Five Ways Russia and China Can Sink US Aircraft Carriers. Five ways Russia and China can sink American aircraft carriers Is it possible to sink an aircraft carrier

What can the Russian Federation oppose to the “invincible armada”.

Once upon a time, while still the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Leon Edward Panetta, said: "Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG (carrier strike group) cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers of the world," writes blogger Anton Rumata.

Wait! But what about Russia! Personally, I have always and everywhere been told that the Russian army can deal with the US Navy - somehow, but it can. More advanced in this matter stated: well, with the whole fleet, maybe not, even an aircraft carrier connection is possible - we won’t overcome it, but we’ll definitely be able to send one AUG to the bottom. Well, very few, all the same, agreed with the Americans in their bravado.

Let's look into this issue (it's interesting, really).

I must say right away that I will not overload the post with numbers and listings, there will be many links, by going through them, it will be possible to get all the data and performance characteristics from different sources. I won't go into detail either. Those. I count on some erudition of visitors in this matter, the rest, if something is not clear in the names or terms, can freely draw definitions through a search engine. Although I will try to give almost all the links.

A typical US AUG is a grouping consisting of:

flagship aircraft carrier groupings with a nuclear power plant of the Nimitz (or Enterprise) type with a carrier-based aviation regiment based on it (60-80 aircraft). As usual, an aircraft carrier, as well as a grouping carrier-based aviation regiment, are separate military units of naval aviation and are under the command of naval aviation officers with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Naval aviation Captain).

Group air defense division- 1-2 KR URO type "Ticonderoga". The basic armament complex of the missile cruiser division includes launchers for the Standard air defense system (SM-2, SM-3), and sea-based Tomahawk missile launchers. All Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers are equipped with the Aegis Maritime Weapons Control and Missile Firing System (AEGIS). Each of the cruisers of the division is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Navy Captain).

PLO grouping division- 3-4 EM URO of the Arleigh Burke type with depth charges and torpedoes to combat submarines, as well as (part of the ships) with Tomahawk missile launchers on board. The PLO division commander is a Navy officer with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Navy Captain), while each of the destroyers of the division is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of captain of the second rank (U.S. Navy Сommander).

Division of multi-purpose submarines- 1-2 submarines of the Los Angeles type with torpedo armament and the Tomahawk cruise missile (launched through TA boats) on board with the tasks of both grouping anti-aircraft missiles and strikes against coastal (surface) targets.

Supply Vessel Division - 1-2 Supply transports, ammunition transports, tankers, other auxiliary ships.

SDA of the Navy- up to 60 aircraft of the US Navy aviation, combined into strike AE, AE AWACS, AE PLO, AE VTS and others. The Naval Aviation Administration, as well as the AVMA, is under the command of a Navy aviation officer with the rank of captain of the first rank or a USMC aviation officer with the rank of colonel (USMC Сolonel).

So what can Russia oppose to such an impressive power. Russia does not have the resources to compete with the United States on an equal footing, in terms of the number of ships. In terms of aircraft carriers, the advantage of the United States is overwhelming, now the American has 10 aircraft carriers, the Russian Federation has one aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, which can be qualified as a light aircraft carrier, but in fact without aircraft. There are ten Su-33s in service out of the planned twenty-five, which they already want to replace with the MiG-29K. In 2013, in addition to the existing dryers, two MiGs were added. As for escort ships, the situation is also not the best.

Many will now say, why are there aircraft carriers, Russia has a lot of other things to destroy the AUG. I agree, in a situation of total superiority in ships, an asymmetric response is needed. So what is he?

The Russian Armed Forces see it in missile weapons, namely in anti-ship missiles. Those. in the effective delivery of a conventional or nuclear charge directly to the AUG ships.

First, I propose to get acquainted with the carriers of anti-ship missiles: the Project 1164 Atlant missile cruiser, the Antey Project 949A submarine, the Orlan heavy nuclear missile cruiser of the Project 1144 Orlan, and the Admiral Kuznetsov heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.

There are also small missile ships, aviation and coastal missile systems.

Since the US AUG has a serious missile defense and air defense system, and of course a powerful aviation fist, the main characteristics for fighting it and defeating it are the detection distance and a possible attack.

In order to hit the composition of the AUG: aviation, ships or submarines must ensure the timely detection of an aircraft carrier group, classify it, get close to the missile strike distance, while maintaining combat capability, and launch missiles that, having overcome air defense and electronic warfare, must destroy the ships in the composition AUG.

Consider the option of attacking the AUG by surface ships of the Russian Navy in the oceans:

The capabilities of Russian ships in the matter of detection are actually limited by the limits of the radio horizon, the helicopters on board the ships are of little use for solving this problem, due to the small number of these machines and the small radius of action. They can be effectively used only in the interests of issuing target designation of missile weapons, but before that, you still need to detect the enemy.

Of course, when missile cruisers were created, i.e. under the Soviet navy, their activities were to be carried out with the support of the naval intelligence system in the ocean theater. It relied on a developed system of radio-technical intelligence, which was based on ground centers located not only on the territory of the USSR, but also in other states. There was also effective space-based maritime reconnaissance, which made it possible to detect and monitor ship formations of a potential enemy, and to issue target designation to missile weapons practically throughout the entire territory of the World Ocean. Russia does not have all this at the current time. In 2006, they began to reanimate the system, but the end is still very, very far away.

Therefore, the AUG will see the ships of the Russian Federation, long before it itself is detected. The grouping constantly provides air control to a depth of 800 km, with the help of Grumman E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, we will be attacked by 48 aircraft, of which 25 will carry the HARPUN anti-aircraft missile system, and almost 8 pieces of Boeing EA-18 Growler will provide electronic warfare.

Fighting off cruisers with their air defense, and even Kuznetsov with a dozen aircraft, is impossible.

The Russian Federation will not be allowed to use the main weapon in the fight against the AUG, namely the P-1000 Vulkan, a range of 550 km and the P-700 Granite, a range of up to 625 km, as you can see, the Russian Federation cannot direct these missiles, even at the launch range, it is extremely unlikely that fit.

But if, by some miracle, the Russian Federation still shoots down enemy aircraft. There will be a duel of anti-ship missiles, and a struggle of electronics, if we are superior to the Americans as anti-ship missiles, then in electronic warfare - again, there is almost no chance. In the best case, anti-ship missiles of the Russian Federation, some of which will pass the AUG missile defense system, will be able to damage the aircraft carrier and, in the extreme, sink several ships of the group, but all this based on the above, unfortunately from the realm of fantasy.

Also, a strike on the AUG with a nuclear weapon is also unlikely, again due to the fact that the Russian Federation simply does not have time to strike, since they will be discovered first.

The most advanced Russian anti-ship missiles today is Granit. Currently, there are no analogues of this rocket in the world. Its flight range is 625 km. This is a hundred kilometers longer than the range of the Tomahawk anti-ship modifications, almost three times the flight range of the main American Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and approximately corresponds to the range of the F / A-18 carrier-based fighters. The marching speed of the Granite is 660 meters per second, in the last section of the trajectory - a kilometer per second, which is three times the speed of the Harpoon and Tomahawk and twice the maximum speed of the F / A-18 fighter. "Granite" carry a warhead (warhead) containing 500 kilograms of powerful explosives, the TNT equivalent of which, according to various sources, is from 1000 to 1500 kilograms. The power of the "Granite" warhead significantly exceeds the 454-kilogram TNT warhead "Tomahawk" and the 227-kilogram warhead "Harpoon". The power of "Granite" allows you to destroy any destroyer or cruiser with one hit. In addition, missiles of this type can be equipped with nuclear warheads, which do not require a direct hit to destroy a ship.

The breakthrough of the enemy's air defense "Granite" makes it easier to book the warhead and important nodes, which reduces the likelihood of anti-ship missiles being destroyed by a close detonation of an anti-aircraft missile, and a low flight altitude. Anti-ship missiles "Granit" is a highly intelligent weapon capable of carrying out "collective" actions, countering enemy air defenses and independently choosing the most important target. In the computer memory of missiles, there are so-called "portraits" of radar for all ships, information about all options orders. The missiles attack along the most rational trajectory, forming a combat order and exchanging information among themselves. In a salvo of one Project 949A submarine, there are 24 missiles, each of which also carries its own decoys to break through missile defense. 23 missiles go low over the water, one rises higher, periodically turning on the radar to aim at targets. It determines the number of targets and distributes them among other missiles. If the "leader" is destroyed, the next missile takes its place. The largest target, that is, an aircraft carrier, in the ship order is automatically determined by missiles. After a breakthrough, the missiles distribute the targets by importance in order to ultimately ensure the destruction of the aircraft carrier. First, covering ships that stand in the way of missiles are destroyed, and then a strike is made on an aircraft carrier. But there is one big BUT, the missile requires accurate target designation until the GOS captures the target, and this aiming is achieved only with the help of aviation or spacecraft.

Conclusion: missiles are good, and they are much better than American ones, but unfortunately flying electronics and AUG fighters nullify this advantage.

Now consider the option with a submarine, the Project 949A Antey missile boat, using its hydroacoustics, can detect AUG noise at a distance of more than 100 miles, i.e. being in the far zone of the anti-submarine defense of an aircraft carrier group, where the probability of its detection and destruction is very low. The boat is armed with 24 P-700 Granit, respectively, the boat is already in a state of attacking the AUG, since the range of the Granit is up to 625 km, and we remind you 100 miles from the aircraft carrier with escort. But here again the problem arises of insufficient awareness, again we need a specific system for issuing target designation, which can be provided either from space or by aviation, and at the moment Russia, I repeat, is missing, and what is available from aviation sources of target designation quickly will be destroyed by AUG fighters. Based on the foregoing, "Antey" is an excellent machine, but it will not be able to classify and even more so determine the battle order of the enemy's formation with the identification of the main order. To do this, it will be necessary to enter the middle anti-submarine defense zone of the group, where the probability of detection and, accordingly, destruction is already significant.

But that's not all, in order to destroy an aircraft carrier, it is necessary to hit it with 8-10 Granit anti-ship missiles with conventional equipment. When missiles break through to an aircraft carrier, it is also necessary to destroy up to half of the guard ships. Taking into account the anti-aircraft defense, for guaranteed destruction of the AUG, it is necessary to use 70-100 anti-ship missiles from all types of carriers in one strike.

Conclusion: one or even three submarines (there are only five of them afloat in Russia at the moment) will not be able to destroy the AUG alone, they can only work together with surface ships and aircraft. Which, again, in the current conditions of the state of the system for detecting and issuing information to the Russian Navy, is impossible. By the way, some refer to the miracle weapon, the Shkval missile-torpedo, which is futile to fight the American group, one has only to read its characteristics.

Coastal anti-ship missile systems can not be considered due to the fact that the AUG will not approach the coast at a distance of destruction of anti-ship missiles.

Aviation remains: Tu-22M, can strike X-22 anti-ship missiles at the grouping, and this is perhaps the most promising option for damaging the AUG, but out of the 150 Carcasses in service, only 40 can fly throughout Russia. Even if we assume that they all reach the enemy ships and strike, then this is only 40 missiles, which is clearly not enough to demolish an aircraft carrier with escort. But if you reduce the range from 2000 km to 1500 km and hang two missiles on the "Carcasses", then again, you can take out the AUG only if all the planes and missiles break through to the enemy, which again is unlikely, the group's air defense very much.

Based on all of the above, in the current situation of the state of the Russian army, Leon Edward Panetta is rather right that indeed not one country in the world is unable to sink the US aircraft carrier strike group. With the possible exception of a massive Tu-22 air strike with X-22 missiles, with a nuclear warhead, but do not forget: the US has more than one AUG, and the Russian Federation is capable of such a strike only once.

Missile swarm flies past the main target

Heavy anti-ship missiles (ASMs) have a number of important advantages that lighter and simpler missiles do not have. The balanced development of anti-ship missiles of the light and heavy classes will significantly increase the capabilities of our fleet in the fight against the most powerful formations of a potential enemy, primarily aircraft carriers.

The military-technical policy in this area has recently been focused on equipping combat surface ships, submarines and attack aircraft with relatively small-sized missiles. The development of complexes with heavy anti-ship missiles has been curtailed, although Basalt, Vulkan and Granit are still in service. Long-range aviation (and naval missile-carrying if it is recreated, which is undoubtedly a necessary step) has the Kh-22 missile system as its main anti-ship weapon. However, all these systems are relatively outdated, as they were developed in the 60s and 70s. New heavy anti-ship missiles are not currently being created and are not foreseen in the future.

Of the recently adopted long-range anti-ship missile systems, the Onyx has the greatest ability to destroy modern surface ships. The starting weight is about 3000 kilograms (with a transport and launch container - 3900 kg), the warhead is about 200 kilograms. The homing head is capable of tracking cruiser-class surface targets at a distance of up to 75 kilometers and has two flight path options. The first - at high altitudes up to 14-15 thousand meters with a decrease to 3-10 meters in the target area. This achieves a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers. The second option provides for flight on the march and in the target area at extremely low altitudes: from 3-10 meters in the target area to 10-15 meters on the march section. However, the maximum firing range in this case is reduced to 120 kilometers. The flight speed of the rocket is supersonic - from 2.0 M in the march area to 2.5 M in the target area. When flying along a combined trajectory, the missile initially captures a target at a high altitude, after which it turns off the radar station and descends to extremely low altitudes. As a result, in the middle section, the flight is carried out under the lower boundary of the air defense zone. Later, after the RCC reaches the range of the radio horizon, the homing head (GOS) turns on again, captures and accompanies the target that the missile is pointing at. In this relatively short section (no more than 20–30 km), the Onyx's supersonic speed makes it difficult to destroy it with short-range air defense systems, as well as jamming the homing head. This anti-ship missile is universal and can be used from surface ships and submarines, as well as from aircraft and coastal missile installations.

Another system related to long-range complexes is the Caliber family. These are subsonic missiles with a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers. The flight to the target is carried out at extremely low altitude. The energy of the homing head allows you to capture cruiser-type targets for auto-tracking at a distance of up to 65 kilometers. However, the real range will be limited by the radio horizon (30 - maximum 40 km, depending on the size of the target and its height above the water surface). The warhead of the rocket is about 400 kilograms. This universal system allows the use of missiles both from surface ships and submarines, and from coastal installations.

In addition to long-range missile systems, there are also short-range systems that provide firing up to 50-130 kilometers. Of these, the most common is the RK X-35. This is a subsonic missile with a low-altitude trajectory (10–20 m), which, with a launch weight of 600 kilograms, has a warhead weighing about 150 kilograms.

Many small or few powerful

All these missile systems appeared in accordance with the concept of creating an inexpensive and high-density missile salvo - a kind of "missile swarm" that allows you to oversaturate the air defense system of a naval formation or an individual enemy ship and thereby guarantee its destruction by several missiles. At the same time, it is believed that although a relatively small warhead of each of the missiles is incapable of guaranteed to disable or destroy the enemy ship, the possibility of placing a large number of missiles on a carrier and using a salvo will make it possible to inflict the required damage on the target. Such rockets should be relatively simple, which ensures their cheapness and, accordingly, reduces the cost of a volley.

Previously, the development of anti-ship missiles, especially long-range ones, relied on a different concept. It was based on the idea of the possibility of destroying or incapacitating a large ship if even one missile hit. Accordingly, its warhead must be powerful enough - 500-700 kilograms or more. These were the differences between "Basalt", "Volcano", "Granite" and X-22 of the Soviet design. It is clear that it is impossible to place a large number of large missiles on a carrier. Consequently, they are required to have high selectivity and additional capabilities to overcome the air defense of a ship formation. And this means that they need to be equipped with sufficiently powerful radar homing heads, which allow detecting and tracking sea targets at a distance of 100 kilometers or more, high-performance airborne recognition systems in order to highlight the main object in the enemy’s ship order. At the same time, the GOS should have high noise immunity, and the missile itself, if possible, should have its own electronic warfare equipment to break through enemy air defenses. That is, rockets are both heavy and expensive. "Basalt", "Volcano" and "Granite" have a starting weight of 6000 to 8000 kilograms and the corresponding dimensions. But the range of their firing significantly exceeds this figure for the latest Onyx and Caliber, ranging from 500 kilometers for Basalt and Granite to 700 kilometers for Vulcan.

So is the concept of a heavy, powerful, and therefore bulky and expensive anti-ship missile outdated? Or is it premature to abandon the development of this direction?

Advantages and disadvantages

Undoubtedly, the strength of the "rocket swarm" concept is the ability to accommodate a large number of missiles on one carrier (even relatively small sizes). This significantly increases the flexibility of use: it allows you to create a reserve, more rationally distribute work among targets, and avoid allocating excess destructive potential to poorly protected objects.

When modern ships are equipped with powerful multi-channel air defense systems, the “missile swarm” concept provides a high-density salvo that is guaranteed to overcome the air defense system of even heavily protected formations, such as American aircraft carrier groups.

The cheapness of such weapons allows them to be produced in in large numbers, to create stocks sufficient for combat operations in a short time. The advantage is the simplicity of both the missiles themselves and the complex as a whole. This contributes to universalization, allows you to place the complexes on ships of all main classes and even on civilian ships if they are mobilized. The strike capabilities of the fleet are significantly increased.

The weaknesses of the “missile swarm” concept include, first of all, the fact that severe weight and size restrictions exclude the placement of powerful radars and other systems on missiles, in particular electronic intelligence, high-performance on-board computers that would make it possible to single out the main target as accurately as possible. For a maximum range of 300 kilometers, Onyx will fly for about 10 minutes, Caliber - more than 20 minutes. Target distribution is carried out on board the carrier according to data received from external sources. After launch, correction of the flight task is not possible. With a relatively high probability, the enemy, by indirect and direct signs, will reveal the preparation for the strike and the moment of the volley. During the flight time of the missiles, the enemy ship formation will be able to reorganize the order and create a jamming environment. Aiming at the main target will be much more difficult - the missiles will be distributed among all ships.

The short target acquisition range of low-altitude and low-speed anti-ship missiles creates the danger that the target will go beyond the viewing band of their homing head (GOS) when firing at extreme distances. It is for this reason that the American Tomahawks provide for the possibility of additional search for a target by moving along a snake in the area of \u200b\u200bits intended location when firing at the maximum range, when target designation is issued with low accuracy. A volley of Kalibr-type missiles when firing at the maximum range in conditions of enemy movement in a tactical zigzag and when issuing target designation from sources with low accuracy in determining the target location can, with a relatively high probability (up to 0.2–0.4), miss the designated target.

A warhead weighing about 200 kilograms is capable of reliably incapacitating ships no higher than the frigate class. It will take at least three or four hits to destroy a cruiser. This is evidenced by the experience of the Second World War (to sink a ship of this class, an average of three to four hits of 250 kg bombs was required). The death of the Sheffield destroyer from the Exocet anti-ship missile hit during the Falklands War is atypical and testifies more to the ineffectiveness of the crew's struggle for survivability than to the power of the missile warhead, which did not even explode: the fire caused by the rocket engine could not be extinguished. To disable an American aircraft carrier, such missiles will require significantly more - 10-15. This is due to the fact that the zone of destruction from the explosion of the warhead is relatively small and does not allow you to reliably hit the vital parts of a large ship. Its failure or death will follow not so much due to the actual explosion of missile warheads, but from subsequent secondary destruction, which in turn is opposed by the highly effective damage control system of a modern aircraft carrier.

Finally, the target capture range of 75–80 kilometers, achieved at high missile flight altitudes, will not help to avoid hitting modern ships by their air defense systems, whose anti-aircraft weapons (AIA) can hit such air targets at a distance of up to 120–180 kilometers or more. And this means that salvo missiles will be destroyed in the most vulnerable section of the trajectory.

These disadvantages are absent in heavy anti-ship missiles. Among their main strengths, first of all, is the possibility of placing powerful, highly efficient radio electronic equipment (RES) on board. With a target capture range of more than 100-120 kilometers, the probability of an enemy order leaving the viewing band of the seeker of salvo missiles is practically eliminated, even with low target designation accuracy.

Less stringent weight and size restrictions make it possible to place on them a seeker with a target acquisition range that exceeds the capabilities of existing and future anti-aircraft missile systems (ADMS), that is, 150-200 kilometers, and thereby avoid defeat on the high-altitude part of the flight path. This also allows the placement of own active electronic warfare assets on heavy anti-ship missiles, which significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's AIA. At the same time, information exchange between salvo missiles is possible, as well as further automatic selection of their combat formation, which is optimal from the point of view of overcoming air defense. We are talking about the active opposition of the enemy's electronic warfare and a radical increase in the reliability of the selection of the salvo of the main target by missiles in automatic mode. Thus, heavy anti-ship missiles have a significantly higher selectivity for hitting designated targets than light-class missiles.

Low requirements for the target designation system create favorable conditions for the development of anti-ship missile systems with an especially long range - 1000–1200 kilometers or more, which allows them to be taken beyond the effective range of carrier-based aviation and anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier groups and formations. Accordingly, the combat stability of carriers of such weapons increases. Reducing the requirements for the target designation system is very important for the Russian Navy, especially in areas of the far sea and ocean zones.

The warhead of heavy anti-ship missiles weighing more than 700-800 kilograms is guaranteed to break through the structural protection system and ensure the defeat of vital elements deep in the hull of the largest warships. And this means that two or three or four or five such missiles will be required to disable or sink an aircraft carrier.

The disadvantages include high cost, limited on-board carrier kit and, as a result, the difficulty of creating a high-density salvo.

Develop both classes

Analysis of strengths and weaknesses two conceptual approaches to the development of anti-ship weapons gives reason to say that they are complementary. The flaws of one become strengths another. Thus, the low selectivity of light anti-ship missiles (in conditions of a limited target designation system), combined with the possibility of creating a high-density volley, makes it possible to count on a significant weakening of the air defense system of an enemy naval formation. At the same time, the relatively small destructive power of the warheads of such missiles is quite consistent with the objects of attack - cruisers, destroyers and frigates from the guards of the main forces.

After the enemy’s air defense system is weakened, when a high-density salvo is no longer required, but reliable, highly selective support for the destruction of the main ships of the warrant is necessary, heavy anti-ship missiles come into play, which can solve the problem of incapacitating or destroying core ships, in particular aircraft carriers.

That is, the expediency of the integrated use of different classes of anti-ship weapons is visible, which will significantly increase its effectiveness compared to the use of any one class.

The concept of heavy anti-ship missiles was abandoned too early. It makes sense not to rely only on the light class and return to work on heavy-type anti-ship missile weapons. The balanced development of both directions will make it possible to significantly increase the capabilities of our fleet in the fight against the most powerful naval formations of a potential enemy, primarily aircraft carriers.

... The Americans still managed to put into operation their last remaining AUG in the North Atlantic, which threatened with considerable losses to our merchant fleet with its outdated weapons. At this time, the flagship of the Northern Fleet, the battleship "Invulnerable" (captured modernized "Zamvolt") was deeply bogged down in supporting the landing on the Yucatan Peninsula. Artillery autonomous modules were forced to separate from the ship and accompany the landing by land - the resistance of the Nicaraguan contras was so intense. The capacitors of the laser battery had already begun to discharge: no one expected that its installations would have to single-handedly shoot down the entire NATO satellite constellation and repel countless drone attacks.

... In the current situation, Admiral Ivanov gave the green light to the separation of the missile module to strike at the US AUG. The decision turned out to be justified: the ekranoplan was able to jump over the ocean in a couple of hours and reach the attack range. A massive missile strike by hypersonic "Kisten" was almost completely sunk by the Sixth Fleet of the "probable enemy". However, what happened already smacked of an international scandal.

After the return of the modules to the spacecraft, "Neuzavimets" made an emergency launch of the nuclear rocket engine and an hour later went to the geostationary station. There, having refueled from the Yuri Gagarin station, the battleship headed for the Lagrange point, to connect with the 2nd strategic tank army, which had long been hiding in the clouds of Kordylevsky from the telescopes of the Hague Tribunal ...

Based on the dispute on alternahistory.ru.

Drone X-47B on the deck of the aircraft carrier "Harry Truman"

This funny opus is a response to two other articles on methods of dealing with American aircraft carriers. The author of the article “The bitter truth about the instantaneous strike of the AUG” is full of optimism - everything that floats will someday sink, we will shoot everyone at once, the sea is ours. His opponent (the article “Is the Russian fleet capable of fighting US aircraft carriers?”) gives a more balanced assessment of the events, rightly pointing out the obvious difficulties in the fight against such a mobile and combat-ready squadron as the AUG of the US Navy.

Dear Y. Nikiforov and S. Linnik, why ask the obvious question again? After all, everything is so obvious. The naval power of the United States surpasses the fleets of all other countries in the world combined. There, the number of aircraft carriers alone exceeds the number of all carriers of long-range anti-ship missiles in the domestic fleet (nuclear Orlans, Atlant-type missiles and SSGN pr. 949A). We have only 4 ships capable of providing zonal air defense of the squadron, the Yankees have 84 such ships (cruisers and destroyers with long-range anti-aircraft systems). Moreover, the American fleet has a multinational format - dozens of technically advanced allied countries with their own bases and ships, ready at any moment to strengthen the fleet of their overlord. Fighting such a force with the help of a handful of rusty submarines and cruisers from the Cold War era is completely unacceptable, useless, and in fact no one needs it.

On board the TARKR "Peter the Great"

If we talk only about AUGs, then the point is not only in their quantity, but also in their quality. The Yankees managed to create a balanced squadron (aviation, air defense and anti-aircraft defense order, submarine forces), practically invulnerable on the high seas. It is extremely difficult to detect and track. It does not approach close to the coast, constantly changing its position at a speed of 500 miles per day. The reconnaissance aircraft sent to search for it will inevitably be intercepted by combat air patrols loitering at a distance of a hundred miles from the main order of the AUG.

Tu-95RTs under the escort of "Phantoms"

The well-known space "Legend" (naval reconnaissance satellites), even in its heyday, was only a technically beautiful experiment that showed all the incredible depth and complexity of this problem. Even omitting the terrible technical moments of Legends-M (satellites with a nuclear reactor), it is worth noting that a low-orbit satellite flies in a circular orbit, making one revolution around the Earth in 80-odd minutes. However, having made one revolution, the satellite will already be completely over another region of the planet, thousands of kilometers away from the place over which it flew for the first time. The earth has its own rotation - as a result, the satellite in relation to the earth observer has a complex movement, and its trajectory resembles a zigzag on the oscilloscope screen. To be able to inspect any given region of the World Ocean with due regularity (at least once an hour) would require a damn lot of space reconnaissance; the creation and operation of such a system is pure fantasy.

The only one who has a chance to detect the AUG and not waste time to strike is a submarine, which by chance happened to be in the path of an aircraft carrier group. However, taking into account the fact that the number of combat-ready multi-purpose nuclear submarines in the Russian Navy is currently less than the number of aircraft carrier groups of the "probable enemy", the probability theory gives a meager forecast about their meeting in the vast ocean. It is worth noting that the AUG moves quickly, and the boat is constrained in maneuver. An attempt to move at full speed, catch up with the squadron and take an advantageous position for the attack is fraught with the risk of losing stealth and disrupting the attack / death of the submarine. The AUG includes at least 4-5 surface ships with powerful sonar stations and RUM-139 ASROC-VL missile torpedoes, not counting multi-purpose nuclear submarines covering the aircraft carrier from under water. Anti-submarine "turntables" are actively used (a couple of dozen per squadron), while the aircraft carrier does not disdain help from the base aviation. Orions and Poseidons (marine patrol / anti-submarine aircraft based on civil airliners) are constantly prowling at the heading angles of the AUG.

As a result, the AUG can continuously evade contact with the enemy, at the same time, due to the presence of " long arm", counterattacking enemy ships trying to get closer to the squadron at the launch range of their missiles (or at least find the approximate location of the AUG).

What can be done to counter such a threat? Equip and send your own AUG to search for it - two "Elusive Joes" will run one after another across the ocean, periodically getting involved in air battles. Someday, one of the parties will be lucky: a coordinated attack will take the enemy by surprise, the planes will break through and “stagger” the enemy order (the battle in the Coral Sea, Midway are distant echoes from the past).

The Legend of Elusive Joe

The facts from the first part of the article can plunge into discouragement, but you should not despair!

The last carrier-based carrier aircraft for nuclear weapons (A-5 Vigilante) was decommissioned by the Yankees in 1963. The reason was the emergence of a much more reliable and efficient system - submarines with ballistic missiles. Since then, the Yankees have never experimented with nuclear weapons aboard their aircraft carriers, relegating them to the role of a maritime tactical system to dominate the seas in the event of a nuclear-free World War III. The world war did not happen, as a result of the “air waffles” wandered aimlessly across the oceans, periodically trying to participate in local conflicts. Where there was little sense from them - in the air everything was decided by the Air Force aviation.

An aircraft carrier is invulnerable in the open ocean, but its strength rapidly decreases as it approaches the shore. Hawkeyes and Super Hornets face competition from shore-based fighters, whose performance characteristics are head and shoulders above those of carrier-based aircraft. What can a small Hawkeye AWACS aircraft do against the E-3 Sentry or the domestic AWACS A-50U, where the mass of one equipment and antenna exceeds the max. takeoff weight of the Hawkeye! It is equally ridiculous to compare the combat load of the SuperHornet (when taking off from a catapult) with some kind of land monster like the Su-34 or F-15E.

The same problem with the number - even the largest aircraft carrier can simultaneously have no more than four dozen combat aircraft. While on the shore they are waiting for an aviation group consisting of many tens, if not hundreds of units of first-class aircraft.

The fact that the air forces of most countries have fewer combat aircraft than one American aircraft carrier is a problem for the air forces of these same countries. There is aviation - there are no problems with aircraft carriers. The Falkend epic (1982) clearly showed how cruelly the squadron was “raked” by coastal-based aviation (despite the fact that the Argentinean clowns had 6 anti-ship missiles for the entire theater of operations, the only tanker aircraft, and a passenger Boeing flew for reconnaissance).

The third problem is geography. American AUGs are not capable of directly threatening Russia, because. all important cities and industrial centers are located in the depths of the coast, and it is easier and closer to fly from the Turkish Inzhirlik air base to the same Crimea than to drive an aircraft carrier into the Black Sea. AUGs have nothing to do in the "marquise puddles" of the Baltic or the Black Sea. On the other hand, continental Russia has no strategic interests in the oceans, we have never been dependent on sea communications. Even in the most difficult years of the Second World War, there was not much difference to us, as the fights took place in the open spaces in the Atlantic. There was nothing we could do to help our allies. And the sea - a boundless blue-green expanse - is still no one's.

Modern nuclear aircraft carriers could be justified in a serious non-nuclear conflict of the “USSR vs USA” format, when the Yankees needed to transfer reinforcements across the ocean to Europe, fighting off Soviet submarines and aircraft pressing from all sides. In this case, AUGs could play a role - their combat stability can really be envied. Alas (or rather, fortunately) such stories are just plots for books in the genre of alternative history.

The AUG is invulnerable while it wanders aimlessly across the ocean. But its strength in real operations is expressed in symbolic percentages. The result of all searches - from ordinary discussions on the Internet to serious scientific research in the field of marine, rocket and space technology, was the understanding of a simple fact: there is no need to catch the "Elusive Joe" in the vast expanses of the sea, wasting trillions of full-fledged rubles. If a real use of the AUG happens, the “Elusive Joe” will come by itself and immediately get hit in the face by coastal aviation and air defense systems (as happened in Lebanon in 1983).

SSGN pr. 949A, armed with anti-ship missiles "Granit". Currently, the Russian Navy has 4 active boats of this type. 4 more boats are under repair

Once, while still the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta, said: "Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers of the world."

The photo shows the US Navy Carrier Strike Group, at the moment, it is the most effective deterrent in the world, after nuclear weapons.

Once, while still the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Edward Panetta, said: "Any fifth grader knows that the US AUG cannot be destroyed by any of the existing powers of the world"

Wait! But what about Russia! Personally, I have always and everywhere been told that the Russian army can deal with the US Navy - somehow, but it can. More advanced in this matter stated: well, with the whole fleet, maybe not, even an aircraft carrier formation is possible - we won’t overcome it, but we’ll definitely be able to send one AUG to the bottom. Well, very few, all the same, agreed with the Americans in their bravado.

Let's look into this issue (it's interesting, really).

Begin:

A typical US AUG is a grouping consisting of:

The flagship aircraft-carrying ship of the Nimitz-type (or Enterprise) type nuclear power plant with a carrier-based aviation regiment (60-80 aircraft) based on it. As usual, an aircraft carrier, as well as a grouping carrier-based aviation regiment, are separate military units of naval aviation and are under the command of naval aviation officers with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Naval aviation Captain).

The air defense division of the grouping is 1-2 KR URO of the Ticonderoga type. The basic armament complex of the missile cruiser division includes the Standard (SM-2, SM-3) SAM launcher and the sea-based Tomahawk missile launcher. AEGIS). Each of the cruisers of the division is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Navy Captain).

PLO division of the group - 3-4 EM URO of the Arleigh Burke type with depth charges and torpedoes to combat submarines, as well as (part of the ships) with Tomahawk missile launchers on board. The PLO division commander is a Navy officer with the rank of captain of the first rank (U.S. Navy Captain), while each of the destroyers of the division is under the command of a US Navy officer with the rank of captain of the second rank (U.S. Navy Сommander).

Division of multi-purpose submarines - 1-2 submarines of the Los Angeles type with torpedo armament and Tomahawk cruise missiles (with launch through TA boats) on board with the tasks of both anti-aircraft grouping and strikes against coastal (surface) targets.

Supply Vessel Division - 1-2 Supply-type transports, ammunition transports, tankers, other auxiliary ships

FMS Naval Aviation - up to 60 aircraft of the US Navy aviation, combined into strike AE, AE AWACS, AE PLO, AE VTS, etc. The FMS of the Navy is a separate military unit of the US Navy aviation. The Naval Aviation Administration, as well as the AVMA, is under the command of a Naval Aviation Officer with the rank of "Captain 1st Rank"\u003e Captain First Rank or a USMC Aviation Officer with the rank of Colonel (USMC Сolonel).

For reference:

So what can we oppose to such an impressive power. Unfortunately, Russia does not have the resources to compete with the United States on an equal footing, in terms of the number of ships. In terms of aircraft carriers, the advantage of the United States is overwhelming, now the American has 10 aircraft carriers, we have one aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, which can be qualified as a light aircraft carrier, but unfortunately, in fact, without aircraft. There are ten Su-33s in service out of the planned twenty-five, which they already want to replace with the MiG-29K. In 2013, in addition to the existing dryers, two MiGs were added. As for escort ships, the situation is also not the best.

The Russian Armed Forces see it in missile weapons, namely in anti-ship missiles. Those. in the effective delivery of a conventional or nuclear charge directly to the AUG ships.

First, I propose to familiarize yourself with the RCC carriers:

1. Project 1164 missile cruiser:

2. Submarine project 949A "Antey"

In July 2011, a tripartite agreement was reached between Russia, the United States and Italy on the dismantlement of the nuclear submarine Krasnodar.
According to it, the United States allocates funds for the transportation of unloaded spent nuclear fuel to the Mayak Production Association. Russia finances all preparatory and final work related to the dismantlement of the Krasnodar nuclear submarine.

The disposal of the submarine is financed by Rosatom and Italian company"Sojin", which has allocated more than five million euros for the dismantling of a nuclear cruiser within the framework of the international program "Global Partnership".

3. Project 1144 heavy missile cruiser

Rocket launch "Granit" from the missile cruiser "Peter the Great" project 1144.2

4. Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser project 1143.5

Launchers SM-233A anti-ship missiles "Granit" on TAKR project 1143.5 ("Arsenal", No. 1 / 2008)

Please note that on the deck of the Kuznetsov there are all the aircraft that are available, although according to the plan, it should look no less full than the American aircraft carriers, although it is smaller - we compare:

There are also small missile ships, aviation and coastal missile systems.

Since the US AUG has a serious missile defense and air defense system, and, of course, a powerful aviation fist, the main characteristics for combating it and defeating it are the detection distance and a possible attack.

Consider the option of attacking the AUG by surface ships of the Russian Navy in the oceans:

Unfortunately, the capabilities of Russian ships in the matter of detection are actually limited by the limits of the radio horizon, the helicopters on board the ships are of little use for solving this problem, due to the small number of these machines and the small radius of action. They can be effectively used only in the interests of issuing target designation of missile weapons, but before that, you still need to detect the enemy.

Of course, when missile cruisers were created, i.e. under the Soviet navy, their activities were to be carried out with the support of the naval intelligence system in the ocean theater.

It relied on a developed system of radio-technical intelligence, which was based on ground centers located not only on the territory of the USSR, but also in other states.

Radio interception post of the 16th Directorate at the GRU base in Lourdes, Cuba.
The post, named "Termite P", became operational in December 1976 and was equipped with a 12-meter fixed parabolic antenna and a 7-meter mobile parabolic antenna mounted on an open truck. They made it possible to intercept messages in the microwave range transmitted from American satellites, as well as control negotiations between microwave communication towers. Later, the same posts were equipped at the Cam Ranh military base (Vietnam) and in South Yemen. On October 16, 2001, Moscow unexpectedly notified Havana of its intention to close the electronic intelligence center located in Lourdes. The next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting at the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed this decision, adding that the base of the Russian Navy in Cam Ranh (Vietnam) and the electronic intelligence post located there would also be liquidated.

There was also effective space-based maritime reconnaissance, which made it possible to detect and monitor ship formations of a potential enemy, and to issue target designation to missile weapons practically throughout the entire territory of the World Ocean.

At the end of the 70s, the USSR created the Legenda marine space reconnaissance and target designation system, which could aim a missile at any ship in the oceans.
In 1982, the unified system was tested in action.

During the Falklands War, data from space satellites allowed the command of the Soviet Navy to monitor the operational-tactical situation in the South Atlantic, accurately calculate the actions of the British fleet, and even predict, to within a few hours, the time and place of the landing of the English landing in the Falklands. The orbital constellation, together with ship information receiving points, ensured the detection of ships and the issuance of target designation to missile weapons.

Due to the fact that high-resolution optical technologies were then unavailable, these satellites had to be launched into a very low orbit (400 km) and powered from the BES-5 Buk nuclear reactor with a thermal power of 100 kW ( electric power- 3 kW, estimated operating time - 1080 hours.

The complexity of the energy scheme predetermined the fate of the entire program - in 1993, the "Legend" ceased to "cover" even half of the strategic sea areas, and in 1998 the last apparatus ceased service.

Russia does not have all this at the current time. In 2006, they began to reanimate the system, but the end is still very, very far away.

Currently in the space group Russian Federation there are only passive electronic intelligence satellites US-P. The last of them - "Cosmos-2421" - was launched on June 25, 2006, and unsuccessfully. According to official information, there were minor problems on board due to incomplete deployment of solar panels.

Therefore, the AUG will see our ships, long before it itself is discovered. The grouping constantly provides air control to a depth of 800 km, with the help of Grumman_E-2_Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, we will be attacked by 48 aircraft, of which 25 will carry the HARPUN anti-aircraft missile system, and electronic warfare will be provided by almost 8 pieces Boeing_EA-18_Growler.

Fighting off the cruisers with their air defenses, and even the Kuznetsov with a dozen aircraft, is impossible.

We will not be allowed to use the main weapon in the fight against the AUG, namely the P-1000 Vulkan, a range of 550 km and the P-700 Granite, a range of up to 625 km, as you can see, we will not be able to direct these missiles, even at the launch range, it is extremely unlikely that let's go.

But if, by some miracle, we still shot down enemy planes. There will be a duel of anti-ship missiles, and a struggle of electronics, if we are superior to the Americans as anti-ship missiles, then in electronic warfare, again, there are almost no chances. In the best case, our anti-ship missiles, some of which will pass the AUG missile defense system, will be able to damage the aircraft carrier and, in the extreme, sink several ships of the group, but all this based on the above, unfortunately from the realm of fantasy.

Also, a strike on the AUG with a nuclear weapon is also unlikely, again due to the fact that we simply will not have time to strike, since we will be discovered first.

Not a single anti-ship missile was created abroad, equal in size and combat capabilities to the 7-ton "Granite"! The only American anti-ship missile "Harpoon" has 10 times less launch weight - only about 700 kg, and as a result - 3 times less warhead, 2 times less speed and 5 times less range. The French "Exoset" had even more modest characteristics. Perhaps someone will remember the Israeli anti-ship missile "Gabriel" or the Chinese missile S-802 - they are all subsonic missiles with rather weak warheads in terms of power and a launch weight in the range of 600-700 kg. topwar.ru/23526-demony-treh...

The marching speed of the Granite is 660 meters per second, in the last section of the trajectory it is a kilometer per second, which is three times the speed of the Harpoon and Tomahawk and twice the maximum speed of the F / A-18 fighter. "Granite" carry a warhead (warhead) containing 500 kilograms of powerful explosives, the TNT equivalent of which, according to various sources, is from 1000 to 1500 kilograms.

The power of the Granite warhead significantly exceeds the 454-kilogram TNT warhead Tomahawk and the 227-kilogram Harpoon. The power of "Granite" allows you to destroy any destroyer or cruiser with one hit. In addition, missiles of this type can be equipped with nuclear warheads, which do not require a direct hit to destroy a ship. The breakthrough of enemy air defense "Granite" facilitates the reservation of the warhead and important components, which reduces the likelihood of destruction of anti-ship missiles by a close detonation of an anti-aircraft missile, and a low flight altitude.

The Granit anti-ship missile is a highly intelligent weapon capable of carrying out "collective" actions, counteracting enemy air defenses and independently choosing the most important target. In the computer memory of missiles, there are so-called "portraits" of radar for all ships, information about all possible variants of orders is also laid down.

The missiles attack along the most rational trajectory, forming a combat order and exchanging information among themselves. In a salvo of one Project 949A submarine, there are 24 missiles, each of which also carries its own decoys to break through missile defense. 23 missiles go low over the water, one rises higher, periodically turning on the radar to aim at targets. It determines the number of targets and distributes them among other missiles. If the "leader" is destroyed, the next missile takes its place.

The largest target, that is, an aircraft carrier, in the ship order is automatically determined by missiles. After a breakthrough, the missiles distribute the targets by importance in order to ultimately ensure the destruction of the aircraft carrier. First, covering ships that stand in the way of missiles are destroyed, and then a strike is made on an aircraft carrier. But there is one big BUT, the missile requires accurate target designation until the GOS captures the target, and this aiming is achieved only with the help of aviation or spacecraft.

Conclusion: missiles are good, and we have them much better than American ones, but unfortunately flying electronics and AUG fighters nullify this advantage.

The boat is armed with 24 P-700 Granit, respectively, the boat is already in a state of attacking the AUG, since the range of the Granit is up to 625 km, and we remind you 100 miles from the aircraft carrier with escort. But here again the problem arises of insufficient awareness, again we need a specific system for issuing target designation, which can be provided either from space or by aviation, and at the moment Russia, I repeat, is missing, and what is available from aviation sources of target designation quickly will be destroyed by AUG fighters.

Based on the foregoing, "Antey" is an excellent machine, but it will not be able to classify and even more so determine the battle order of the enemy's formation with the identification of the main order. To do this, it will be necessary to enter the middle anti-submarine defense zone of the group, where the probability of detection and, accordingly, destruction is already significant.

Conclusion: one or even three submarines (there are only five of them afloat in Russia at the moment: K-132 Irkutsk, K-119 Voronezh, K-410 Smolensk, K-456 Tver, K- 186 "Omsk"), will not be able to destroy the AUG alone, they can only work in conjunction with surface ships and aircraft. Which again, in the current conditions of the state of the system for detecting and issuing information to the Russian Navy, is impossible. By the way, some refer to the miracle weapon, the Shkval missile-torpedo, which is futile to fight the American group, one has only to read its characteristics.

Coastal anti-ship missile systems can not be considered due to the fact that the AUG will not approach the coast at a distance of destruction of anti-ship missiles.

Therefore, for Russia, it is extremely important to develop all kinds of tracking, target designation and electronic warfare systems. Because we have the power to strike, but alas, we won’t be able to hit and / or hit.

The launcher and head part of the rocket of the Granit complex on the Kursk SSGN after lifting, the ZM-45 rocket was fixed with polyurethane. In total, 16 missiles out of 23 were unloaded (including 1 training missile, another training missile was launched shortly before the accident), the rest of the launchers with missiles are filled with polyurethane and are to be disposed of at the Nerpa shipyard along with the remains of the SSGN.

I decided to consider such a long-standing and large-scale issue discussed on the network as a confrontation between Soviet anti-ship missiles and American naval air defense systems. Usually they are compared on the example of the P-700 "Granit" and the AEGIS system. Unfortunately, discussions of this kind are usually held on forums, have the character of a discussion, and isolating the actual information is a clear problem.

Therefore, I decided to conduct an analytical review (within the framework of the information available, of course) and compile the conclusions:

Means of attack, in this case - P-700 "Granite". The missile is indeed impressive - it is almost the crowning achievement of the development of the Soviet line of heavy supersonic ship-based anti-ship missiles. Its length is 10 meters, the wingspan is 2.6 meters, i.e. in terms of dimensions, the rocket approaches light aircraft.

The maximum speed of the rocket is almost 2.5 Mach (about 763 meters per second) when flying at high altitude. Over water, the speed of the rocket is approximately 1.5 Mach (about 458 meters per second). Remember these numbers, they matter.

The defense rests on the AEGIS system: a combat information system that coordinates the actions of AN / SPY-1 general detection radars, AN / SPG-62 targeting radars, and SM-2 missiles.

Defense of AEGIS on the outer line

This part discusses the counteraction to flying "Granites" by AEGIS at a long distance. To be even more precise - at the distance at which the "Granite" is kept on the high-altitude section of the trajectory.

Attention, this is important! Although in all sources the range of "Granite" is simply indicated at 550 km, this is the maximum radius along the combined trajectory. Those. along the trajectory in which the rocket most The path flies high above the water - where there is less air resistance and fuel costs for the flight are significantly reduced - and then, when approaching the target, it dives down and passes the rest of the distance at a low altitude.

A: The flight altitude of the P-700 "Granit" on the high-altitude section of the trajectory is about 14,000 meters. A number of sources indicate even more, but they are doubtful. The later "Onyx", in any case, climbs to a height of about 14,000 meters in the high-altitude section of the trajectory, so I think that taking 14,000 meters we will not be mistaken.

Taking into account the altitude of the AN / SPY-1 radar at 20 meters above sea level, and the altitude of the rocket at 14,000 km, we get a distance to the radio horizon of about 438 km. The detection radius of the AN / SPY-1 radar (table) is approximately 360 km. Those. you can be sure that AEGIS will be able to track the approaching "Granites" from a distance of more than 250 km.

P.S. It should be noted that, other things being equal, most likely, a missile salvo will be detected by an AWACS aircraft at a greater distance. Those. the figure of 250 km is not the detection radius, but the tracking radius, the distance from which AEGIS itself monitors the approaching anti-ship missiles.

B: Now we know that the rocket will be taken for AEGIS tracking somewhere at a distance of 200-250 km. Go ahead.

The radar of the Granit missile has a cruiser-sized target detection radius of about 70 km under normal conditions. Given that the cruiser does not want to be detected at all, and actively uses electronic warfare, let's take a real capture radius of 55 km.

At this distance - 55-70 km - the Granit missile will capture the ship and make a "dive" from a height of 14,000 meters to low altitudes to approach the target. Those. we get that 200-55=145 km. This is the interval at which the Granit flying at high altitude will be confidently followed by the cruiser's radar. And, accordingly, it can be attacked by missiles controlled by AEGIS.

This is the finest hour for carriers of SM-2ER "Standard" (ER - extendent range, large radius). The range of these missiles is about 150-180 km. Consequently, missile attacks on flying anti-ship missiles can begin from the moment the missiles enter a 150-kilometer radius.

How long will "Granit" remain under cruiser missile fire? The distance is 150-55=105 km, the speed of "Granite" is 0.763 km/s, i.e. under fire, the missile will remain for about 125 seconds. A little over 2 minutes.

During this time, a ship equipped with the AEGIS system will be able to fire from 50 rocket shots (for 2 double-girder Mk-26 launchers with a reload cycle of 10 seconds, which were on the first 4 Ticonderoga-class cruisers) to 65 rocket shots (for Mk-41 with a firing cycle of 1 rocket in 2 seconds, standing on the late Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burks). Although the ships carry a limited number of AN / SPG-62 radars used for target designation, this is not a limiting parameter in this case, because the design of the "Standard" quite allows it to "wait" for a queue, flying on inertial guidance to the target area.

What is the probability of shooting down one "Granite" with one "Standard"? The 62-kilogram fragmentation-fragmentation SM-2ER has quite enough power to destroy or severely damage the Granit (which at this stage of the flight is tantamount to shooting down - a heavily damaged missile will not reach the target). Therefore, the problem is only in the hit.

How to estimate the probability of hitting a rocket? From the experience of Vietnam, we know that the probability of hitting a fighter in the conditions of the active use of electronic warfare systems with one missile was about 20%. But the SM-2ER is still somewhat smarter than the radio command air defense systems used in Vietnam, and the electronic warfare equipment of an unmanned missile is much weaker. For simplicity, let's take a probability of 40% as the probability of shooting down one P-700 with one "Standard"

Taking this figure, we get that about 15-22 missiles can be shot down on the outer line. Already some result.

AEGIS Defense on the Inner Line

At a distance of 55 km, the P-500 missile will make a sharp dive down and exit the vulnerability mode. It will go beyond the radio horizon and out of range of AEGIS radars. Moving at a height of about 20 meters, it flies to the target in low-altitude mode, at a speed of about 1.5 Mach.

How soon will the P-700 reappear because of the AEGIS radio horizon? This distance is approximately 30 km. At a speed of 1.5 Mach or 458 meters per second, the P-700 will fly this distance in 65 seconds, i.e. about a minute.

At this distance, the missile will be fired upon by SM-2MR salvos (MR - Medium Radius). Since in this case the missile is NOT VISIBLE until it leaves the radio horizon, AEGIS cannot open fire in advance, launching inertial guided missiles in its direction, and "meet" the approaching P-700 at the maximum missile radius.

Assuming that the system is completely ready to fire, we get that AEGIS will open fire at the same moment when it notices P-700s that have come out from behind the radio horizon. Considering that the SM-2MR has a speed of the order of 3,5 Mach (about 1000 m / s), the first volley of missiles will meet the enemy somewhere in the 20th second of the P-700 flight from the radio horizon, and then the anti-ship missiles will be continuously fired for 25 seconds (until they get within 5 km, out of reach of the SM-2MR)

How many volleys will AEGIS have time to fire? Ships with Mk-26 installations will have time to fire two full salvos (i.e., release 8 anti-ship missiles), ships with Mk-41 will have time to launch 12 anti-ship missiles.

Of course, the probability of hitting will be much lower - for a low-flying target - and, according to calculations, will be somewhere around 25%.

Thus, we get that about 2-3 P-700 anti-ship missiles can be shot down in a low-altitude area.

Close defense

Defense options in this phase are limited. For ships with the Mk-26 at this stage, the only adequate means of self-defense is the universal 127-mm autocannon (2 on the Ticonderoga). The probability of a missile being shot down is estimated to be approximately 0.8 per autocannon. Ships with the Mk-41 can add RIM-7VL "Sea Sparrow" short-range missiles to their autocannons. CIWS "Volcano" should be recognized as a whole, of little use in this case.

Although formally these air defense systems have a radius of up to 25 km, it did not make much sense to shoot them earlier, because this would only take away the guidance channels from the more effective SM-2MR. At point-blank range, however, they are much more effective. Considering that the number of guided "Sea Sparrows", just like the SM-2MR, is limited by guidance channels - i.e. 4 - for the remaining time, the cruiser manages to release about 8 missiles. The probability of hitting should be recognized as similar - 0.25.

Thus, using autocannons and missiles, the Ticonderoga class can stop up to 4 P-700 class missiles at the inner line.

EW facilities:

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of electronic warfare. Typically, Ticonderoga-class ships are equipped with the AN/SLQ-32 EW system integrated with the Mark 36 SRBOC jamming systems. The effectiveness of the system is difficult to assess. But in general, it can be assumed that against such anti-ship missiles as the P-700, the probability of successfully evading a missile on a false target will be no more than 50%.

The capabilities of the AEGIS system to counter the P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles are quite high. On 3 lines of defense, the cruiser can effectively repel an attack of 19-25 missiles. The presence of effective electronic warfare equipment makes it possible to sharply increase this parameter, since there is a high probability of the missile being led to interference.

In general, the theoretical calculation confirms the Soviet conclusion that the effectiveness of the ship's air defense AUG with the advent of AEGIS has increased significantly. A full broadside salvo of a Project 949A submarine (24 P-700 missiles) DOES NOT GUARANTEE a breakthrough in AUG air defense even at the level of having only one Ticonderoga in it and the absence of successful intercepts of anti-ship missiles by patrolling fighters.

Heavy anti-ship missiles (ASMs) have a number of important advantages that lighter and simpler missiles do not have. The balanced development of anti-ship missiles of light and heavy classes will significantly increase the capabilities of our fleet in the fight against the most powerful formations of a potential enemy, primarily aircraft carriers.

The military-technical policy in this area has lately been focused on equipping combat surface ships, submarines and attack aircraft with relatively small-sized missile weapons. The development of complexes with heavy anti-ship missiles has been curtailed, although Basalt, Vulkan and Granit are still in service. Long-range aviation (and naval missile-carrying if it is recreated, which is undoubtedly a necessary step) has the Kh-22 missile system as its main anti-ship weapon.

However, all these systems are relatively outdated, as they were developed in the 60s and 70s. New heavy anti-ship missiles are not currently being created and are not foreseen in the future.

Among the recently adopted long-range anti-ship missile systems, the most capable of hitting modern surface ships has "Onyx". Starting weight - about 3000 kg (with a transport and launch container - 3900 kg), warhead - about 200 kg. The homing head is capable of tracking cruiser-class surface targets at a distance of up to 75 km and has two flight path options. The first - at high altitudes up to 14-15 thousand meters with a decrease to 3-10 meters in the target area. This achieves a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers.

The second option provides for flight on the march and in the target area at extremely low altitudes: from 3-10 meters in the target area to 10-15 meters on the march section. However, the maximum firing range in this case is reduced to 120 km. The flight speed of the rocket is supersonic - from 2.0 M in the march area to 2.5 M in the target area.

When flying along a combined trajectory, the missile initially captures a target at a high altitude, after which it turns off the radar station and descends to extremely low altitudes. As a result, in the middle section, the flight is carried out under the lower boundary of the air defense zone.

Later, after the RCC reaches the range of the radio horizon, the homing head (GOS) turns on again, captures and accompanies the target that the missile is pointing at. In this relatively short section (no more than 20–30 km), the Onyx's supersonic speed makes it difficult to destroy it with short-range air defense systems, as well as jamming the homing head. This anti-ship missile is universal and can be used from surface ships and submarines, as well as from aircraft and coastal missile installations.

Another system related to long-range complexes is the family "Caliber". These are subsonic missiles with a maximum firing range of 300 km. The flight to the target is carried out at extremely low altitude. The energy of the homing head makes it possible to capture cruiser-type targets for auto-tracking at a distance of up to 65 km.

However, the real range will be limited by the radio horizon (30 - maximum 40 km, depending on the size of the target and its height above the water surface). The warhead of the rocket is about 400 kg. This universal system allows the use of missiles both from surface ships and submarines, and from coastal installations.

In addition to long-range missile systems, there are also short-range systems that provide firing up to 50–130 km. Of these, the most common is the RK X-35. This is a subsonic missile with a low-altitude trajectory (10-20 m), which, with a launch weight of 600 kg, has a warhead weighing about 150 kg.

Many small or few powerful

At the same time, it is believed that although a relatively small warhead of each of the missiles is incapable of guaranteed to disable or destroy the enemy ship, the possibility of placing a large number of missiles on a carrier and using a salvo will make it possible to inflict the required damage on the target. Such rockets should be relatively simple, which ensures their cheapness and, accordingly, reduces the cost of a volley.

It is clear that it is impossible to place a large number of large missiles on a carrier. Consequently, they are required to have high selectivity and additional capabilities to overcome the air defense of a ship formation. And this means that they need to be equipped with sufficiently powerful radar homing heads, which make it possible to detect and track sea targets at a distance of 100 km or more, and highly effective on-board recognition systems in order to highlight the main object in the enemy’s ship order.

At the same time, the GOS should have high noise immunity, and the missile itself, if possible, should have its own electronic warfare equipment to break through enemy air defenses. That is, rockets are both heavy and expensive. "Basalt", "Volcano" and "Granite" have a starting weight of 6000 to 8000 kg and the corresponding dimensions. But the range of their firing significantly exceeds this figure for the latest Onyx and Caliber, ranging from 500 km for Basalt and Granite to 700 km for Vulcan.

So is the concept of a heavy, powerful, and therefore bulky and expensive anti-ship missile outdated? Or is it premature to abandon the development of this direction?

Advantages and disadvantages

The cheapness of such weapons makes it possible to produce them in large quantities, to create stocks sufficient for combat operations in a short time. The advantage is the simplicity of both the missiles themselves and the complex as a whole. This contributes to universalization, allows you to place the complexes on ships of all main classes and even on civilian ships if they are mobilized. The strike capabilities of the fleet are significantly increased.

Target distribution is carried out on board the carrier according to data received from external sources. After launch, correction of the flight task is not possible. With a relatively high probability, the enemy, by indirect and direct signs, will reveal the preparation for the strike and the moment of the volley. During the flight time of the missiles, the enemy ship formation will be able to reorganize the order and create a jamming environment. Aiming at the main target will be much more difficult - the missiles will be distributed among all ships.

A volley of Kalibr-type missiles when firing at the maximum range in conditions of enemy movement in a tactical zigzag and when issuing target designation from sources with low accuracy in determining the target location can, with a relatively high probability (up to 0.2–0.4), miss the designated target.

A warhead weighing about 200 kg is capable of reliably incapacitating ships no higher than the frigate class. It will take at least three or four hits to destroy a cruiser. This is evidenced by the experience of the Second World War (to sink a ship of this class, an average of three to four hits of 250 kg bombs was required).

The death of the Sheffield destroyer from the Exocet anti-ship missile hit during the Falklands War is atypical and testifies more to the ineffectiveness of the crew's struggle for survivability than to the power of the missile warhead, which did not even explode: the fire caused by the rocket engine could not be extinguished.

To disable an American aircraft carrier, such missiles will require significantly more - 10-15. This is due to the fact that the zone of destruction from the explosion of the warhead is relatively small and does not allow you to reliably hit the vital parts of a large ship. Its failure or death will follow not so much due to the actual explosion of missile warheads, but from subsequent secondary destruction, which in turn is opposed by the highly effective damage control system of a modern aircraft carrier.

Finally, the target capture range of 75–80 km, achieved at high missile flight altitudes, will not help to avoid hitting modern ships by their air defense systems, whose anti-aircraft weapons (AIA) can hit such air targets at a distance of up to 120–180 km or more. And this means that salvo missiles will be destroyed in the most vulnerable section of the trajectory.

These disadvantages are absent in heavy anti-ship missiles. Among their main strengths, first of all, is the ability to place powerful, highly efficient radio electronic equipment (RES) on board. With a target acquisition range of more than 100–120 km, the probability of an enemy order leaving the viewing band of the seeker of salvo missiles is virtually eliminated, even with low target designation accuracy.

Less stringent weight and size restrictions make it possible to place on them a seeker with a target capture range that exceeds the capabilities of existing and future anti-aircraft missile systems (ADMS), that is, 150-200 km, and thereby avoid defeat on the high-altitude part of the flight path. This also allows the placement of own active electronic warfare assets on heavy anti-ship missiles, which significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's AIA.

At the same time, information exchange between salvo missiles is possible, as well as further automatic selection of their combat formation, which is optimal from the point of view of overcoming air defense. We are talking about the active opposition of the enemy's electronic warfare and a radical increase in the reliability of the selection of the salvo of the main target by missiles in automatic mode. Thus, heavy anti-ship missiles have a significantly higher selectivity for hitting designated targets than light-class missiles.

Low requirements for the target designation system create favorable conditions for the development of anti-ship missile systems with an especially long range - 1000–1200 km or more, which makes it possible to bring their carriers beyond the effective range of carrier-based aviation and anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier groups and formations. Accordingly, the combat stability of carriers of such weapons increases. Reducing the requirements for the target designation system is very important for the Russian Navy, especially in areas of the far sea and ocean zones.

The warhead of heavy anti-ship missiles weighing more than 700-800 kg is guaranteed to break through the structural protection system and ensure the destruction of vital elements deep in the hull of the largest warships. And this means that two or three or four or five such missiles will be required to disable or sink an aircraft carrier.

The disadvantages include high cost, limited on-board carrier kit and, as a result, the difficulty of creating a high-density salvo.

Develop both classes

An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the two conceptual approaches to the development of anti-ship weapons gives grounds to say that they are complementary. The weaknesses of one become the strengths of the other. Thus, the low selectivity of light anti-ship missiles (in conditions of a limited target designation system), combined with the possibility of creating a high-density volley, makes it possible to count on a significant weakening of the air defense system of an enemy naval formation.

At the same time, the relatively small destructive power of the warheads of such missiles is quite consistent with the objects of attack - cruisers, destroyers and frigates from the guards of the main forces.

That is, the expediency of the integrated use of different classes of anti-ship weapons is visible, which will significantly increase its effectiveness compared to the use of any one class.

Five Ways Russia and China Can Sink US Aircraft Carriers. Five ways Russia and China can sink American aircraft carriers Is it possible to sink an aircraft carrier

Many small or few powerful

Advantages and disadvantages

Develop both classes

Regular and irregular English verbs

Where did the Romanov dynasty come from?