantages

Develop both classes

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