Today there is no doubt that the decisive role in preparing the collapse of the “Union of the Indestructible” was played by Gorbachev and his entourage, one part of which actively implemented the disastrous decisions of the General Secretary, and the other silently watched as betrayal corroded the foundations and unity of the country.
And none of the so-called comrades-in-arms ever dared to tell Gorbachev that he was not “a giant, but just a cockroach.” But in the post-Soviet period, some of the General Secretary’s associates hastened to publish memoirs in which they cursed their former patron in every possible way, talking about how they “resisted” the destructive perestroika course.
In this regard, I will try to show how the personnel environment for more than six years created conditions for Mikhail Sergeevich to work on the collapse of the country. I wouldn't want something like this to happen again.
THE DARKER THE NIGHT IS, THE BRIGHTER THE STARS ARE
Narcissistic amateurs like Gorbachev, having broken into power, only care about their image. They surround themselves not with personalities, but with convenient people in order to look like “geniuses” against their background. This feature of Mikhail Sergeevich was noticed by the US Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock, saying: “He felt comfortable only next to the silent or gray…”
Mikhail Sergeevich formulated the essence of his personnel policy during his work in Stavropol. Once, in response to friendly criticism of his personnel approaches, Gorbachev uttered a mysterious phrase: “The darker the night, the brighter the stars.” There is no doubt that he saw himself in the sky as a star of the first magnitude. Therefore, he always shuffled the deck tirelessly, selecting those who were convenient and helpful.
“Architect” of perestroika Alexander Yakovlev (to the left of M. Gorbachev)
By the time Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, Yegor Ligachev, then head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the CPSU Central Committee, managed to replace 70% of the secretaries of regional and regional party committees, installing “his own proven” people, ready to carry out any instructions and ensure a majority at the Plenums of the Central Committee.
With the arrival of Gorbachev, personnel changes became more widespread. In the first three years, the composition of the Central Committee was updated by 85%, which far exceeded the figures of 1934-1939. Then they amounted to about 77%. In 1988, Gorbachev began the “rejuvenation” of the Central Committee apparatus. “Gorbachevites” were appointed to all key positions.
In the same way, the Council of Ministers of the USSR was renewed. There, out of 115 pre-Gorbachev ministers, only ten remained. Nevertheless, despite the endless personnel leapfrog, Gorbachev still believes that HIS perestroika was torpedoed by the conservative apparatus.
In his memoirs “Life and Reforms,” he writes: “...After the 27th Congress (1986), the composition of district and city committees changed three times, and Soviet bodies were almost completely renewed. After the January Plenum of the Central Committee in 1987, there was a change of first secretaries in alternative elections, many “old-timers” retired. A second, third or even fourth “team” took the helm, and things went on as usual. The leaven was so strong. This is how the dogmas of Marxism in a simplified Stalinist interpretation were firmly driven into people’s heads.”
It is difficult to imagine a greater misunderstanding of the situation. It is absolutely clear that in 1988-1989, people came to the leadership of most party organizations in the CPSU who were not only “poisoned” by the dogmas of Marxism, but very far from both Marxism and socialism. As a result, the restructuring of socialism turned into a departure from it. For the same reason, in September 1991, the CPSU quietly died.
PERSONNEL RELATIONS. ARCHITECT OF PERESTROIKA
The main credo of Gorbachev’s personnel policy was the placement of trusted and manageable supporters in key positions, which created personnel ties. By pushing for the appointment of such people, Mikhail Sergeevich showed truly “teeth of steel,” which Politburo Patriarch Andrei Gromyko once said.
USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State J. Shultz
A clear indication of this is the situation with the appointment on July 1, 1985, of the tongue-tied and poor Russian-speaking Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. However, in his memoirs “Life and Reforms,” Gorbachev states without a shadow of embarrassment: “Eduard Shevardnadze is undoubtedly an extraordinary person, an established politician, educated, erudite.”
The damage the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze combination caused to the Soviet Union and, accordingly, Russia is best demonstrated by a quote from the memoirs of former US President George W. Bush:
“We ourselves did not understand such a policy of the Soviet leadership. We were ready to give guarantees that the countries of Eastern Europe would never join NATO, and to forgive many billions of dollars of debt, but Shevardnadze did not even bargain and agreed to everything without preconditions. The same goes for the border with Alaska (we are talking about the delimitation of maritime spaces in the Bering and Chukchi Seas), where we did not count on anything. It was a gift from God."
Yegor Ligachev, who became famous for his phrase in relation to Yeltsin: “Boris, you’re wrong!”
The situation with the appointment of Gennady Yanaev to the post of vice president is no less scandalous. Gorbachev and Lukyanov actually raped the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 1990), pushing through this candidacy. In the end, from the second round, the deputies voted for “a mature politician capable of participating in the discussion and adoption of important decisions on a national scale.” This is how Gorbachev described his candidate Gennady Yanaev for the post of Vice President of the USSR.
I knew Yanaev well; I visited him in the Kremlin office more than once. He was a decent and kind man, completely devoid of Kremlin bureaucratic fanaticism, but not a vice president, as the events of August 1991 confirmed. Apparently, for this reason, Mikhail Sergeevich needed Yanaev so much.
In addition, Gorbachev was aware of Yanaev’s delicate problem: his hands were constantly shaking. During my first meeting with Gennady Ivanovich, I noticed how he took cigarettes with trembling hands and lit them. We were alone in the office, so Yanaev had no reason to worry.
So the trembling hands, supposedly from fear, at the press conference on August 19, 1991, are a myth of journalists. Apparently, this personal aspect also determined Gorbachev’s persistent desire to see Yanaev as vice president. As a result, Mikhail Sergeevich managed to create a very necessary personnel combination between Gorbachev and Yanaev.
In addition to the above, Mikhail Sergeevich managed to create the following personnel connections: Gorbachev - Yakovlev, Gorbachev - Ryzhkov, Gorbachev - Lukyanov, Gorbachev - Yazov, Gorbachev - Kryuchkov, Gorbachev - Razumovsky, Gorbachev - Bakatin.
The central link was Gorbachev - Yakovlev. True, it was created by Yakovlev, not Gorbachev, during his official visit to Canada in 1983. Let's talk about it in more detail.
Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov
It is known that the most important ideas of the disastrous perestroika were instilled in Mikhail Sergeevich by Yakovlev. It is no coincidence that he was called “the architect of perestroika” behind his back.
Yakovlev managed to convince Gorbachev that socialism had no prospects. He also introduced the idea of the priority of universal human values. And he also helped Mikhail Sergeevich to furnish himself with the “right people.”
It is no secret that Yakovlev was the one who insisted on the appointment of Dmitry Yazov as Minister of Defense of the USSR, and Vladimir Kryuchkov as Chairman of the KGB.
Being a good psychologist, Yakovlev felt that, despite all the positive characteristics, the diligence of these two would always prevail over initiative and independence. This subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the USSR.
Yakovlev's real contribution to the collapse of the USSR was revealed in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta (October 10, 1998) by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former adviser to R. Reagan on defense and foreign intelligence. When asked about the role of individuals in the politics of the twentieth century, on a par with such figures as Churchill, Mussolini, Hitler, Mao Zedong, Truman, Stalin, she named Yakovlev.
The surprised journalist asked: “Why Yakovlev? Have you met him? There was an ambiguous answer: “A couple of times. I think he is a very interesting person and has played a huge and important role. I hope he knows I feel that way."
Comments are unnecessary, especially if we recall the statement of Yuri Drozdov, the former head of Directorate “S” of the KGB of the USSR (illegal intelligence), made to a correspondent of Rossiyskaya Gazeta (August 31, 2007): “Several years ago, a former American intelligence officer, whom I knew well, Having arrived in Moscow, over dinner at a restaurant on Ostozhenka he said the following phrase: “You are good guys. We know that you have had successes that you can be proud of. But time will pass, and you will gasp if it is declassified, what kind of agents the CIA and State Department had at your top.”
PERSONNEL LINK-2
Special mention should be made of the Gorbachev-Ryzhkov combination. Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov is an excellent specialist and a person with a heightened sense of decency and responsibility, which did not allow him to properly confront Gorbachev.
They started talking about him as a leader in July 1989, when Ryzhkov said at a meeting of party workers in the Kremlin: “The party is in danger!” Therefore, when at the extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (March 1990) the question of electing a president arose, a number of deputies turned to him with a request to nominate their candidacy.
This is how Vitaly Vorotnikov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, describes this situation: “The situation developed in such a way that, had the prime minister not withdrawn his candidacy, Gorbachev would undoubtedly have been defeated in a normal vote. However, as you know, Nikolai Ivanovich never found the courage to cross the invisible line separating the most senior official from the real party leader. Thus, he gave Gorbachev the post of President of the USSR.”
I want to clarify. In my opinion, and I talked a lot with Nikolai Ivanovich, the main role in Ryzhkov’s refusal to run for president was played not by a lack of courage, but by the decency that I mentioned above. Ryzhkov considered it dishonest to trip up a colleague. Gorbachev was counting on this.
But it was not only Ryzhkov’s position that gave Gorbachev the presidency. The decisive role here was played by the Gorbachev-Lukyanov combination. Anatoly Ivanovich chaired the meeting of the III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which approved an addition to the Constitution establishing the post of President of the USSR. The head of state was to be elected by citizens through direct and secret ballot. But at that time it was already clear that Gorbachev had very little chance of becoming “popularly elected”.
Lukyanov managed to push through, with a tiny margin of 46 votes, the decision that the first elections, as an exception, would be held by the Congress of People's Deputies. M. Gorbachev, N. Ryzhkov and V. Bakatin were nominated as candidates. However, the last two candidates recused themselves. As a result, Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR. This is what it means to put the right person in the right position. This skill could not be taken away from Gorbachev.
A few words about the Gorbachev-Razumovsky connection. Georgy Razumovsky headed the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the Central Committee in May 1985, replacing Ligachev in this post. A year later he acquired the status of Secretary of the Central Committee.
Regulation and ostentation in the work of the country's party organizations under Razumovsky increased significantly. It was he who was responsible for the separatist sentiments that appeared in the Communist Party of Lithuania in 1988.
The fact is that on the eve of the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev called for the development of internal party democracy and openness. But at the same time, from the organizational department of the Central Committee, which was headed by Razumovsky, strict instructions went out to the localities, including the Communist Party of Lithuania, about which delegates should be elected. This caused a wave of indignation not only in the Communist Party of Lithuania, but also in the republic.
The protest sentiments of the Lithuanian communists largely contributed to the creation and development of Sąjūdis in Lithuania. The situation was further aggravated by the complete disregard by the organizational department of the CPSU Central Committee of the critical comments expressed by Lithuanian communists during the reporting and election campaign of 1988.
As a result, on January 19, 1989, the plenum of the Vilnius City Party Committee was forced to re-apply to Razumovsky regarding the critical comments sent from the republic after the reporting and election campaign. However, this time there was no answer.
Then the topic of independence of the Communist Party of Lithuania came up on the agenda in the Lithuanian media. As a result of this discussion, to which the CPSU Central Committee also did not react, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (December 1989) announced the party’s withdrawal from the CPSU. Well, on March 11, 1990, Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the USSR.
In this regard, let me remind you that Gorbachev constantly talked about the old party bureaucratic apparatus, which supposedly lay like a “dam” on the path of perestroika. It is clear that this was verbiage, because in fact such a “dam” was the combination of Gorbachev - Razumovsky and their entourage.
Cover of Vadim Bakatin’s book with the characteristic title “Deliverance from the KGB”
I will add that, according to Russian journalist Evgenia Albats, former candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee Razumovsky, at least until 2001, received a monthly salary from Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s structures. Apparently there was a reason.
The Gorbachev-Bakatin combination caused serious damage to the country.
In October 1988, Vadim Bakatin, the former first secretary of the Kemerovo regional party committee, was appointed to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It would seem that the change is insignificant. Former first The secretary of the Rostov regional committee of the CPSU, Vlasov, was replaced by the first secretary of another regional committee, Bakatin. But this is only at first glance.
Bakatin’s personality is usually associated with the defeat of the Committee. However, his role there was small. The KGB was already doomed in August 1991, and Bakatin only followed the instructions of the puppeteers to “finish off” him. Of much greater interest is the role of Vadim Viktorovich in the collapse of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Offering Bakatin the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, Gorbachev emphasized: “I don’t need police ministers. I need politicians." Bakatin “brilliantly” coped with the role of a police politician. During his two years of work, he caused irreparable damage to the Soviet police.
The minister issued an order according to which police officers received the right to work part-time in other organizations. As a result, this led not only to corruption and the merging of law enforcement agencies with the criminal contingent, but also to the departure of the main professional core of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to commercial structures. This was the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet law enforcement system.
An equally painful blow to this system was dealt by another order from Bakatin - on the liquidation of the intelligence police apparatus. Police officers around the world considered and still consider this agency to be their eyes and ears in the criminal world. Even amateurs know this.
Russia is still experiencing the consequences of the above-mentioned orders of Bakatin. Towards the end of his reign, Vadim Viktorovich dealt another fatal blow to the Soviet law enforcement system. He prepared its actual division into fifteen national republican departments.
Let me give you an example. In 1990, after Lithuania declared independence, the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs not only did not submit to the Union Ministry, but also took hostile positions in resolving controversial issues.
However, Bakatin gave personal instructions that the Ministry of Internal Affairs finance the Ministry of Internal Affairs of independent Lithuania, supply it with modern equipment and help create a police academy in Vilnius, which, by the way, trained personnel in an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian spirit. Bakatin considered this a “constructive step” in relations between the USSR and independent Lithuania.
POLITBURO. DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET GENERALITY
Special mention should be made of the role of the Politburo of the Central Committee under Gorbachev. It was intended to provide collective leadership of the party and the country. However, it turned into a handy tool for blessing the disastrous decisions of the new Secretary General.
Solving this problem, Mikhail Sergeevich already in April 1985 began to change the balance of forces in the Politburo of the Central Committee. First of all, all Gorbachev’s opponents were removed from the PB: Romanov, Tikhonov, Shcherbitsky, Grishin, Kunaev, Aliev. The first to take their place were those who took an active part in the operation to elect him Secretary General: E. Ligachev, N. Ryzhkov and V. Chebrikov.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, dismissed after the “Rust affair”
In total, during his reign, Gorbachev replaced three members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and each of them was much weaker than the previous one. He immediately felt like a master. According to Valery Boldin, a former long-term assistant and in fact “ right hand“Mikhail Sergeevich, he “became completely intolerant of any criticism addressed to him... I remember at a meeting he said to one of the Politburo members: “If you continue to chat, I’ll immediately kick you out the door” (“Kommersant-Vlast”, May 15, 2001 of the year).
That's how! However, members of the PB took this trick of the new Secretary General for granted. The old party apparatus was brought up in very strict traditions.
Special mention should be made of the meeting at which Gorbachev dealt with the generals. The time for the “departure” of the candidate member of the PB, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, came when Gorbachev realized that his one-sided “peacekeeping policy” was being hampered by the military, led by the intransigent Minister of Defense. It is known that Sokolov and his entourage were opponents of the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).
It was then that a grandiose action was conceived to renew the Soviet generals. An incident that occurred in May 1941 was used as an example. Then the German military transport aircraft Junkers-52, checking the Soviet air defense system, unhindered over 1200 kilometers, landed at the Tushinsky airfield in Moscow. As a result, the Soviet military command and, above all, the air force, were hit by a wave of repression, and almost everything was replaced.
On May 28, 1987, Border Guard Day, a Cessna-172 Skyhawk sports plane landed on Vasilyevsky Spusk near Red Square, with German amateur pilot Matthias Rust at the helm. Gorbachev, having arrived in the evening of that day from Romania, held a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee right in the Vnukovo-2 government hall. On it, Marshal Sokolov was dismissed, and Yazov, who conveniently happened to be at the airport, was immediately appointed minister.
On May 30 of the same year, a meeting of the PB regarding Rust took place in the Kremlin. The tone was set by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ryzhkov, who demanded the immediate removal of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense. Well, then everything went according to plan. Yakovlev, Ligachev, Gorbachev spoke: resign, remove, punish.
Matthias Rust on Vasilyevsky Spusk shortly after landing
Surprisingly, no one remembered that after the scandalous situation in September 1983 with the South Korean Boeing, the USSR signed an addition to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which categorically prohibited shooting down civil aircraft.
No one touched on the question of why the plane, after crossing the border for 3 hours and 20 minutes, disappeared from radar screens and landed with fairly full tanks. KGB Chairman V. M. Chebrikov did not say a word about the fact that, in anticipation of Rust, trolleybus wires were allegedly cut on the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge, and professional television cameras were installed on Red Square.
According to the operational duty officer of the Moscow Air Defense District, Major General Vladimir Reznichenko, at the very moment when Rust’s plane flew up to Moscow with a tailwind, he unexpectedly received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces to turn off the automated air defense control system to carry out preventive work.
The plane on which M. Rust flew, in the Berlin Technical Museum
One of the most vulnerable points of air defense is the border between location zones. According to General I. Maltsev: “the target was lost because the continuous radar field was only in a narrow strip along the border, then there were dead zones, and for some reason Rust chose them for the flight.”
The question is, how could a German amateur pilot know about the boundaries of such “dead zones”? According to the chief of staff of the Tallinn Air Defense Division, Colonel V. Tishevsky, in the air defense system of that time there was the following rule: every 24 hours the boundaries of such zones were changed. However, on May 27 such a command was not received, so on May 28 the boundaries of the location zones established the day before continued to apply.
It turns out that Rust knew about the boundaries of the “dead” zones. Information could only be obtained from the USSR. The question is: through whom? Allegedly, Rust landed in the area of Staraya Russa (“AiF”, No. 31, July 2013).
M. Rust during the trial.
The newspaper quotes the author of the TV program “Moment of Truth,” Andrei Karaulov: “I ask Rust: “Do you want me to show you a photo of how your plane is refueled?” Rust did not answer, remained silent, he was not interested in looking at the photographs, only his eyes darted around ... "
By the way, this version appeared almost immediately as soon as Rust was detained. Journalist M. Timm from the German magazine “Bunde” drew attention to two facts. Firstly, Rust took off in a green shirt and jeans, and in Moscow he got off the plane in a red jumpsuit. Secondly, in Helsinki, only the sign of the Hamburg flying club appeared on board his plane, while in Moscow people could see the image of a crossed out atomic bomb pasted onto the tail stabilizer.
The intermediate landing was needed to mislead the radio engineering units of the air defense forces: to disappear from the radar screens, and then take off again, turning from a “border violator” into a domestic “flight violation.”
No one at the Politburo of the Central Committee raised the question that Rust followed a surprisingly clear route, as if knowing how the air defense system in the northwestern direction of the USSR was built. It is known that in March 1987, Marshal Sokolov left maps of the country’s air defense in this particular direction to the Secretary General.
As the former commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, Army General Pyotr Deinekin, later stated, “there is no doubt that Rust’s flight was a carefully planned provocation of Western intelligence services. And, most importantly, it was carried out with the consent and knowledge of individuals from the then leadership of the Soviet Union.”
“In the Rust case, it is necessary to carefully separate real facts from exaggerated sensations,” says Pavel Evdokimov, editor-in-chief of the Spetsnaz Rossii newspaper. - So, for example, at the suggestion of Andrei Karaulov, the version about trolleybus wires, which were removed in advance in the Cessna landing area, became widely circulated.
However, everything was exactly the opposite: new ones appeared! After. When investigator Oleg Dobrovolsky got acquainted with the photographs from the scene of the emergency, he asked Rust in amazement: “Tell me, Matthias, how could you even land the plane on the bridge?..” He replied that there were obstacles only in three places: at the beginning, at middle and end. They began to find out... And it turned out that a day or two later, on the instructions of the leadership of the Moscow City Executive Committee, wires appeared every twenty meters.
Another thing is how was Rust able to overcome what happened? In criminal case No. 136 of the Investigative Department of the KGB of the USSR, the answer of a witness, traffic police officer S.A. Chinikhin was recorded: “If you don’t know where the guy wires are on the bridge, you have to assume that there was a possibility of a catastrophe.”
One of two things: either we are dealing with some kind of “secret operation”, multiplied by favorable coincidences, or everything that happened is a truly amazing coincidence of circumstances that allowed Rust to fly to Moscow.
The same Karaulov talks about the presence of a photograph of the Cessna refueling near Staraya Russa. Fine! Then why hasn't it been published yet? It seems that Karaulov simply took Rust “at gunpoint” to see his reaction.
Be that as it may, in May 1987, Gorbachev could present the matter in such a way that the Soviet Armed Forces were supposedly pursuing the intruder along the entire route of his movement, from the border, and did not shoot down solely because of humanism and goodwill - in the spirit of Perestroika, Glasnost and Democratization. And the international resonance from such a noble position would be enormous! However, Gorbachev acted completely differently,” concludes Pavel Evdokimov.
The analysis at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the scandalous flight of Rust ended with the displacement of almost the entire top of the Armed Forces of the USSR. “One afternoon, in early June,” recalled Ligachev’s assistant V. Legostaev, “Yakovlev, as usual, unexpectedly appeared in my office. By that time, he had already become a member of the Politburo, close to the Secretary General. A.N.’s broad, roughly outlined face shone with a triumphant smile. He was in a frankly elevated, almost festive mood. Right from the threshold, triumphantly holding out his palms in front of him, he blurted out: “Wow! All hands are covered in blood! Up to your elbows!”
From the excited explanations that followed, it turned out that my guest was returning from the next meeting of the Politburo, at which a personnel showdown was held in connection with the Rust case. A decision was made to remove a number of senior Soviet military leaders from their posts. The results of this meeting brought Yakovlev into such an enthusiastic, victorious state. His hands were “stained with the blood” of his defeated adversaries.”
On December 8, 1987, M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan freely signed the INF Treaty, which today is considered the actual surrender of the USSR to the United States.
ANTI-ALCOHOL POLITIBURO
The next Politburo of the Central Committee that deserves attention concerns the results of the famous anti-alcohol campaign initiated by Gorbachev in May 1985. A discussion of these results took place on December 24, 1987. A note by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Vorotnikov, “On the consequences of the anti-alcohol campaign in the RSFSR” was discussed. The facts presented there were damning. But Gorbachev stood his ground: “The decision was correct. We will not change our principled position.” And everyone once again agreed with the Secretary General.
But Gorbachev turned out to be crafty. In 1995, he published the book “Life and Reforms,” in which he titled one chapter “Anti-alcohol campaign: a noble plan, a disastrous result.” In it, he transferred the responsibility for the failure to the Secretary of the Central Committee Yegor Ligachev and the Chairman of the Party Control Committee Mikhail Solomentsev. Allegedly, they were the ones who “brought everything to the point of absurdity. They demanded that local party leaders, ministers, and business executives “exceed” the plan to reduce the production of alcohol and replace it with lemonade.”
However, the former Minister of Finance of the USSR, and later Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Valentin Pavlov, revealed the exact calculation and intent that Gorbachev and Yakovlev laid on the anti-alcohol campaign: “The world experience of attempts to introduce prohibition teaches that prohibitions for inoculating sobriety in the population are useless, but are extremely favorable to create mafia structures and enrich them. The results of the campaign in the USSR were not long in coming, in exact accordance with world experience. Gorbachev and Yakovlev could not have been unaware of this experience, but they were solving a different problem and, apparently, were ready to pay any price for its successful solution.”
There is no doubt that the “fathers” of perestroika were in a hurry to create in the USSR a social basis for the restoration of capitalism. And they found it in the shadow of the mafia-criminal business. According to various estimates, the state lost up to 200 billion rubles in the fight against alcoholism. The “shadow workers” put the lion’s share of this amount into their pockets. And Mikhail Sergeevich has been friends with the “shadow people” since Stavropol times.
The second part of the social base of the capitalist restoration was made up of the party, Soviet and especially economic nomenklatura. Favorable conditions were also created for its successful integration into capitalism. This was facilitated by the adopted laws on state-owned enterprises, cooperation and foreign economic activity.
As a result, the majority of Soviet directors were able to lay the foundation of personal well-being on the ruins of their enterprises with the help of cooperatives, which they generously shared with the party and Soviet nomenklatura. This is how the class of owners of democratic Russia was formed. And his fathers should be considered not only Gaidar and Chubais, but above all Gorbachev and Yakovlev.
Let's finish the story about the strange August State Emergency Committee. Today, when everyone witnessed the coup that took place in Kiev, where power passed to the Maidan militants, it became clear that not only the blatant corruption of Ukrainian officials, but, above all, the weakness of the authorities, provoked the militants to commit lawlessness.
The events in Kyiv again recalled the Moscow events of August 1991. The indecisiveness and uncertainty of the position of the State Emergency Committee, led by the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov, led to the defeat of the State Emergency Committee.
By the way, the Gekachepists could count on the support of the majority of the population of the USSR. I would like to remind you that in March 1991, 70% of the population of the “Union of the Indestructible” spoke in favor of maintaining a single state.
ARREST YELTSIN. "WAIT FOR THE TEAM!"
As you know, special group “A” of the KGB of the USSR, led by Hero of the Soviet Union V.F. Karpukhin, has been in the Arkhangelskoye area since the night of August 18-19, 1991. But the order to isolate Yeltsin, despite repeated telephone requests from the commander of Group A, never came.
In this regard, I will quote a direct participant in those events - the President of the International Association of Veterans of the Alpha anti-terror unit, deputy of the Moscow City Duma Sergei Goncharov:
“Karpukhin reported to headquarters that we are in place and ready to carry out the order. The command followed, and I heard it clearly: “Wait for instructions!” It's starting to get light. I say to Karpukhin: “Fedorych! Report to headquarters - dawn is coming soon." Again the command: “Wait! Contact me later." Our commander took responsibility: “What are we waiting for!” And we relocated to a village located next to Arkhangelskoye.
The mushroom pickers went... People, seeing the fighters in an unusual uniform - in “spheres” and with them in their hands, were scared and began to shy away from us and return home.
As I understand it, the information reached Korzhakov. I say: “Fedorych, call again! Everyone understands that we have already been deciphered!” Karpukhin goes to management. A new order is formulated for him: “Move forward to the position of option No. 2” - this is to capture at the moment of advancement. We take off the guys, get back into the cars and move out about two kilometers, starting to disguise ourselves. But how can so many armed people do this? The villagers looked at us with obvious fear, they didn’t even go out for water...
Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Fedorovich Karpukhin (1947-2003). It was he, as the commander of Group “A” of the KGB of the USSR, who was waiting for the order to arrest Boris Yeltsin. And I didn't receive it.
OK. We worked out the operation on how to block the advance, and Karpukhin reported that he was ready. It was 6 o’clock - it was light, everything was visible, there was a stream of cars heading to Moscow. From headquarters again: “Wait for instructions, there will be an order!”
By 7 o'clock, service vehicles with security began to arrive at Arkhangelskoye. We see some high ranks. Okay, we sent our reconnaissance. It turns out that Khasbulatov, Poltoranin and someone else arrived. Let's report. To us again: “Wait for instructions!” All! We don’t understand what they want from us and how to carry out the operation!
Somewhere around 8 a.m., intelligence officers report: “A column - two armored ZILs, two Volgas with the security of Yeltsin and the persons who arrived there is moving onto the highway. Get ready for surgery! Karpukhin calls headquarters once again and hears: “Wait for the command!” - “What are you waiting for, the column will pass in five minutes!” - “Wait for the command!” When we already saw them, Fedorych again pulled the phone off. To him again: “Wait for the command!”
The command never arrived. Why? The members of the State Emergency Committee, including Kryuchkov, did not give a clear answer to this question. It is obvious that none of its organizers dared to take responsibility. There was no man of the caliber of Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, but he was in Kyiv and could not influence the development of events.
Or perhaps there was some complex double or triple play going on. I don’t know, it’s hard for me to judge... The last head of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Anatoly Lukyanov, in an interview with the Russian press, reported that the State Emergency Committee was created at a meeting with Gorbachev on March 28, 1991. And Gennady Yanaev said that the documents of the State Emergency Committee were developed on behalf of the same Gorbachev.
After Yeltsin’s motorcade passed us at high speed, Karpukhin picked up the phone: “What should we do now?” - “Wait, we’ll call you back!” Literally five minutes later: “Take some of your officers under guard at Arkhangelskoye.” - "For what?!" - “Do what you are told! The rest - to the unit!
The time when the Emergency Committee could have won was wasted. Yeltsin was given precious time to mobilize his supporters and take active action. At about 10 or 11 o'clock we returned to N-sky Lane, to the place of permanent deployment. And on the central television, instead of the programs announced in the broadcast network, they showed “Swan Lake”. The tragedy of the state turned into a farce.”
…Then the whole situation collapsed like a house of cards. Yeltsin, having climbed onto a tank near the White House, declared the actions of the State Emergency Committee unconstitutional. In the evening, a news broadcast went on television, in which information was announced that put the final end to the State Emergency Committee. The disastrous press conference held by the Gekachepists also played a role.
In a word, it turned out not to be the State Emergency Committee, but almost a madhouse. In fact, there was a repetition of the January situation in Vilnius in 1991. Meanwhile, it is known that the KGB always carefully prepared its operations. Let us recall at least the first phase of the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, for which the security officers were responsible. Everything was calculated down to the minute.
However, much becomes clear when it turns out that the two “irreconcilable enemies”, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, actually worked in tandem. Former Russian Minister of Press and Information Mikhail Poltoranin stated this to Komsomolskaya Pravda (August 18, 2011). Apparently, the head of the KGB knew or guessed about this connection, which determined the strange duality of his behavior. Moreover, V. Kryuchkov, judging by his conversation with the head of the PGU (intelligence) of the KGB, Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, decided to bet on Yeltsin back in June 1990.
At the same time, Vladimir Alexandrovich could not get rid of the feeling of personal obligation to Gorbachev. As a result, his behavior was a clear example of following the principle of “ours and yours.” But in politics, such duality of position is usually punished. Which is exactly what happened.
CERTIFICATE OF PRINCE SHCHERBATOV
Boris Yeltsin, who played a subordinate role in the “link,” realized that the “putsch” gave him a rare opportunity to put an end to Gorbachev. Unfortunately, Boris Nikolaevich, trying to throw Mikhail Sergeevich out of big politics, at the same time, without regret, said goodbye to the Union.
Once again, we should recall Gorbachev’s treacherous behavior in a situation when Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich, meeting in Viskuli, announced the cessation of the activities of the USSR as an international entity.
This is now being said about the legitimacy of the statement adopted by the troika. And then the conspirators knew very well that they were committing a crime and met precisely in Belovezhskaya Pushcha so that, as a last resort, they could leave on foot for Poland.
It is known that after Viskuley, Yeltsin was afraid to come to the Kremlin to see Gorbachev. He was sure that he would give the command to arrest him, but... Mikhail Sergeevich chose to let the situation take its course. He was satisfied with the situation of the collapse of the USSR, since in this case the likelihood of bringing him to justice for the crimes committed disappeared.
Sworn enemies Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, however, played a common role in the collapse of the Soviet Union
Earlier, I already wrote that during this period Gorbachev was not thinking about how to preserve the Union, but about how to provide himself with a deficit for the future: food, drinks and housing. It is no coincidence that the long-time head of Mikhail Sergeevich’s security, KGB General Vladimir Timofeevich Medvedev, aptly emphasized that Gorbachev’s main ideology was the ideology of self-survival.
Unfortunately, at that time many of the Soviet political and military elite tried to provide themselves with a material foundation for the future. In this regard, we should talk about how in 1991 the Americans bought up the Soviet elite, helping Yeltsin come to power. I will cite the testimony of Prince Alexei Pavlovich Shcherbatov (1910-2003) from the Rurik family, president of the Union of Russian Nobles of North and South America.
On the day of the “putsch,” Shcherbatov flew to Moscow from the United States to participate in the congress of compatriots. The prince outlined his impressions of this trip
in the memoirs entitled “Very Recent History. First trip to Russia."
By the will of fate, Shcherbatov found himself in the thick of the events of August 1991. He, as an influential American citizen, had direct access to the US Ambassador to the USSR Robert Strauss, who was a very informed person. The prince, who remained a Russian patriot at heart, was acutely worried about the events of August 1991. Therefore, he was interested in everything connected with them.
In an article published by the popular Orthodox newspaper “Vera” - “Eskom” (No. 520), Prince Shcherbatov said: “... I tried to find out more details of the preparation of the coup. And in a few days I clarified something for myself: the Americans and the CIA spent money through their ambassador to Russia, Robert Strauss, using his connections to bribe the military: the Taman and Dzerzhinsk airborne divisions, which were supposed to go over to Yeltsin’s side. The son of Marshal Shaposhnikov, Minister of War Grachev, received a lot of money.
Shaposhnikov now has an estate in the south of France and a house in Switzerland. I heard from George Bailey, my longtime friend who worked for many years in the CIA, that the amount allocated for the USSR was more than one billion dollars. Few knew that in 1991, special planes under the guise of diplomatic cargo delivered money to Sheremetyevo airport; they were distributed in packs of 10-, 20-, 50-bill banknotes to government leaders and the military. These people were later able to participate in privatization. Today this is a known fact.
Former delegates of the conference in Shatagua took part in the coup: General Chervov helped distribute money among the military; one of the directors of the Banks Trust Company, John Crystal, as I learned, passed the amounts received from the CIA through his bank. It turned out that if Soviet officials were given good bribes, it would not be difficult to destroy the Soviet Union.”
It remains to add that the journalist’s conversation with Prince Shcherbatov, who was called “the man-legend of Russian history,” took place in New York, in a house in Manhattan, in the summer of 2003.
BETRAYAL OF SHEVARDNADZE
Treason has long settled in the Kremlin. On February 14, 2014, the Rossiya 1 TV channel showed the film “Afghan” by journalist Andrei Kondrashov. In it, one of the relatives of the famous Mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Masud said that most of the military operations of the Soviet troops against the Mujahideen ended in nothing, since Masud received timely information from Moscow about the timing of these operations.
NATO has always welcomed Eduard Shevardnadze, M. Gorbachev's closest ally, as a dear guest. Not yet put into circulation
The film voiced another fact of obvious betrayal of the Soviet leadership. It is known that before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, an agreement was reached with the same Ahmad Shah Massoud on a mutual ceasefire. However, at the insistence of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and on the instructions of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Gorbachev, on January 23-26, 1989, Soviet troops launched a series of massive missile and air strikes on areas under the control of Ahmad Shah Massoud. This was not only a treacherous decision by the Kremlin, but also a war crime.
In this regard, the Republic of Afghanistan has all the legal grounds to declare M. Gorbachev and E. Shevardnadze war criminals, and can also demand their extradition to conduct a criminal trial against them.
Shevardnadze proved himself not only in Afghanistan. It is known that in April 1989, Shevardnadze spoke at the Politburo of the Central Committee for the immediate restoration of order in the protesting Tbilisi and the prosecution of the leader of the Georgian opposition, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. However, having appeared in Tbilisi on April 9, 1990, after the well-known tragic events, it was Shevardnadze who began to voice the version about the inadequacy of the military’s actions in dispersing the protesters, while emphasizing the use of sapper blades by the paratroopers - which, as evidenced by the film shot by KGB cameramen, only covered their faces from flying stones and bottles.
I remember that in March 1990, at meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee dedicated to Lithuania’s exit from the USSR, Shevardnadze was one of those who demanded the most decisive measures be taken against the Lithuanian separatists and the return of constitutional order in the republic. But in fact, he and A. Yakovlev constantly supplied Landsbergis with information.
On June 1, 1990, Shevardnadze committed an act of treason. While on a visit to Washington, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, together with US Secretary of State John Baker, he signed an agreement under which the States “gained” free of charge more than 47 thousand square kilometers of the Bering Sea, rich in fish and hydrocarbons.
There is no doubt that Gorbachev was informed about this deal. Otherwise, Shevardnadze would not have fared well in Moscow. Otherwise, how can we understand that Gorbachev blocked any actions to recognize this “deal” as illegal. The Americans, knowing in advance about such a reaction from the head of the USSR, quickly took control of this area. It must be assumed that Shevardnadze and Gorbachev’s remuneration for this “service” was an extremely substantial amount.
Undoubtedly, Kryuchkov knew about this dubious deal, but he never dared to publicly declare the betrayal of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Well, these two received the money, but why was he silent? By the way, in modern Russia there is also a “conspiracy of silence” around this event.
The practice of bribing national elites of “independent” US states in last years applies very intensively and effectively. Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt... The latest example is Ukraine.
Russian political scientist Marat Musin said that Yanukovych’s vague position regarding the rampaging Maidan was determined by the desire of the Ukrainian president to preserve the billion “greens” that he kept in the United States. Vain hopes. In the United States, the money of the Iranian Shah M. Reza Pahlavi, the President of the Philippines F. Marcos, the President of Iraq S. Hussein, the President of Egypt H. Mubarek and other former “friends” of America disappeared into oblivion.
The entourage of the Ukrainian president also managed to make good money. Most of them have already left Kiev with their households for their “reserve airfields”, similar to those that our “Russian jingoist” Yuri Luzhkov had previously created for himself in Austria and London.
There is no doubt that a significant part of the Russian ruling elite, if the situation in the country worsens, will also follow the example of their Ukrainian “colleagues.” Fortunately, their “alternate airfields” have long been ready.
THIRTY SILVER GORBACHEV
Mikhail Sergeevich also won a good sum for his betrayal. Paul Craig Roberts, an American economist and publicist, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the government of R. Reagan, told the Izvestia newspaper in 2007 how this was done.
He recalled the time when his supervisor was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs (Melvin Laird was then Secretary of Defense). Taking this opportunity, Roberts asked him how the United States forces other countries to dance to its tune. The answer was simple: “We give their leaders money. We buy their executives."
Roberts cited former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as an example. As soon as he left office, he was appointed adviser to financial corporations on a salary of £5 million. In addition, the United States gave him a series of performances - for each Blair received from 100 to 250 thousand dollars. It is known that the US State Department organized a similar program for ex-President Gorbachev.
However, Mikhail Sergeevich, explaining his participation in advertising campaigns, refers to a lack of funds, which he then allegedly directs to finance the Gorbachev Foundation. Maybe, maybe... However, it is known what considerable compensation Gorbachev received from Yeltsin for his “non-conflict” departure from the Kremlin.
It is also known that Mikhail Sergeevich received the Freedom Medal from the United States in September 2008 for “ending the Cold War.” The medal came with $100,000. To this should be added the Nobel Peace Prize, which R. Reagan “procured” for Gorbachev in 1990. However, without a doubt, this is only a certain part of the material well-being that the States provided to the former president of the USSR.
It is known that in 2007 Gorbachev acquired an impressive castle in Bavaria, where he lives with his household. “Castle Hubertus”, where previously there was a Bavarian orphanage in two large buildings, is registered in the name of his daughter, Irina Virganskaya.
In addition, Mikhail Sergeevich owns or uses two villas abroad. One is in San Francisco, the other is in Spain (next to the villa of singer V. Leontyev). He also has real estate in Russia - a dacha in the Moscow region (“Moscow River 5”) with a plot of 68 hectares.
The financial capabilities of the former USSR President are evidenced by the “modest” wedding of his granddaughter Ksenia, which took place in May 2003. It took place in the Moscow fashionable restaurant Gostiny Dvor, which was cordoned off by police. The food at the wedding was, as the media wrote, “no frills.”
For cold dishes they served medallions of goose liver (foie gras) and figs, black caviar on an ice base with warm pancakes, chicken with mushrooms in thin puff pastry. In addition, guests indulged in fried hazel grouse and moose lips. The highlight of the gastronomic program was a three-tier snow-white cake one and a half meters high.
There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future Gorbachev will be able to organize more than one such celebration for his granddaughters. Unfortunately, lifelong retribution, apparently, will never pass him by. But besides the human court, there is another Court, which sooner or later will pay tribute to this greatest of traitors - Herostratus of the 20th century. And the US State Department will no longer help there.
Ctrl Enter
Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter
And tried to stop him. And therefore, it is no coincidence that Gorbachev, almost immediately after coming to power, struck at the Azerbaijani security officer. So what could the “competent authorities” know about the last Soviet General Secretary?
The main role in the collapse of the USSR was played by Stavropol Judas M. Gorbachev, who was brought to power in the USSR with the help of external forces. During the 6 years of his leadership of the USSR, the external debt increased by 5.5 times, and the gold reserves DECREASED by 11 times. The USSR made unilateral military-political concessions. M. Gorbachev caused the greatest damage to his Fatherland in the history of the country. No country in the world has NEVER had such a leader. Therefore, a Public Tribunal over Judas is needed to identify the reasons that contributed to his rise to power and destructive anti-state activities.
« When WE received information about the upcoming death of the Soviet leader (we were talking about Yu. V. Andropov), we thought about the possible coming to power with our help of a person, thanks to whom we could realize our intentions. This was the assessment of my experts (and I always formed a very qualified group of experts on the Soviet Union and, as necessary, contributed to additional emigration of the necessary specialists from the USSR). This person was M. Gorbachev, who was characterized by experts as a careless, suggestible and very ambitious person. He had good relationships with the majority of the Soviet political elite, and therefore his coming to power with our help was possible».
Margaret Thatcher. Member of the Trilateral Commission- January 1992.
While reading a book Panarin Igor Nikolaevich « First World Information War» came across interesting material about M.S. Gorbachev. He cites some excerpts from an article dated December 29, 2004 in the newspaper “Rossiyskie Vesti” by Leonid Smolny “ General liquidator».
"For some people, autumn comes early and stays for life... Where do they come from? From the dust. Where are they heading? To the grave. Does blood flow in their veins? No, it's the night wind. Is the thought pounding in their heads? No, it's a worm. Who speaks with their lips? Toad. Who is looking through their eyes? Snake. Who listens with their ears? Black abyss. They stir up human souls with an autumn storm, they gnaw at the foundations of reason, they push sinners to the grave. They rage and are fussy in explosions of rage, they sneak, track, lure, from them the moon turns a gloomy face and the clear flowing waters are clouded. These are the people of autumn. Beware of them on your way".
Ray Douglas Bradbury, "Something Bad is Coming".
On March 2, 1931, a boy was born in the village of Privolnoye, Stavropol Territory. He will grow up, graduate from Moscow University, fate will elevate him to the very pinnacle of power in a mighty and great country, he will be enthusiastically received outside his homeland and cursed in his homeland. He will change the map of the planet and reverse evolution. It will undoubtedly end up in the history books, in fact it already has. It’s just a pity that he forgot that you can not only get into history, but also get stuck.
Came down from the mountains
By the beginning of the 80s, the Soviet Union was still outwardly strong, but it was already being undermined from within by invisible “worms” and “moles.” The country needed reforms, this was clear to everyone. The question was whose group would come to power and, accordingly, whose strategic line would prevail. The Brezhnev clan was preparing its candidacy for a “successor” to replace the leader who had fallen into senile impotence. At one time, certain forces put forward the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Belarusian Republican Party Committee Petra Masherova, who died mysteriously in a car accident. They also talked about St. Petersburg Romanov. But he was compromised by the intelligence services.
However, unexpectedly for many, he comes to the post of Secretary General Yuri Andropov. It seemed like a long time. Contrary to the intensely spreading rumors about Yuri Vladimirovich’s poor health, he could have lasted in the Kremlin for more than one year. Did not work out. Konstantin Chernenko also flew fleetingly in the people's memory. The country was tired of funerals, and in March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Secretary General.
Much has been written about the intrigues that accompanied the nomination and promotion of Mikhail Sergeevich to this high position. But not all. Writers and analysts who thoughtfully discuss the undercurrents in the “Kremlin aquarium” for some reason do not mention one remarkable circumstance. Gorbachev is a southerner, the mystical Caucasus Mountains are located near his Stavropol region. And in the south, everything not only grows quickly, but also takes root in ways that you can’t immediately identify.
There is a certain mystery in the mechanism of MSG promotion to the top.
A provincial secretary with an appropriate outlook and a limited vocabulary from old political economy textbooks objectively had no chance of moving to Moscow. But they moved him. As they say, including the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Yuri Andropov (which is not true, but more on that below). Gorbachev was the first secretary of the Stavropol regional committee, the king and god of the largest region of the country, where party bosses like Andropov and Suslov loved to relax, and the curator of “failed” agriculture.
Another mystery: the leader KGB of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, presumably, knew something about Gorbachev’s Stavropol past and tried to stop him. Yuri Andropov at one time promoted Aliyev to Moscow in order, apparently, to use his dossier against Mikhail Sergeevich at the last moment. And therefore, it is no coincidence that Gorbachev, almost immediately after coming to power, struck at the Azerbaijani security officer. So what could the “competent authorities” know about the last Soviet General Secretary? What scared Mikhail Sergeevich so much?
Party intrigue
The reform plans that Yuri Andropov started included a lot, but there was never any talk about the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Gorbachev later did, who did not hesitate to call himself Yuri Vladimirovich’s nominee.
Andropov intended to move the CPSU away from governing the country, transferring full power to Soviet “business executives.” The Soviet government, and not a conclave of Politburo elders, should have headed the management vertical. And Andropov also wanted to create a two-party system in the country, where the ruling party would constantly feel the breath of a competitor on the back of its neck. This version of reforms seems to be very different from what Mikhail Sergeevich subsequently did with the gullible people.
It is clear that the removal of the CPSU from power was not an easy matter. It was first necessary to “bleed” the party, to introduce disorganization into the orderly ranks. The reason for the offensive was the financial sins of the Soviet economic elite, whose affairs became the subject of attention of KGB officers. However, before Andropov arrived, they could not put the accumulated information into action, because the “business executives” were covered by high-ranking party officials. But now, in 1982, the “committee” seriously took on the Krasnodar and Astrakhan secretaries. But few people know that the third on this list was the former secretary of the Stavropol regional committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev.
A short excursion into history. The southern direction has become a subject of concern for law enforcement agencies for some time. From the Republic of Afghanistan, where a contingent of Soviet troops carried out an “international mission,” “hard” drugs began to arrive along with the coffins of dead servicemen. Analysts from the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR saw a particular danger in the fact that the transit and distribution of narcotic substances was protected by both high-ranking officers of law enforcement agencies and individual representatives of the party apparatus.
Attempts to calculate the geography of transit flows of Soviet drug dealers were made by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Vasily Fedorchuk, his deputy for personnel Vasily Lezhepekov and the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Viktor Chebrikov. On instructions from the Council of Ministers of the USSR, they sent the head of the psychophysiological laboratory of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mikhail Vinogradov, to develop a method for covertly identifying law enforcement officers who either used drugs or were in contact with drug-containing substances.
The republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan were chosen as testing grounds for the method; a special team took part in the annual preventive examination of personnel of internal affairs bodies. As a result, it turned out that police officers in these republics, from generals to privates, personally used drugs in 60 out of a hundred cases. But the most important thing, for which the operation was planned and which the immediate director of the study, Mikhail Vinogradov, did not know about at the time, was confirmation of the information that all drug flows from Central Asia and the Caucasus converged in the Stavropol Territory from the very beginning.
And now it has become clear why, back in 1978, Mikhail Gorbachev was “pushed” from the first secretaries of the Stavropol Territory to the insignificant position of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee due to the “failed” agriculture. Removed from under attack? Or maybe, on the contrary, they were exposed to the repressive skating rink of the “committee”? After all, by that time the security officers had started surveillance on him.
Mysticism of Malta
Gorbachev was saved by a miracle. True, one can also say that this miracle was man-made. The strange quick deaths of two general secretaries, Andropov and Chernenko, who in theory should have been cared for and cherished by the doctors of the Fourth Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health, still haunt many specialists and historians. Be that as it may, after coming to power, Mikhail Sergeevich immediately defeated a group of experts from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who were involved in the scandalous “Stavropol drug transit”, sending some to resign, some to retire.
But the southern accent in the activities of the Secretary General only intensified. It is no coincidence that Gorbachev pulled out Georgian Shevardnadze, placing him in a key direction - foreign policy, appointing him who had hitherto had nothing to do with diplomatic work Eduard Amvrosievich to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Shevardnadze covered Gorbachev from the rear, and together they then quietly and not without benefit for themselves surrendered the foreign policy positions of the great country.
They went too far; they could have been exposed by loyal secret services. And therefore, in order not to fall under the skating rink of the “committee”, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze deliberately accelerated the processes of the collapse of the USSR.
A remarkable touch.
The famous meeting in Malta, December 1989. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George H. W. Bush said at the end of the meeting that their countries were no longer adversaries. And on the eve of the historic visit, a terrible storm broke out at sea. It seemed as if nature itself was preventing something, trying to prevent some terrible tragedy. But what? Knowledgeable people they tell how, during negotiations, a frantic American journalist appeared on the deck of a Soviet ship and said to his colleagues in the purest Russian: “ Guys, your country is over...."
Stavropol Judas
In the last years of perestroika, the country went into disarray. Gorbachev, in response to the alarming remarks of party officials that something was wrong, answered cheerfully: “We have everything calculated.” But the processes were controlled not only on Old Square. In April 1991, a plenum of the Moscow City Party Committee was held. The first secretary of the city committee, member of the CPSU Politburo Yuri Prokofiev announced the agenda.
It stated that the group of the Moscow party organization, together with a bloc of secretaries of Siberian and Ural party organizations, including committees of the largest industrial enterprises, was introducing a single point for consideration at the upcoming plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: on the removal from the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. However, behind the scenes, Mikhail Sergeevich outplayed his opponents. It turned out that The plenum was postponed to the end of August. And in the meantime, it was planned to sign the Union Treaty developed in Novo-Ogarevo.
State Emergency Committee. Let’s assume that Kryuchkov and his comrades would not have acted in August 1991. And what? Nothing special. The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, President Gorbachev was removed from party power. In the future, the course of events could develop as follows:
1. The CPSU was losing its influence, embarking on the path of reform(a split into two or three parties is the same Andropov version),
2. the transition of the economy to a market economy would be launched as planned(following the Chinese model), democracy would be built, but not according to Western false patterns.
With such a combination, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin would have been taken out of the “great game.”
So the August conspiracy objectively played into the hands of Mikhail Sergeevich, who thus tried to outplay the party opposition. Yeltsin also benefited, who, if the Union Treaty was signed, retained the post of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. However, after the State Emergency Committee, the chances were lost.
One day one of the former presidents of the former Soviet republic asked Gorbachev: " Why are you tearing our people away from the Russians?" . In response, Gorbachev simply lowered his eyes. He betrayed those who at first believed his demagoguery and hoped to lead the country out of the political and economic impasse through just one maneuver, playing according to the principle of “both ours and yours.” Selfishness in life and politics, personal irresponsibility - this is the verdict of history.
When starting reforms of the USSR in 1985, M.S. Gorbachev acted according to a clearly developed “ Advice on international relations " He, of course, did not know its contents, and he hardly knew about its existence. The real architects of perestroika know how to keep secrets. M. Gorbachev simply knew that external forces helped him come to power, whose requests he had to listen to.
Only D. Rockefeller knew the full contents of the plan. About some components of the plan knew M. Thatcher, G. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski and a number of other people. Let's call it conventionally Combiner plan. Just like the top secret plan for information warfare against the USSR in 1943, “Rankin”, so The Combiner plan will never be published.
It is symbolic, however, that if the initiator of the Rankin plan was W. Churchill, then Briton M. Thatcher played a key role in the Combiner plan. In fact, she was the one who managed to accomplish:
1. successful recruitment approach to M.S. Gorbachev, using his suggestibility and ambition in 1984.
2. Simultaneously she had a plump folder with incriminating evidence on the former Stavropol combine operator prepared for her by the resident foreign intelligence KGB of the USSR in London and at the same time an agent of British intelligence MI6 (since 1974) Colonel Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky. November 14, 1985 O.A. Gordievsky was sentenced in absentia “for treason to the Motherland” to death with confiscation of property. The sentence was not canceled even after the collapse of the USSR.
3. The Combiner plan also had a clear economic component, aimed at disorganizing the Soviet economy and its falling under the influence of transnational corporations. To a certain degree it was Marshall Plan 2, on the economic enslavement of the USSR.
At the end of 1987, when the USSR Government prepared its proposals for the country's economy for 1988. According to these proposals, the solid national economic plan was transformed into a state order, fully provided with financial and material resources. At the same time, the order was reduced to 90 - 95% of the total production volume, and the remaining 5 - 10% of the production of the enterprise received the right to dispose at its own discretion on the basis of contractual relations. In subsequent years, using the experience gained, it was planned to gradually establish the optimal level of government orders.
At a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee at the end of 1987, M. Gorbachev achieved a decision to finalize the Government's draft, as a result of which the level of government orders was reduced by one third, and for a number of ministries - by more than half. It is obvious that M. Gorbachev acted on external instructions.
I believe that they were targeted actions on the collapse of the Soviet economy. Everything went in accordance with the USSR KGB memo of 1977 on the formation of the Fifth Column. Let us recall some of its provisions:
« 1. The US CIA, based on the analysis and forecast of its specialists about the future paths of development of the USSR, is developing plans to intensify hostile activities aimed at the disintegration of Soviet society and the disorganization of the socialist economy.
2. For these purposes, American intelligence sets the task of recruiting agents of influence from among Soviet citizens, training them and further promoting them into the sphere of management of politics, economics and science of the Soviet Union.
3. The CIA has developed individual training programs for agents of influence, providing for their acquisition of espionage skills, as well as their concentrated political and ideological indoctrination. In addition, one of the most important aspects of training such agents is the teaching of management methods at the leading level of the national economy.
4. The leadership of American intelligence plans to purposefully and persistently, regardless of costs, search for individuals who, based on their personal and business qualities, are capable of occupying administrative positions in the management apparatus in the future and fulfilling the tasks formulated by the enemy».
Operation Perestroika - economic reform.
1. Following the instructions of M.S. Gorbachev, taking advantage of free contract prices, many enterprises at first began to receive huge amounts of money - excess profits, but not due to increased production, but due to its monopoly position. As a result, income in 1988 increased by 40 billion rubles, in 1989 - by 60 billion rubles, and in 1990 - by 100 billion rubles. (instead of the usual increase of 10 billion rubles). The consumer market was blown up, all goods literally “flyed” off the shelves.
2. Everywhere They began to discontinue unprofitable products, and the cheap assortment was washed out. If government orders were sharply reduced in mechanical engineering and a number of other industries, then in the fuel and energy complex it amounted to 100%.
3. Miners bought everything they needed for production at negotiated prices, and sold coal at state prices. This was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of miners' strikes. Justice has been violated. There was a break in the established relationships in the national economy.
4. Regional interests began to come to the fore, which became fertile ground for separatism.
The result of perestroika- socio-economic collapse: control over production, finance, and money circulation was lost. But this was the main goal of Operation Perestroika as part of the “Combineer” information war plan against the USSR.
Before perestroika, the USSR state budget was adopted and executed without a deficit.
5. For 1988, it was adopted for the first time without revenues exceeding expenses in a balanced amount. But already in 1989, the state budget of the USSR was adopted with a budget deficit about 36 billion rubles, but budget revenues included State Bank loans, which had never before been included in budget revenues in the amount of over 64 billion rubles. That is, in fact, the budget deficit amounted to 100 billion rubles! Therefore, the consumer market was soon “exploded”, and problems began with the food supply of the population.
6. Refusal of the monopoly on the production and sale of alcoholic beverages in 1989 alone led to the state budget losing more than 20 billion rubles in turnover tax revenues.
7. The country’s economy began to experience problems, production volumes decreased by 20% compared to 1985, prices climbed steadily upward and unemployment appeared.
8. Government external debt has increased many times over the years of perestroika and became the main means of covering the budget deficit. State internal debt grew even more rapidly.
9. After M. Gorbachev came to power Crime increased sharply. The number of crimes increased by 30% annually. Already in 1989, the number of prisoners in the USSR (1.6 million people) became 2 times more than in 1937. The number of intentional murders in 1989 (19 thousand) was one and a half times greater than the number of Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan over TEN YEARS.
Political reform
And in these unstable socio-economic conditions, POLITICAL REFORM begins. A similar scheme was used by the CIA and MI6 in 1953 to overthrow the Mossadegh government in Iran, after which oil production came under the control of transnational corporations.
1. During the POLITICAL REFORM, an informational moral liquidation of all heroes and outstanding people who constituted the pride of the Russian people was carried out. During its course, the emphasis was placed on the implementation of Allen Dulles's keynote speech in 1945. Almost all the heroes of the Great Patriotic War were subjected to sophisticated slanderous accusations and abuse, the same was done in relation to more distant Russian history, including Peter I, Catherine II, Ivan the Terrible.
2. The devilization of individuals and historical periods of Rus' began. All Russian history, according to the versions of the late 80s, was the history of nonentities. So, gradually, step by step the idea of the inferiority of the Russian people began to be instilled. These information and ideological actions were successfully carried out “Colombian” A.N. Yakovlev, who was simultaneously close to both M.S. Gorbachev and CIA agent O. Kalugin.
3. The media, supervised by A.N. Yakovlev, proclaimed the concept of freedom of speech and launched a phased anti-state campaign. Taking into account the interaction carried out "Colombian" A.N. Yakovlev with another “Colombian” - General of the KGB of the USSR and a CIA agent O. Kalugin, it can be assumed that the main “temniks” and commentaries for the Soviet media were developed overseas.
4. The comments developed in New York were based on the conclusions of the so-called "Harvard Project", research led by Allen Dulles, aimed at studying the deep mechanisms of social consciousness in the USSR and searching for “pain points” for its destruction. Under external information and ideological control, the Soviet media began to work to destroy the state. The media was led by a group of globalist-Trotskyists A. Yakovlev, V. Medvedev, V. Korotich, D. Volkogonov and others, who previously strictly punished dissent and carried out strict censorship of “anti-socialist” views. They were M. Gorbachev's closest associates in the collapse of the USSR.
5. Rewriting history has become widespread. An illustration can be the replacement of the crimes of the Western colonialists, who carried out the enslavement and mass destruction of defenseless peoples, their, supposedly an educational civilizing mission with the establishment of democratic ideals. But the development of the West, starting from the 15th century, occurred largely due to the robbery of colonies. In fact, Western Europe as a whole exploited vast masses of enslaved people. The colonial model of world development created by the British Empire was unfair. Internal European contradictions were smoothed over by income from the colonies. Russia lived off its own labor and created its own wealth. She also had to continuously repel external invasions from the West and East.
6. Globalists-Trotskyists, having organized information cover from the media and the loyal West, launched a total purge at all levels of government of the USSR. In 1986-1989 under pressure from M. Gorbachev, 82.2% of the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and republican Central Committees of the CPSU were removed from their posts. This was the largest purge in the entire history of the CPSU. And this was not just a personnel shuffling. This was their defeat in accordance with the recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations. The country was being prepared for collapse. Massive fire was opened to kill the “headquarters”.
Powerful anti-state propaganda was launched on Soviet television channels, supposedly to combat the mythical BRAKING MECHANISM on the part of party cadres. Myself the term, BRAKING MECHANISM, was coined by specialists at Harvard University. At the first stage, the “dogmatic Suslovites”, led by member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev, also took part in the destruction of the Soviet management system. Then it will be the turn of the “dogmatists.” But it was they who were used at first as a battering ram to destroy the CPSU.
Suslov Mikhail
and Egor Ligachev
After all, the positions of the globalist-Trotskyists before 1987 were weak in the Soviet system of governance. And they could not do without the support of “technocrats” and “dogmatists”. The KEY FACTOR of the collapse of the USSR was the anti-state course of M. Gorbachev. It was M. Gorbachev who laid the main mines, the explosion of which in 1991 led to the collapse of the USSR.
7. Having revised the system of previous geopolitical priorities of the USSR-Russia, M. Gorbachev began to formulate a new foreign policy course. It was based on the abstract primacy of universal human values. Implementation of the new foreign policy in practice led to unilateral concessions and took destructive forms.
8. The excessively forced withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe had the consequences of a sharp weakening of the geopolitical interests of the USSR-Russia. The collapse of many years of contacts with former allies led to the ousting of the USSR-Russia from many regions of the world, leading to major geopolitical and economic losses.
The American newspaper WASHINGTON POST published an article on December 15, 1991 with an analysis of the reign of M.S. Gorbachev. The newspaper data shows what the economic efficiency, one might say “profitability,” of the information war against the USSR is.
Name.........................1985................1991
Soviet gold reserves......2500 tons................240 tons
Official dollar exchange rate...0.64 rubles................90 rubles
Economic growth rate.......+2.3%....................- 11%
External debt, dollars.............10.5 billion......52.0 billion.
If we try to objectively analyze the reasons for the defeat of the USSR in the information war, then main reason is the inability of the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB of the USSR to counteract, which led to the creation of the Fifth Column within the USSR and the coming to the leadership of the country of a group of globalist Trotskyists led by M. Gorbachev.
Good evening, dear sirs and ladies!
In this post, I will briefly touch on a topic closely related to the eightieth birthday of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.
So, after the events referred to in Russian historiography as a putsch and which occurred between August 19 and August 22, 1991, the collapse of Trieseria became a fait accompli. However, there were still several months left before this political fact was legally formalized. Therefore, formally, until December 1991, the USSR existed as a state recognized by the notorious international community. And the core of the Soviet Union from the moment of its inception was the Communist Party.
I would like to recall the outline of events preceding the above-mentioned putsch. So in July 1991 the last XXVIII Congress of the CPSU took place, which adopted new program party and, thereby, determined new vectors for the development of Trieseria.
Structurally, the party by this time was no longer an integral organization, but a collection of parties of the union republics, which was recorded in the new changed composition of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, consisting of the Secretary General (Gorbachev), his deputy (Ivashko) and the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the union republics.
Such a structure was already a harbinger of the collapse of the Trieseria, and the main role in this fact was played by the formed Communist Party of the RSFSR. It was she who became the factor that finally broke the allied relations within the CPSU, making it the sum of allied communist parties. The superstructure was no longer needed.
At the same time, within the framework of the entire quasi-state structure of Trieseria, the process of developing a new order of internal political interaction was taking place, the basis of which was to be the new Union Treaty. The old one, signed in 1922, no longer met the new realities. The signing of this agreement was scheduled for August 20, 1991...
It is difficult to say with complete certainty what this putsch was. I, like many of my politically engaged colleagues, believe that the main customer of it was M. Gorbachev himself. As evidence, one can cite, firstly, the indecision of the actions of the putschists, and secondly, their flight to M. Gorbachev after the failure of the putsch itself. It seemed that they simply did not carry out the order, and were now eager for new instructions. But be that as it may, the failure of the event and the subsequent collapse of the USSR became historical facts.
M. Gorbachev's resignation from the post of President of the USSR occurred after the signing of the Belovezh Accords, but from the post of Secretary General of the Bolshevik Party - already on August 22, 1991 from the Nativity of Christ! Moreover, M. Gorbachev not only left the party, but also proposed that the party dissolve itself. Why?
Let's try to figure it out.
All of M. Gorbachev’s activities as General Secretary of the Bolshevik Party boiled down to reforming it and, as a consequence, reforming the entire quasi-state structure of the Soviet of Deputies.
The reforms of the last Secretary General were comprehensive.
First of all, they concerned the political sphere and represented a large-scale democratization of the entire socio-political structure of Trieseria. In Bolshevik language this phenomenon was designated by the word “perestroika”.
Perestroika touched upon the issues of party building, changes in the national-state structure of Trieseria, and the breakdown of the party and state apparatus. Particularly significant was the change in foreign policy, which turned into a means of saving the USSR itself and its transformation into a more mobile modern society.
The media have become more open. Television, radio and newspapers gradually began to more objectively consider not only historical events, but also contemporary events for their readers, radio listeners and television viewers.
Freedom affected theatre, cinema, literature, and painting.
An unprecedented thing for the atheistic Soviet of Deputies was the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. And also the relatively independent elections of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' (one official of the Council for Religious Affairs told the author an interesting detail about these elections. In particular, for the first time a unique order was received from the Central Committee: do not interfere in the course of the elections, just observe).
Secondly, the economic sphere was reformed. This process was given a name - “acceleration”.
The acceleration was aimed at developing the industrial and agricultural potential of the Soviet Union. However, industrial acceleration was followed by a revision of the focus of industrial development from the military to the civilian sphere (conversion). As a result, market relations were officially introduced in the Council of Deputies, enshrined in the law on cooperation. Previously, these relationships were a criminal offense and existed only underground (black market, workshops, etc.).
Finally, in the third chapter, the spiritual sphere was reformed. The name of this direction is “glasnost” and “new thinking”.
Glasnost opened up many historical archives of past eras. As a result, whole oceans of new information were sent to the zombified Soviet slaves. Particularly painful was the information concerning the period of the reign of I. Dzhugashvili (drive - Stalin). They were still afraid to plan the cult of V. Ulyanov (Lenin was driving it). After all, they were still following the “correct Leninist course.” However, other historical periods of the Soviet of Deputies were subject to unprecedented ideological reassessment. Perhaps the second historical myth, which was affected to a lesser extent during the reign of M. Gorbachev, was the myth of the so-called “Great Patriotic War”.
The new thinking related more to the foreign policy of the Trieseria and was a way to instill confidence in the normal, highly developed countries of Western Europe, the USA and Japan. They even started talking about convergence, which meant the mutual absorption of the Soviet Republic and Europe. For these purposes, nuclear tests were suspended, negotiations on disarmament began, and comprehensive relations between the USSR and the USA were improved.
All three directions not only constituted a whole, but were also generated by one team, or, if you like, the matrix of development of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet of Deputies created by it.
The reforms affected the entire diversity of Soviet life. Moreover, new ideas were followed by even newer and more radical ones. As a result, every year of M. Gorbachev's reign brought new results.
In particular, perestroika very quickly became not only a household word, but also brought about global changes in the entire “socialist camp.” One after another, the Bolshevik regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, and the Bolshevik regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America looked for new patrons (mainly in the person of China) and also began timid reforms.
But if the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic quite peacefully collapsed into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the collapse of the SFRY was accompanied by long ethno-confessional conflicts, the centers of which still exist.
Within Trieseria itself, divisions also began to take place on ethnic and ideological grounds. National movements grew like mushrooms after rain in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Turkestan. Soon these nationalist shoots bore fruit.
As a result, by 1991, enormous power was concentrated in the hands of M. Gorbachev: the Secretary General of the Bolshevik Party and the President of the Trieseria. But the very mechanism for controlling these two monsters began to get out of control. This led to an irreversible denouement.
As I wrote earlier about the essence of the Soviet of Deputies, the party was the core around which everything existed.
Moreover, the merger of the party and quasi-state structures was so multi-level that a significant number of senior leaders simultaneously occupied the highest party and government posts.
This influence allowed party leaders to always remain in the shadows. Whatever happened, the responsibility fell on the state. And within the party itself mutual responsibility flourished.
We can say that it was the Bolshevik Party that was the living tissue of the entire Soviet slave-owning society. Cancerous tissue. But still alive. But the quasi-state structure was just a shell protecting Bolshevism from external and internal threats.
This real state explains why everything in the Council of Deputies could be reformed, but not the Bolshevik Party itself.
Look for yourself: from 1917 to 1991, when obvious overt Bolsheviks were in power, they managed to carry out various “transformations”.
The Bolsheviks managed to destroy millions of people, break the back of the Russian peasantry during collectivization, expel or put to death the intelligentsia, at the cost of incredible efforts and sacrifices, win with the help of the Anglo-Saxon world in the Soviet-German war, carry out numerous reforms and repressions in the so-called Red Army, up to the reduction of officers, several times to break the system of workers' and peasants' militia, to reduce and transform the KGB apparatus.
But no one managed to reform the Bolshevik Party itself!
In the 20s, those who wanted a different path quickly went to the Lubyanka basement. Some were hit in the head with an ice pick in the equatorial country.
I. Dzhugashvili himself could destroy thousands of party workers, but he did not change the essence of the Bolshevik party.
N. Khrushchev's attempts to reform it led to his imminent resignation!
L. Brezhnev did not reform the party - he ruled calmly.
History gave Y. Andropov and K. Chernenko very little time at the Bolshevik Olympus.
The last reformer of the Bolshevik party was M. Gorbachev. It was the reforms in the party itself that led to its death and the death of the state it created.
I dare to suggest that such a reformer as M. Gorbachev simply realized the impossibility of changing this particular organization. And therefore he proposed to destroy it, which subsequently happened.
An ideology born in hell itself, through the Jewish retro-slaters K. Marx and F. Engels, quietly crept into the heads of Russian revolutionaries. Having gone through an incubation period in the minds of the Russian intelligentsia, satanic ideology was born as a terrible Bolshevik atheistic monster, ready to devour the entire human world. The tip of the sting of this monster was directed against our Lord Jesus Christ himself and the entire Holy Trinity.
The cells of this terrible monster were the members of the party, and the body was the party itself. It was she who, having created a protective shell from the Soviet state, absorbing the human, technical and natural resources of Russia, became the most poisonous detachment of the master of hell! The real head of the Bolshevik Party is the devil himself.
It was precisely the affiliation of the party itself to hell and its owner, Satan, that did not allow a single leader to change the focus of the Bolshevik Party on the world revolution. It was this imprisonment and its real curators from hell that did not allow the Council of Deputies to be transformed into a normal state (and N. Khrushchev, L. Brezhnev, and M. Gorbachev tried to do this), and the Bolshevik Party to be transformed into a normal political organization.
After the collapse of Trieseria, the body of the party disintegrated into its cells. These cells partially merged into various communist organizations in the former USSR, the largest of which is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
But after the death of the party, the skeleton of the Council of Deputies itself remained. Since this skeleton reproduces precisely the party structure, it is designed to fulfill the same goals that the Bolshevik party, or rather its demonic masters, pursued.
As a result, the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the Soviet of Deputies, inheriting from the latter the walls, ceilings and other frames of the building itself. The current inhabitants of the Kremlin, unfortunately, do not understand this. Therefore, they are trying to fill the quasi-state Sovdepov structure with new liberal-democratic content (and often they don’t even try, they simply go with the flow, stealing the natural and technical resources remaining from the Trieseria).
Thus, the creation of United Russia was an attempt to recreate the CPSU. But hell doesn't need United Russia. The owner of hell - Satan - needs members of this party, but not she herself. That’s why “help” is coming sluggishly.
From the Bolshevik Council of Deputies in the Russian Federation, symbols remained (mausoleum, red stars, eternal flame, toponymy, architecture, sculpture, etc.), which on a mystical level create an inevitable conflict with the Divine Energies emitted by Orthodox Temples.
As a result, the collapse of the current unviable regime of the Russian Federation is inevitable unless a miracle happens and a renewed Russian Orthodox Kingdom arises from the ruins of Trieseria!
God bless you!
Experts' opinions about the reasons for Perestroika vary in many ways, but experts agree on one thing - the need for change had matured long before the start of Gorbachev's reforms. Not everyone agrees that Gorbachev was the initiator of Perestroika. From the point of view of some, he was just a pawn in the hands of Western elites.
Finish what you started
According to former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, the idea of Perestroika first came from Yuri Andropov. The Soviet leader stated that fundamental problems had accumulated in the economy that needed to be urgently resolved. However, the death of the General Secretary interrupted his endeavors. One of the first trends of Perestroika was the rejuvenation of the Soviet Politburo. The frail party elders began to gradually give way to young, energetic cadres, among whom the main ideologist of change, Gorbachev, came. However, at first the new Secretary General did not think about global changes. In April 1985, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev confirmed the continuity of the party’s course and its general line, aimed “at improving the society of developed socialism.” The Secretary General either truly believed or was deceiving that our country “has ascended to the heights of economic and social progress, where the working man has become the master of the country, the creator of his own destiny.” Historian Vladimir Potseluev is sure that such words were intended for the still strong conservative environment. Knowing the true state of Soviet society, Gorbachev nevertheless cautiously introduced the idea of small economic changes. He still operated with old nomenklatura theses, such as: “The main content of the modern era is the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism.” On the other hand, Gorbachev truly believed that reforms could not only eliminate the imbalance in Soviet society, but also bring it to a new level of social prosperity. Thus, the ideologists of Perestroika, discussing the country’s development plan for the next 15 years, were going to provide each family with a separate apartment or house, which would be a clear indicator of the growth of the well-being of the Soviet people. Gorbachev was determined to use the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution to bring the forms of socialist economic management “in line with modern conditions and needs.” He stated that the country must achieve “a significant acceleration of socio-economic progress. There is simply no other way." It is known that Gorbachev came up with the idea of conducting shock socio-economic therapy back in 1987, i.e. five years before Yeltsin and Gaidar used it. However, in the late 1980s, this proposal did not go beyond the inner circle and did not receive wide publicity.
Publicity policy
One of the goals of Gorbachev's Perestroika was to achieve a certain degree of openness of the leadership to the people. At the January 1987 plenum, the Secretary General proclaimed the policy of glasnost, which he spoke so much about to the secretaries of the regional party committees. “People, the working people, must know well what is happening in the country, what difficulties, what problems arise in their work,” Gorbachev emphasized. The Secretary General himself, unlike past Soviet leaders, boldly went out to the people, spoke about current problems in the country, talked about plans and prospects, and willingly entered into discussions with his interlocutors. Gorbachev's former ally Ryzhkov was skeptical about such openness. He noted that Gorbachev was more interested not in the country, but in how he himself looked against its background. Nevertheless, the policy of glasnost bore fruit. The process of critical rethinking of the past has affected almost all public spheres. The catalyst for glasnost was the films “Agony” by Elem Klimov and “Repentance” by Tengiz Abuladze, the novels “Children of Arbat” by Anatoly Rybakov and “White Clothes” by Vladimir Dudintsev. One of the manifestations of glasnost was the acquisition of freedoms unthinkable in the “era of stagnation.” It became possible to openly express one's opinion, publish literature banned in the USSR, and return dissidents. In April 1988, Gorbachev received Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Rus' in the Kremlin, which was a turning point in resolving the issues of returning the Church to its property and the adoption of the law on freedom of religion (published in 1990).
Crisis of power
According to historian Dmitry Volkogonov, Perestroika and the subsequent collapse of the USSR were a foregone conclusion. According to him, the last “leader” of the Soviet Union only “outlined in relief the end of the totalitarian system,” which was started by Lenin. Thus, for Volkogonov, the “tragedy of Soviet history,” the final stage of which was Perestroika, which in turn ended with the collapse of the country, was “predetermined by Lenin’s experiment.” Some researchers see in Perestroika a “post-communist transformation”, which in all respects resembles classical revolutions. Thus, Irina Starodubrovskaya and Vladimir Mau in the book “Great Revolutions: From Cromwell to Putin” compare Gorbachev’s transformations with the socialist revolution of 1917, arguing that they have no fundamental differences in external parameters.
The crisis of power, according to many sociologists, became perhaps the most important reason that prompted the new leadership of the country to radically restructure party structures. The subsequent collapse of the system, from the point of view of some, was due to a confluence of subjective factors and a misunderstanding by party leaders of the essence of the Soviet system. Others claim that attempts to preserve the Soviet system were doomed to failure from the very beginning, since the CPSU, having “usurped power,” turned “into a brake on social development,” and therefore left the historical arena. In other words, no one and nothing could save the USSR from disaster. Academician Tatyana Zaslavkaya believed that Gorbachev was late with reforms. The country could still have been kept afloat if these transformations had been carried out earlier. By the mid-1980s, in her opinion, the Soviet system had already exhausted all its social resources, and was therefore doomed.
Forward to capitalism!
As historian Alexander Barsenkov notes, the preconditions for Gorbachev’s reforms were based on technological innovations that appeared in developed countries and marked the entry of world civilization into a new era. These new trends required the Soviet leadership to search for an “adequate reaction” to what was happening in order to completely keep up with the progressive public. Many historians have pointed out that the changes initially took place on a political basis developed in the early 1980s, and only after an increase in economic problems did the Soviet leadership set a course for “priority transformation.” A number of other researchers see the essence of Perestroika in the transition from a centrally planned economy to capitalist relations. In their opinion, transnational corporations began to create a new world legal order by the mid-1990s. Their goal was to maintain control over natural resources and concentrate them in the hands of the industrial and financial elite of the world. The Soviet party leadership did not remain aloof from these processes. There is an even bolder assumption that Perestroika was conceived with the active participation of the World Bank and provided for: at the first stage, the initial accumulation of capital through the total sale of national wealth and scarce goods, at the second - the seizure of land and production. It was then that the social status of people in the USSR began to be determined by the thickness of their pockets. Some economists believe that Perestroika and subsequent reforms of the 1990s did not lead to capitalism, but only helped “to feudalize the country, transferring all past “socialist gains” to a narrow stratum of the highest nomenklatura clan.”
Sabotage of the West
Foreign experts often point out the diversity of Perestroika in the USSR. From the point of view of the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, it had four vectors. The first is the “liberation of the countries of the Soviet empire” in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War; the second is economic reform; third - gradual liberalization of public opinion and the media; the fourth is “controlled” democratization and decentralization of the communist system. All this could not but lead to the weakening of the foundations of the Soviet state structure, which, according to some Russian experts, was beneficial to the West. According to one conspiracy theory, the collapse of the USSR was the result of an information and psychological war waged by the United States against the Soviet Union. A large role in this process, based on the statements of conspiracy theorists, was assigned to the fifth column - individual ideologists of the USSR, who “turned scientific communism into a parody of science” and “covered up the country’s Soviet past with black paint.” In order to destroy the most important link in government - the CPSU, the fifth column carried out an intensive campaign to discredit the party, and the “Gorbachev group” organized a “massive change of personnel”, placing its people in key positions in all government bodies.
Publicist Leonid Shelepin emphasizes that with the destruction of the CPSU, the creation of a network structure of democrats began with the active participation of the West. After the dismemberment of the country, its wealth passed into the hands of “an insignificant group of oligarchs,” and the bulk of the population found itself “on the brink of survival.” Thus, the result of Perestroika was a forcibly imposed socio-political system, “imitating the Western one.”
On March 15, 1990, the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR elected Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the country. He only got to serve a third of his five-year sentence.
The congress opened on March 12. In addition to establishing the post of president, he made another historical change to the constitution: he abolished Article 6 on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU.
17 deputies spoke in the debate. Opinions ranged from “We see in presidential power an important guarantee of the unity of our federation” (Nursultan Nazarbayev) and “Our country has raised a leader of global scale, the author of new political thinking, a leader advocating disarmament, for peace” (Fedor Grigoriev) to “Perestroika will choke presidency" (Nikolai Dzhiba).
Let's not play hide and seek, today we are talking about the election of a specific leader as president of the country - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev Alexander Yakovlev
“An attempt to hastily introduce the post of president here at the congress is a gross, grave political mistake, which will greatly aggravate our difficulties, anxieties and fears,” said co-chairman of the Interregional Deputy Group Yuri Afanasyev. Academician Vitaly Goldansky objected: “We cannot wait, we need intensive care, not sanatorium treatment.”
The proposal to ban the combination of the post of president and leader of a political party, supported by both radical democrats and orthodox communists, who dreamed of seeing Alexander Yakovlev and Yegor Ligachev or Ivan Polozkov in the role of general secretary, respectively, received 1303 votes and would have passed if it had not been for a constitutional amendment. , which required a two-thirds vote.
On March 14, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, nominating Gorbachev as a presidential candidate. A number of congress deputies proposed the candidacies of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Bakatin, but they refused, and the elections turned out to be uncontested.
We were in a hurry to elect the President. But, perhaps, having been elected, it was not worthwhile to immediately elevate him to this post here, on the stage of the Kremlin Palace. It should have been postponed for one day, announcing that the solemn event would take place, for example, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin. In the presence of deputies, the government, representatives of the capital's workers, soldiers, the diplomatic corps, and the press, the newspaper "Pravda"
Of the 2,245 deputies (five seats were vacant at that time), exactly two thousand took part in the congress. 1,329 votes were cast for Gorbachev (59.2% of the total number of deputies). 495 opposed, 54 ballots were spoiled. 122 people did not vote.
At the suggestion of Anatoly Lukyanov, who replaced Gorbachev as Chairman of the Supreme Council, the elected president immediately took the oath - going to the podium and placing his hand on the text of the constitution, he uttered a single phrase: “I solemnly swear to faithfully serve the people of our country, strictly follow the Constitution of the USSR, guarantee rights and freedoms citizens, to conscientiously fulfill the high duties assigned to me by the President of the USSR."
The foreign reaction was purely optimistic.
“The Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union carried out the greatest revolutionary transformations in the life of Soviet society, the likes of which have not been seen in Russia since the revolution of 1917,” Japanese television indicated. “The decisions of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR cemented perhaps the most important changes in the political and economic system of the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917,” echoed the Washington Post.
At the pace of a military operation
It is unknown who came up with the idea of introducing the post of president.
The topic has been discussed in the media since December 1989, but in the form of hypotheses and discussions.
Gorbachev's assistant Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his memoirs that in January 1990, the “architect of perestroika” and Secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Yakovlev told him in a terrible secret: once Gorbachev came into his office, upset, worried, lonely. Like, what should I do? Azerbaijan, Lithuania, economy, orthodoxies, radicals, people on edge. Yakovlev said: “We must act. The most important obstacle to perestroika and your entire policy is the Politburo. It is necessary to convene a congress of people’s deputies in the near future, let the congress elect you president.” And Gorbachev agreed.
The decision on presidential rule was so urgent that they decided to convene an extraordinary congress. I didn’t understand such urgency, since only two and a half months passed after the Second Congress of People’s Deputies, where this issue was not even discussed Nikolai Ryzhkov
Be that as it may, on February 14, unexpectedly for everyone, Gorbachev voiced the idea at a session of the Supreme Council, and on February 27 the parliament decided to convene an extraordinary congress. Frankly speaking, not enough time was allocated for preparation and public discussion.
The haste provoked criticism from both the left and the right, who suspected some kind of trick and persistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get a clear explanation from Gorbachev why he needed it.
The official version set out in the draft law on the establishment of the post of president and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the constitution: “In order to ensure the further development of the deep political and economic transformations taking place in the country, strengthening the constitutional system, the rights, freedoms and security of citizens, improving the interaction of the highest bodies of government and the administration of the USSR" did not satisfy anyone. You'd think Gorbachev didn't have enough power before!
According to historians, the leading reason lay on the surface: the leader wanted, while remaining the General Secretary of the CPSU, to weaken his dependence on the Central Committee, which could at any moment hold a plenum and deal with him, as in his time with Khrushchev.
After Gorbachev was elected president and the abolition of Article 6, it was no longer so much that he needed the party for his own legitimacy as the party needed him.
Using the powers of the Secretary General, Gorbachev is precisely strengthening the power of the Communist Party. Including its power over the Secretary General himself. Two ideas - the abolition of Article 6 and the introduction of the presidency - are closely related. Only by receiving full state, and not party power, can Gorbachev abolish the party monopoly. Otherwise he will simply lose power Anatoly Sobchak
Since the CPSU had lost official power, the vacuum needed to be filled.
After the events in Tbilisi and Baku, it turned out to be difficult to find out who made the decisions to use the army, and talk intensified about the need for “a person who is responsible for everything.” However, the presidency did not prevent Gorbachev from evading responsibility for the Vilnius drama.
There was another practical consideration.
According to the tradition established by Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary General simultaneously headed the highest representative body. But, starting in the spring of 1989, the Supreme Council began working on a permanent basis. Gorbachev, who presided over it, had to spend a lot of time at meetings. Other members of management did the same, always copying the behavior of the first person.
I urge you to vote for presidential power and believe that under this condition there will be social justice, national security, including that of the Russian people. Deputy Ivan Polozkov, orthodox communist
Naturally, this made governing the country difficult. And the question arose in society: who is taking care of business while the debate is going on?
Meanwhile, the opinion was expressed that Gorbachev’s personality was more suitable for the role of speaker than head of state. He was brilliant at manipulating a large, diverse audience and achieving the voting results he wanted.
Anatoly Sobchak in his book “Walking into Power” noted that in personal communication, the magic of Gorbachev’s influence was irresistible. “Give in to this charm, and you will begin to act as if under hypnosis,” he wrote.
Main mystery
The main question that researchers are still puzzling over to this day is why Gorbachev did not go to the national elections? Moreover, this was provided for by the law on the introduction of the post of president, and only for the first case a special clause was made.
Many consider this a fatal mistake. As Boris Yeltsin later proved, it is very difficult to legally remove a popularly elected president from power.
According to a number of historians, Gorbachev did not want to directly measure his popularity with Yeltsin
Being elected not by citizens, but by deputies, made Gorbachev’s status insufficiently convincing, since the legitimacy of the congress itself was tarnished. He was elected under Article 6; in the absence of organized opposition, everywhere except Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and the Baltic states, a third of the deputy corps were representatives of public organizations.
Some historians suggest that Gorbachev, even with an objective advantage, experienced a mystical fear of Yeltsin, for whom everything somehow worked out. Others say that he followed the lead of the nomenklatura circle, which in principle did not like direct democracy and feared that the election campaign would give reformers an additional opportunity to promote their views.
In conditions of political and economic instability, tempting fate once again and going to national elections is a risk, and a considerable one Anatoly Sobchak
In public speeches, Mikhail Sergeevich mainly emphasized that the situation is difficult, and the country will not survive another day without the president.
“They [interregional deputies] also spoke out for the presidency, but they conditioned it with such reservations and such approaches that this process could be slowed down for a long time, if not buried. In the current situation, serious decisions cannot be postponed. The introduction of the institution of the presidency is necessary for the country today,” - he said at the session of the Supreme Council on February 27.
Democrats' position
Supporters of perestroika and renewal are split on the issue of Gorbachev's presidency.
Considering in principle the institution of the presidency to be progressive in comparison with the current form of government, the question of the President of the USSR and the procedure for his election cannot be resolved hastily, without the participation of the new Supreme Councils of the republics, without a developed multi-party system in the country, without a free press, without strengthening the current Supreme Council . This issue must be linked to the constitutions of the republics and the new Union Treaty. Without these indispensable conditions, making a decision on the presidency will undoubtedly lead to a new aggravation of relations between the Center and the republics, to limiting the independence of local Soviets and self-government, to the threat of the restoration of a dictatorial regime in the country. From the statement of the Interregional Deputy Group
Some continued to see him as the only chance and believed that Gorbachev should be supported in everything, because he knows what he is doing, and because otherwise it will be even worse. The point of view of these people was expressed in a remark from the seat at the congress by a deputy who did not introduce himself: “Is it really that we don’t have food? The most important thing is that we found in history someone like Gorbachev, a pure man, the likes of which we will never find again.”
Some were simply impressed by the word “president”: here we will be, just like in civilized countries!
Others pointed out that this term is associated not only with America and France, but also with Latin American and Asian dictators, and most importantly, they demanded popular alternative elections.
“I believe that only the people can make an appropriate decision,” Alexander Shchelkanov, a member of the Interregional Group, said in the debate at the congress.
Zelenograd resident Shuvalov went on a hunger strike on the opening day of the congress. Theater Square"as a sign of protest against the election of the president only by deputies."
A supporter of Gorbachev's presidency on the terms he put forward was Anatoly Sobchak, opponents were Yuri Afanasyev and Yuri Chernichenko. The latter, in particular, feared that “we will allow ourselves to be duped again; if the deputies cannot really control the actions of the chairman of the Supreme Council, then it will be even less possible to keep track of the president.”
One of Gorbachev’s main opponents at the congress was deputy Yuri Afanasyev
Boris Yeltsin, as far as is known, has not spoken publicly on this issue.
Sobchak wrote in his memoirs that shortly before the death of Andrei Sakharov, he tried to discuss with him the prospects of Gorbachev’s presidency, but the academician showed no interest in the topic, considering the issue insignificant compared to the development of a new constitution.
Not a new idea
We need to cast aside fears and despondency, gain faith in our strengths and capabilities. And ours are huge. The Russian people and all the peoples united with them into a great multinational state will be able to revive their common Motherland. And they will definitely achieve this along the paths of perestroika and socialist renewal. From Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech at the congress after his election
The idea of establishing a popularly elected president in the USSR was discussed quite seriously in the past: during the preparation of the “Stalinist” constitution of 1936, in the last years of Nikita Khrushchev’s rule and at the dawn of perestroika.
Why Stalin rejected it is not entirely clear. He was guaranteed 99.99% of the votes, and a nationwide expression of support for the “beloved leader” could be turned into a powerful educational and propaganda event.
Khrushchev, according to researchers, simply did not have enough time, and his successors were guided by their deep conservatism and dislike of innovation.
According to the testimony of people who knew him, Leonid Brezhnev liked the address “Mr. President” during his foreign visits, but he did not legitimize the title.
Third try
In 1985, the “architect of perestroika” Alexander Yakovlev suggested that Gorbachev begin political reform with the party and put forward a detailed plan: to organize an all-party discussion, based on its results, to divide the CPSU into two parties - the reformist people's democratic and conservative socialist - to hold elections to the Supreme Council and instruct the winners government formation.
Now, as I observe, Gorbachev presses on the gas and at the same time presses on the brake. The engine roars to the whole world - this is our glasnost. And the car stands still Olzhas Suleimenov, deputy, Kazakh poet
According to Yakovlev’s plan, both parties were to declare their commitment to the basic values of socialism, join an alliance called the Union of Communists, delegate an equal number of members to its Central Council, and nominate the chairman of the council as a joint candidate for the post of President of the USSR.
A political structure in which two parties competing with each other in elections simultaneously enter into some kind of coalition with a single leader would show the world another “Russian miracle.” At the same time, some researchers believe that the implementation of the “Yakovlev Plan” would allow a smooth transition to multi-party democracy and avoid the collapse of the USSR.
Then Gorbachev did not support the idea. Five years later it was too late.
Pyrrhic victory
Gorbachev rushed about in search of alternatives, compromises, the optimal combination of old and new methods of leadership. There were mistakes, miscalculations, delays, and simply absurdities. But they are not the reason for the beginning of the disintegration of society and the state. It was inevitable by the very nature of the transition of a society, complexed and corrupted by a long dictatorship, to freedom, unique in world history, to freedom Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s assistant
Historians consider the First Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 to be the peak of Gorbachev's political career, and his election as president to be the beginning of its end. Soon the leader's rating rapidly and irreversibly went down.
That was the last credit of trust issued by society.
Conservatives hoped that Gorbachev needed presidential powers to “establish order,” while Democrats hoped for bold reform steps. When neither one nor the other happened, although he got everything he wanted, the disappointment turned out to be universal and deadly.
The prediction made at the congress by deputy Teimuraz Avaliani came true: “You will rush here and there, and at this time what we have now will happen.”
After 660 days, Gorbachev resigned (or rather, was forced to resign).
