German offensive maps. The occupation of the territory of the USSR by the troops of the Third Reich in photographs of Wehrmacht soldiers. It was they who reported to Stalin

After Nazi Germany captured the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and a number of western regions of the RSFSR, tens of millions of Soviet citizens found themselves in the occupation zone. From that moment on, they had to live in fact in a new state.

In the occupation zone

On July 17, 1941, on the basis of Hitler’s order “On civil administration in the occupied eastern regions”, under the leadership of Alfred Rosenberg, the “Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories” was created, which subordinates two administrative units: the Reichskommissariat Ostland with its center in Riga and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine with its center in Rivne.

Later it was planned to create the Reichskommissariat Muscovy, which was supposed to include the entire European part of Russia.

Not all residents of the German-occupied regions of the USSR were able to move to the rear. For various reasons, about 70 million Soviet citizens remained behind the front line and suffered difficult trials.
The occupied territories of the USSR were primarily supposed to serve as a raw material and food base for Germany, and the population as a cheap labor force. Therefore, Hitler, if possible, demanded that agriculture and industry be preserved here, which were of great interest to the German war economy.

"Draconian measures"

One of the primary tasks of the German authorities in the occupied territories of the USSR was to ensure order. Wilhelm Keitel's order stated that, due to the vastness of the areas controlled by Germany, it was necessary to suppress the resistance of the civilian population through intimidation.

“To maintain order, commanders should not demand reinforcements, but use the most draconian measures.”

The occupation authorities maintained strict control over the local population: all residents were subject to registration with the police, moreover, they were prohibited from leaving their places of permanent residence without permission. Violation of any regulation, for example, the use of a well from which the Germans took water, could entail severe punishment, including death by hanging.

The German command, fearing protest and disobedience of the civilian population, gave increasingly intimidating orders. Thus, on July 10, 1941, the commander of the 6th Army, Walter von Reichenau, demanded that “soldiers in civilian clothes, who are easily recognized by their short haircut, be shot,” and on December 2, 1941, a directive was issued calling for “shooting without warning at any civilian of any age and floor that approaches the front line,” and also “immediately shoot anyone suspected of espionage.”

The German authorities expressed every interest in reducing the local population. Martin Bormann sent a directive to Alfred Rosenberg, in which he recommended welcoming abortions of girls and women of the “non-German population” in the occupied eastern territories, as well as supporting the intensive trade in contraceptives.

The most popular method used by the Nazis to reduce the civilian population remained execution. Liquidations were carried out everywhere. Entire villages of people were exterminated, often based solely on suspicion of an illegal act. So in the Latvian village of Borki, out of 809 residents, 705 were shot, of which 130 were children - the rest were released as “politically reliable”.

Disabled and sick citizens were subject to regular destruction. So, already during the retreat in the Belarusian village of Gurki, the Germans poisoned two trains with soup with local residents who were not to be transported to Germany, and in Minsk in just two days - November 18 and 19, 1944, the Germans poisoned 1,500 disabled old people, women and children.

The occupation authorities responded to the killings of German soldiers with mass executions. For example, after the murder of a German officer and five soldiers in Taganrog in the courtyard of plant No. 31, 300 innocent civilians were shot. And for damaging a telegraph station in Taganrog, 153 people were shot.

Russian historian Alexander Dyukov, describing the cruelty of the occupation regime, noted that “according to the most conservative estimates, one in five of the seventy million Soviet citizens who found themselves under occupation did not live to see Victory.”
Speaking at the Nuremberg trials, a representative of the American side noted that “the atrocities committed by the armed forces and other organizations of the Third Reich in the East were so stunningly monstrous that the human mind can hardly comprehend them.” According to the American prosecutor, these atrocities were not spontaneous, but represented a consistent logical system.

"The Hunger Plan"

Another terrible means that led to a massive reduction in the civilian population was the “Famine Plan” developed by Herbert Bakke. The “Hunger Plan” was part of the economic strategy of the Third Reich, according to which no more than 30 million people were supposed to remain from the previous number of inhabitants of the USSR. The food reserves thus freed were to be used to meet the needs of the German army.
One of the notes from a high-ranking German official reported the following: “The war will continue if the Wehrmacht in the third year of the war is fully supplied with food from Russia.” It was noted as an inevitable fact that “tens of millions of people will die of hunger if we take everything we need from the country.”

The “hunger plan” primarily affected Soviet prisoners of war, who received virtually no food. During the entire period of the war, almost 2 million people died of hunger among Soviet prisoners of war, according to historians.
The famine hit no less painfully on those whom the Germans hoped to destroy first - the Jews and Gypsies. For example, Jews were prohibited from purchasing milk, butter, eggs, meat and vegetables.

The food “portion” for Minsk Jews, who were under the jurisdiction of Army Group Center, did not exceed 420 kilocalories per day - this led to the death of tens of thousands of people in the winter of 1941-1942.

The most severe conditions were in the “evacuated zone” with a depth of 30-50 km, which was directly adjacent to the front line. The entire civilian population of this line was forcibly sent to the rear: the migrants were placed in the houses of local residents or in camps, but if there was no space, they could also be placed in non-residential premises - barns, pigsties. The displaced people living in the camps for the most part did not receive any food - at best, “liquid gruel” once a day.

The height of cynicism are the so-called “12 commandments” of Bakke, one of which says that “Russian people have become accustomed for hundreds of years to poverty, hunger and unpretentiousness. His stomach is stretchable, so [don’t allow] any fake pity.”

The school year 1941-1942 for many schoolchildren in the occupied territories never began. Germany counted on a lightning victory, and therefore did not plan long-term programs. However, by the next school year, a decree of the German authorities was promulgated, which declared that all children aged 8 to 12 years (born 1930-1934) were required to regularly attend a 4-grade school from the beginning of the school year, scheduled for October 1, 1942 of the year.

If for some reason the children could not attend school, parents or persons replacing them were required to submit an application to the head of the school within 3 days. For each violation of school attendance, the administration charged a fine of 100 rubles.

The main task of the “German schools” was not to teach, but to instill obedience and discipline. Much attention was paid to hygiene and health issues.

According to Hitler, a Soviet person had to be able to write and read, and he did not need more. Now the walls of school classrooms, instead of portraits of Stalin, were decorated with images of the Fuhrer, and children, standing in front of German generals, were forced to recite: “Glory to you, German eagles, glory to the wise leader! I bow my peasant head very low.”
It is curious that the Law of God appeared among school subjects, but history in its traditional sense disappeared. Pupils in grades 6-7 were required to study books promoting anti-Semitism - “At the Origins of the Great Hatred” or “Jewish Dominance in the Modern World.” The only foreign language left is German.
At first, classes were conducted using Soviet textbooks, but any mention of the party and the works of Jewish authors was removed. The schoolchildren themselves were forced to do this, and during lessons, on command, they covered “unnecessary places” with paper. Returning to the work of the Smolensk administration, it should be noted that its employees took care of the refugees to the best of their ability: they were given bread, free food stamps, and sent to social hostels. In December 1942, 17 thousand 307 rubles were spent on disabled people alone.

Here is an example of the menu of Smolensk social canteens. Lunches consisted of two courses. The first course was served with barley or potato soups, borscht and fresh cabbage; for the second course there was barley porridge, mashed potatoes, stewed cabbage, potato cutlets and rye pies with porridge and carrots; meat cutlets and goulash were also sometimes served.

The Germans mainly used the civilian population for heavy work - building bridges, clearing roads, peat mining or logging. They worked from 6 o'clock in the morning until late in the evening. Those who worked slowly could be shot as a warning to others. In some cities, for example, Bryansk, Orel and Smolensk, Soviet workers were assigned identification numbers. The German authorities motivated this by their reluctance to “pronounce Russian names and surnames incorrectly.”

It is curious that at first the occupation authorities announced that taxes would be lower than under the Soviet regime, but in reality they added taxes on doors, windows, dogs, excess furniture and even beards. According to one of the women who survived the occupation, many then existed according to the principle “we lived one day - and thank God.”

The internationally recognized term “collaborationism” refers to the cooperation of the local population of the occupied territories with the Nazis during the Second World War. In Ukraine, almost a quarter of a century of “independent” existence, attempts are being made to justify the traitors. In this series are decrees on the liquidation of Soviet monuments and their destruction without any decrees, on the honoring of Hauptmann Shukhevych and Bandera, on the recognition of UPA soldiers as veterans, on the removal of “communist-chauvinist literature” from libraries for destruction, etc. All this is accompanied by constant attempts to whitewash “at the scientific level” of Ukrainian nationalists, up to the complete denial of such a phenomenon as Ukrainian collaborationism, in the works of V. Kosik, O. Romaniv, M. Koval, V. Sergiychuk and others.
We have to remind you of well-known facts. All the leaders of the OUN Wire - E. Konovalets, A. Melnyk, S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko - were agents of the German intelligence services since the 1930s. This is confirmed by the same testimony of Abwehr Colonel E. Stolze: “In order to attract the broad masses for subversive activities against the Poles, we recruited the leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Colonel of the Petliura Army, White emigrant KONOVALETS... Soon Konovalets was killed. The OUN was headed by Andrei MELNIK, who, like Konovalets, we attracted to cooperate with German intelligence... at the end of 1938 or at the beginning of 1939, a meeting was organized for Lahousen with Melnik, during which the latter was recruited and received the nickname “Consul”... Germany was intensively preparing for a war against the USSR and therefore measures were taken through the Abwehr to intensify subversive activities, because those activities that were carried out through Melnik and other agents seemed insufficient. For these purposes, the prominent Ukrainian nationalist Stepan BANDERA was recruited, who during the war was released by the Germans from prison, where he was imprisoned by the Polish authorities for participating in a terrorist attack against the leaders of the Polish government.”
Almost all the commanders of the Bandera UPA (not to be confused with the Bulba-Borovets UPA destroyed by Bandera with the help of the Nazis at the end of 1942-1943) are former officers of German units. 1939: “Ukrainian Legion”, also known as the special unit “Bergbauerhalfe” (R. Sushko, I. Korachevsky, E. Lotovich), who fought as part of the Wehrmacht against Poland. 1939 - 1941: Abwehr battalions “Roland” and “Nachtigal” (Hauptmann R. Shukhevych, Sturmbannführer E. Pobigushchiy, Hauptmanns I. Grinoch and V. Sidor, Oberst-lieutenants Yu. Lopatinsky and A. Lutsky, Abwehr lieutenants L. Ortynsky, M. Andrusyak, P. Melnik) - all of them subsequently transferred to the police “Schutzmanschaftbattalion-201”, and from there to the UPA. The commander of the “Bukovinsky Kuren” and military assistant of the OUN (M) P. Voinovsky is a Sturmbannführer and commander of a separate SS punitive battalion in Kyiv. P. Dyachenko, V. Gerasimenko, M. Soltys - commanders of the “Ukrainian Self-Defense Legion” of the OUN (M) in Volyn, also known as “Schutzmanschaftbattalion-31”, which suppressed the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. And also B. Konik (shb–45), I. Kedyumich (shb–303) - executioners of Babyn Yar; K. Smovsky (shb–118) - Khatyn is on his conscience; SB No. 3 - Cortelis. And also the numerous “Ukrainian auxiliary police” (K. Zvarych, G. Zakhvalinsky, D. Kupyak), which in 1943, in full force, joined the SS division “Galicia”. This is not counting the various “Abwehrstelle” teams (M. Kostyuk, I. Onufrik, P. Glyn). One cannot but agree with the thesis of the famous Canadian scientist V.V. Polishchuk that “the OUN lost its loyal Great Britain until May 9, 1945. There was only a short period of time in the OUN Bandera - up to 3 months - a break between the spivdia and the occupiers - when their “powers of power” were established... (end 19 42 - cob 1943)"

He recalled: Stalin was sure that the Germans would break into Moscow, but he planned to defend ​ every house - until the arrival of fresh divisions from Siberia.

On October 12, 1941, the NKVD organized 20 groups of militant security officers: to protect the Kremlin, Belorussky Station, Okhotny Ryad and sabotage in areas of the capital that could be captured. Throughout the city, 59 secret warehouses with weapons and ammunition were set up, the Metropol and National hotels, the Bolshoi Theater, the Central Telegraph and... St. Basil's Cathedral were mined - it occurred to someone that if Moscow was captured, Hitler would come there. Meanwhile the British historian Nicholas Reeds in 1954 he suggested: if the soldiers of the Third Reich had entered Moscow, the “Stalingrad scenario” would have happened. That is, the Wehrmacht exhausts itself in multi-day battles from house to house, then troops arrive from the Far East, and then the Germans capitulate, and the war... ends in 1943!

Anti-aircraft gunners guarding the city. The Great Patriotic War. Photo: RIA Novosti / Naum Granovsky

Fact No. 2 - Officials started panicking

...On October 16, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution “On the evacuation of the capital of the USSR.” The majority understood it this way: any day now Moscow will be surrendered to the Germans. Panic began in the city: the metro was closed, trams stopped running. The very first to rush out of the city were party officials, who only yesterday had called for “war until victory.” Archival documents testify: “On the very first day, 779 senior employees of institutions and organizations fled from the capital, taking with them money and valuables worth 2.5 million rubles. 100 cars and trucks were stolen - these leaders used them to take their families out.” Seeing how the authorities were fleeing from Moscow, the people, picking up their bundles and suitcases, also rushed away. For three days in a row, the highways were clogged with people. But

Muscovites are building anti-tank fortifications. Photo: RIA Novosti / Alexander Ustinov

Fact No. 3 - The Kremlin was not considered

...It is believed that the Wehrmacht was stuck 32 km from what was then Moscow: the Germans managed to capture the village of Krasnaya Polyana, near Lobnya. After this, information appeared that German generals, having climbed the bell tower, examined the Kremlin through binoculars. This myth is very persistent, but from Krasnaya Polyana the Kremlin can only be seen in the summer, and then in absolutely clear weather. This is impossible in snowfall.

On December 2, 1941, an American working in Berlin journalist William Shirer made a statement: according to his information, today the reconnaissance battalion of the 258th Wehrmacht division invaded the village of Khimki, and from there the Germans observed the Kremlin towers with binoculars. How they managed this is unclear: the Kremlin is certainly not visible from Khimki. Plus, on that day, the 258th Wehrmacht Division miraculously escaped encirclement in a completely different place - in the Yushkovo-Burtsevo area. Historians still have not come to a consensus when exactly the Germans appeared in Khimki (now there is a defense monument there - three anti-tank hedgehogs) - October 16, November 30, or still December 2. Moreover: in the Wehrmacht archives... there is no evidence of an attack on Khimki at all.

Fact No. 4 - There were no frosts

…Commander of the 2nd Reich Panzer Army, General Heinz Guderian after the defeat near Moscow, he blamed his failures on... Russian frosts. They say that by November the Germans would have already been drinking beer in the Kremlin, but they were stopped by the terrible cold. The tanks got stuck in the snow, the guns jammed and the grease froze. Is it so? On November 4, 1941, the temperature in the Moscow region was minus 7 degrees (before that it had rained in October, and the roads were soggy), and on November 8 - completely zero (!). On November 11-13, the air froze (-15 degrees), but soon warmed up to -3 - and this can hardly be called “terrible cold.” Severe frosts (minus 40°) struck only at the very beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive - December 5, 1941 - and could not radically change the situation at the front. The cold played its role only when the Soviet troops drove the Wehrmacht armies back (this is where Guderian’s tanks really didn’t start), but stopped the enemy near Moscow in normal winter weather.

Two Red Army soldiers stand next to an overturned German tank, knocked out in the battle of Moscow. Photo: RIA Novosti / Minkevich

Fact No. 5 - Battle of Borodino

...On January 21, 1942, Russians and French met on the Borodino field for the second time in 130 years. The “Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism” - 2,452 soldiers - fought on the side of the Wehrmacht. They were tasked with defending Borodino from the advancing Soviet troops. Before the attack, he addressed the legionnaires Marshal von Kluge: “Remember Napoleon!” Within a few days, the legion was defeated - half of the soldiers died, hundreds were captured, and the rest were taken to the rear with frostbite. As in the case of Bonaparte, the French were unlucky on the Borodino field.

...December 16, 1941 Hitler, amazed by the flight of his army from Moscow, issued an order similar to Stalin’s, “Not a step back!” He demanded to “hold the front until the last soldier,” threatening division commanders with execution. The chief of staff of the 4th Army, Gunter Blumentritt, in his book “Fatal Decisions” indicated: “Hitler instinctively realized that a retreat in the snow would lead to the disintegration of the entire front and our troops would suffer the fate of Napoleon’s army.” This is how it ultimately turned out: three and a half years later, when Soviet soldiers entered Berlin...

The Borodino Museum was destroyed and burned by the Germans during the retreat. The photo was taken in January 1942. Photo: RIA Novosti / N. Popov

The famous German plan “Barbarossa” can be briefly described as follows: it is Hitler’s almost unrealistic strategic plan to capture Russia as the main enemy on the path to world domination.

It is worth remembering that by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, had almost unopposedly captured half of the European states. Only Britain and the USA resisted the aggressor.

The essence and goals of Operation Barbarossa

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, signed shortly before the start of the Great Patriotic War, was nothing more than a head start for Hitler. Why? Because the Soviet Union, without assuming a possible betrayal, fulfilled the said agreement.

And the German leader thus gained time to carefully develop a strategy for capturing his main enemy.

Why did Hitler recognize Russia as the biggest obstacle to the implementation of the blitzkrieg? Because the resilience of the USSR did not allow England and the USA to lose heart and, perhaps, surrender, like many European countries.

In addition, the fall of the Soviet Union would serve as a powerful impetus to strengthen Japan's position on the world stage. And Japan and the United States had extremely tense relations. Also, the non-aggression pact allowed Germany not to launch an offensive in the unfavorable conditions of winter cold.

The preliminary strategy of the Barbarossa plan looked something like this:

1. A powerful and well-trained Reich army invades Western Ukraine, instantly defeating the main forces of the disoriented enemy. After several decisive battles, German forces finish off the scattered detachments of surviving Soviet soldiers.
2. From the territory of the captured Balkans, march victoriously to Moscow and Leningrad. Capture both cities that are extremely important to achieve the intended result. The task of capturing Moscow as the political and tactical center of the country stood out especially. Interesting: the Germans were sure that every single remnant of the USSR army would flock to Moscow to defend it - and it would be as easy as shelling pears to completely defeat them.

Why was Germany's attack plan on the USSR called Plan Barbarossa?

The strategic plan for the lightning capture and conquest of the Soviet Union was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who ruled the Holy Roman Empire in the 12th century.

The said leader went down in history thanks to his numerous and successful campaigns of conquest.

The name of the Barbarossa plan undoubtedly reflected the symbolism inherent in almost all actions and decisions of the leadership of the Third Reich. The name of the plan was approved on January 31, 1941.

Hitler's goals in World War II

Like any totalitarian dictator, Hitler did not pursue any special goals (at least those that could be explained using the elementary logic of common sense).

The Third Reich started the Second World War with the sole purpose: to take over the world, establish dominance, subjugate all countries and peoples with its perverted ideologies, and impose its worldview on the entire population of the planet.

How long did it take for Hitler to take over the USSR?

In general, Nazi strategists allocated only five months - a single summer - to capture the vast territory of the Soviet Union.

Today, such arrogance may seem unfounded, unless we remember that at the time the plan was developed, the German army had captured almost all of Europe in just a few months without much effort or loss.

What does blitzkrieg mean and what are its tactics?

Blitzkrieg, or the tactic of lightning the capture of the enemy, is the brainchild of German military strategists of the early 20th century. The word Blitzkrieg comes from two German words: Blitz (lightning) and Krieg (war).

The blitzkrieg strategy was based on the possibility of capturing vast territories in record time (months or even weeks) before the opposing army came to its senses and mobilized its main forces.

The tactics of a lightning attack were based on the close cooperation of infantry, aviation and tank formations of the German army. Tank crews, supported by infantry, must break through behind enemy lines and surround the main fortified positions important for establishing permanent control over the territory.

The enemy army, being cut off from all communication systems and all supplies, quickly begins to experience difficulties in solving the simplest issues (water, food, ammunition, clothing, etc.). The forces of the attacked country, thus weakened, are soon captured or destroyed.

When did Nazi Germany attack the USSR?

Based on the results of the development of the Barbarossa plan, the Reich's attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15, 1941. The date of the invasion was shifted due to the Nazis carrying out the Greek and Yugoslav operations in the Balkans.

In fact, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war on June 22, 1941 at 4:00 am. This mournful date is considered the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Where did the Germans go during the war - map

Blitzkrieg tactics helped German troops in the first days and weeks of the Second World War to cover enormous distances across the territory of the USSR without any particular problems. In 1942, the Nazis captured a fairly impressive part of the country.

German forces reached almost Moscow. In the Caucasus they advanced to the Volga, but after the Battle of Stalingrad they were driven back to Kursk. At this stage, the retreat of the German army began. The invaders passed through the northern lands to Arkhangelsk.

Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa

If we consider the situation globally, the plan failed due to the inaccuracy of German intelligence data. William Canaris, who led it, may well have been a British double agent, as some historians claim today.

If we take these unconfirmed data on faith, it becomes clear why he “fed” Hitler the misinformation that the USSR had practically no secondary lines of defense, but there were huge supply problems, and, moreover, almost all the troops were stationed on the border.

Conclusion

Many historians, poets, writers, as well as eyewitnesses of the events described, recognize that a huge, almost decisive role in the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany was played by the fighting spirit of the Soviet people, the love of freedom of the Slavic and other peoples who did not want to drag out a miserable existence under oppression world tyranny.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.