Chilling hike. Pepelyaev's Yakut expedition. How the Tunguska People's Republic was born and died. The Okhotsk Uprising

TUNGUS NATIONAL UPRISING 1924-1925

Egor Petrovich ANTONOV,

Candidate of Historical Sciences

The main reason for the Tunguska national movement was the policy of terror of the era of “war communism” against the aborigines, carried out during the NEP period by the party-Soviet leadership of the Okhotsk coast. Chairman of the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee K.K. Baikalov noted in 1925 that crimes against civilians by the Okhotsk authorities and the OGPU served as “one of the main reasons for the uprising.”

Criminal and dubious persons have made their way into the leadership of the Okhotsk district. The head of the OGPU Kuntsevich, together with his friends, the former white bandits Kharitonov and Gabyshev, robbed the aborigines, collecting pre-revolutionary debts from them. By order of platoon commander Suvorov, after cruel torture, the Yakuts and Tungus I.S. were shot without trial. Gotovtsev, A.V. Atlasov, S.F. Ayanitov, A.V. Vinokurov, I.G. Sivtsev and others. In 1924, the OGPU authorities arrested 64 Tungus and Yakuts, in 1925 - 250 people, a total of 314 people1.

The authorized representative of the OGPU department, Gizhigi Osinsky, survived all the honest and business-like workers; they were replaced by former White Guards, merchants and various kinds of crooks. His entourage included D.S. Plotnikov, former head of the Kamchatka team, moonshine merchant Platunov. Among them was an embezzler exiled to Kamchatka, who amassed substantial capital and aimed to become the “Kings of Chukchi.”

Anyone who tried to counteract these lawlessnesses was subjected to severe persecution. Chief of Police, A.P. Kryzhansky, awarded the Order of the Red Banner, was thrown into prison, into a cell where the floor was covered with a thick layer of dirt, without bunks or bedding. Kryzhansky's wife was arrested for 15 days. They took away her money and personal belongings, and during her captivity they physically abused her2.

The Okhotsk authorities committed lawlessness, terrorized and robbed the local population, as a result, the inhabitants of the Okhotsk coast became impoverished. The average-income Tungus, who owned 40-50 deer in the pre-revolutionary period, had a little more than 10 reindeer in the 20s; the wealthy Evenk Gilemde, who had 1,500 deer, had only 70 heads left. Hungry reindeer herders began to include wild onions and seaweed in their daily diet. Member of the YACEC delegation F.G. Sivtsev reported to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR that there was not a single person who could be classified as an exploiter. In addition, visiting merchants from among the Yakuts and Russians were not averse to robbing the gullible Evenks. There were cases when they took eight squirrel skins for a pack of tea.

Under their influence, many Tungus became addicted to gambling into cards. Often, businessmen used lies and slander to incite peaceful hunters and fishermen against the Soviet regime3.

Representatives of the official authorities did not know the language, traditions, culture, and life of the Tungus. There were no national schools, not a single aborigine worked in Soviet institutions and law enforcement agencies, there were not enough translators4.

In 1859, Okhotsk was annexed to the Amur province, in 1910-1911. The Okhotsk district was subordinated to the Kamchatka region, but in fact not a single case in the ceded territory was resolved without the sanction of Yakutsk. All Tungus wandering from the Okhotsk coast to Nelkan were assigned to the Ust-Maysky ulus of the Yakut region. It turned out that they lived in the neighboring region, and no one stopped them from doing so. The border was only on paper. Trade, food warehouses, post office, schools, churches were assigned to the Lena region. Yakut Cossacks performed military service in Okhotsk and Ayan, performed police duties, escorted mail, carried out rescue work, etc.5

Tunguska insurgency in 1924-1925. covered the Okhotsk coast and the southeastern regions of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 13,000 Tungus lived in the Yakut, Aldan, Verkhoyansk, Vilyui, Kolyma and Olekminsky districts. By that time, Soviet power had not yet destroyed the traditional patriarchal way of life of the Tungus clans. The forefathers and “princelings” enjoyed enormous influence among them. In the Tunguska speech of 1924-1925. 600 people participated, i.e. 4.6%. Of these, in the Petropavlovsk region - 150, on the Okhotsk coast - 200 and in the northern districts - 250 people6, including 175 Yakuts, i.e. almost 30% fought in the M.K. detachment. Artemyeva - 72 people, P. Karamzina - 55, in Oymyakon - 20, in Verkhoyansk - 20, in Nelkan - 8 people; Intellectuals from the Yakuts (3-5 people) took part in the movement7.

On May 10, 1924, rebels (25-30 people) led by M.K. Artemyev occupied the village of Nelkan. Captured Soviet workers A.V. Akulovsky, F.F. Popov and Koryakin were released. On the night of June 6, the rebels numbered 60 people. under the leadership of Tungus P.V. Karamzin and M.K. Artemyev, after an 18-hour battle, captured the port of Ayan. The surrendered garrison was liberated by the Tungus and sent to Yakutia8. After these events, the rebels and Red Army units did not undertake active military operations9.

In June 1924, a congress of the Ayan-Nelkan, Okhotsk-Ayan and Maimakan Tungus took place in Nelkan. A Temporary Central Tungus National Administration was elected, which included Tungus: Chairman - K. Struchkov, deputy - N.M. Dyachkovsky, management members - E.A. Karamzin and T.I. Ivanov. The congress approved P.V. as the head of the General Staff of the Tunguska partisan detachments. Karamzin. The new leadership decided to create an independent state on the territory inhabited by the Tungus10.

The rebels created their own paraphernalia. They adopted the tricolor flag of the Tunguska Republic: white symbolized Siberian snow, green – forest, black – earth. The anthem “Sargylardaah sa-khalarbyt”11 was also adopted.

Thus, this movement was not criminal, since its leaders were political oppositionists who rallied around specific socio-political ideas. The rebel leaders had ideas about jurisprudence. This is evidenced by their demands for national self-determination, individual rights, the rights of small ethnic groups, and the creation of an independent national-territorial entity. The reason for the discontent of the rebels was the inequality of rights of large and small nations during the creation of a national-territorial federation.

In addition to political ones, the rebels put forward demands of an economic and cultural nature. For example, they proposed to restore the ancient highways Yakutsk - Okhotsk, Nelkan - Ayan and Nelkan - Ust-Maya12, i.e. sought to establish previous economic ties with Yakutia; developed a set of measures for the economic and cultural development of the Okhotsk coast zone.

These demands coincided with the position of the party-Soviet leadership of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which advocated the formation of an autonomous Tunguska region and the right for Yakutia to enter the foreign market. Attention was drawn to the fact that in the pre-revolutionary period there was duty-free import of goods by the Sea of Okhotsk. P.A. Oyunsky, in his letter to the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Council and the Yakut Representation in Moscow, proposed to annex the Okhotsk coast to Yakutia, staff the local revolutionary committee with Tungus and Yakuts, abolish the pre-revolutionary system of elders and organize Councils, the chairmen of which should be Yakut communists. The first secretary of the Yakut regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, E. G. Pestun, believed that the Okhotsk coast was economically closely connected with Yakutia13. The party-Soviet leadership headed by M.K. Ammosov, I.N. Barakhov, S.V. Vasilyev, in the General Plan for the Reconstruction of the National Economy of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, outlined a project for transport links with the Primorsky Territory through access to the Sea of Okhotsk14.

E.G. Pestun in April 1925 spoke of the rebels' connections with the Japanese, Americans and French. In the summer of 1924, a Japanese schooner called at the port of Ayan. According to one of the rebel leaders, Yu.A. Galibarov, there was a Frenchman there who called himself a “professor” (name unknown). He and the Japanese captain promised to support Yu.A. Galibarov and his accomplices. At the same time, the English company Hudson Bay, which had a trade concession in Kamchatka, through its agents supplied the Tungus with Winchester rifles and the necessary supplies.

On March 10, 1925, the OGPU commissioner for the Amgino-Nelkansky region, Khalin, reported information received from the rebels who had surrendered. According to them, a Japanese cruiser visited the port of Ayan, with a certain general on board. M.K. Artemyev negotiated with him

about the supply of weapons and food to the rebels. Subsequently, the commander of one of the rebel detachments, I. Kanin, received from M.K. Artemyev secret notification, which talked about his receipt of Japanese assistance. On December 5, 1925, at a meeting of the Tungus of the Kyup nasleg, the commander of the rebel detachment N.N. Bozhedonov spoke about the need to establish contacts with Japan and America15. However, K.K. Baikalov came to the conclusion that foreigners had nothing to do with the Tunguska rebellion; the rebels maintained only commercial ties with them.

Participants in the movement did not want bloodshed at all and were ready to resolve the ongoing conflict through peaceful negotiations. K.K. Baykalov noted that the rebels released all captured Red Army soldiers and OGPU employees. In this respect, the “native savages” turned out to be smarter than the Okhotsk authorities16. But official circles chose violence as a method of resolving the conflict. In 1924, the Yakut District Executive Committee published an appeal “To all working Yakuts, Tungus. Towards the National Intelligentsia”, in which the rebels appeared as “criminal robbers”, “brazen robbers”, “criminals”17.

The cultural and educational society "Sakha Omuk" adopted a resolution stating that there were no reasons for which the uprising of 1921-1922 began: autonomy was proclaimed and a humane policy was pursued towards former rebels, representatives of the intelligentsia and peasantry. The new movement was assessed as an adventure and criminal banditry leading to economic ruin. There was an appeal to members of “Sakha Omuk” to take part in the campaign against the rebels, to attract former rebels for propaganda work among the population and participants in the new movement18.

In September 1924, by order of Kuntsevich, a detachment of the Okhotsk OGPU (45 people) led by V.A. was sent to the village of Ulya. Abramov and Andreev. According to information, there were rebels there. The Red Army soldiers shot three Russian fishermen, three Tungus (Mikhail and Ivan Gromov, I. Sokolov), and a Yakut M. Popov. The Tungus of Osenina19 died from brutal beatings.

February 7 cavalry detachment I.Ya. Stroda captured Petropavlovsk without a fight. A group of rebels led by I. Kanin at that time was on the opposite bank of the Aldan, one mile from the river. The Strodovites attacked them and a shootout ensued. The rebels fled to Nelkan, from where M.K. came out to meet them. Artemyev with a detachment of 30 people.20

From February 21 to February 22, 1925, the Tunguska detachment P.V. Karamzin, numbering 150 people, armed with 2/3 “thin Berdans”, with one “Shoshe” machine gun, occupied Novoe Ustye, located 8 versts from Okhotsk, in a night attack. The capture was a success, despite the two-fold numerical superiority and technical superiority of the Reds, who had 317 people armed with three-line rifles and machine guns (one Maxim, one Lewis, two Colts, three Chauchets). The head of the Okhotsk military garrison, Alpov, did not risk attacking the rebels and decided only to defend the port21.

The rebels confiscated the goods of the Nelkan branch of the Hudson Bay company and appointed Yu. Galibarov as warehouse manager22. In Novy Ustye, up to 10 thousand poods of food worth 100,000 rubles were in their hands, in Oymyakon - various goods worth about 25 thousand rubles, in Abye - furs worth 25 thousand rubles. In the captured areas, the rebels got the shops and warehouses of Yakutpushnina, the Kholbos cooperative, and other economic and trade organizations. There were cases of robberies of civilians, when horses, food supplies, and hay were taken23.

On the morning of March 4, the rebels raided Ust-Maiskoye. Fifty Red Army soldiers who went there were ambushed. Having lost 9 killed and 8 wounded, the Reds retreated to Petropavlovsk. Secondly this

A detachment of 80 Red Army soldiers was sent to the area. After a short firefight, the rebels fled. March 31 group M.K. Artemyeva occupied the Sulgachi area; On April 8, G. Rakhmatulli-na-Bossoiki’s detachment entered the village of Abaga. Cavalry I.Ya. Stroda, 20 km from Petropavlovsk, surrounded and forced the group of S. Kanin to surrender25. Of the 13 surrounded rebels, two died, three fled to Artemyev, and 8 people, including Kanin himself, laid down their arms26.

During the NEP in our country, the central party and Soviet bodies tried to resolve national problems peacefully. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin sent instructions to the authorized representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee K.K. Baikalov, who led the liquidation of the Tunguska uprising. It said: “The Central Committee, taking into account all the above considerations, finds it expedient to peacefully liquidate the uprising, using military forces only if this is dictated by necessity...”27

The party-Soviet bodies of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, guided by orders from the center, sent a commission consisting of: P.I. Orosina, A.V. Davydov and P.I. Filippova, who attended the Second Tunguska Congress in January 1925. This delegation informed the audience about political life in Yakutia and new construction, but the congress was distrustful of their arguments. The Tungus in the commission did not see a legal entity that could have significance and weight in politics. Therefore, the population considered the members of the delegation to have little authority and the question quite reasonably arose: “Can yesterday’s rebel give anyone a firm amnesty?”

The Tunguska Congress, through a peace delegation, presented demands to the YACI of the YASSR: 1) separation of the Okhotsk coast from Far East and annexation to Yakutia; 2) granting the Tungus the right to resolve political, economic and cultural issues themselves; 3) the removal from power of communists who pursued a policy of terror28. M.K. Artemyev wrote that if the Tungus and Yakuts fall under the yoke of foreign states or remain under communist rule, they will turn into slaves. “No party defends a nation as its native people defend.” Artemyev proposed that party and non-party aborigines unite and jointly defend national interests29.

Chief of Staff M.K. Artemyev with 60 rebels was in the Myryla area (160 km from Amga). A delegation of the YACI headed by R.F. arrived there. Kulakovsky, who signed the armistice agreement. On April 30, the YACEC sent an official delegation consisting of E.I. Sleptsova, F.G. Sivtsev and N. Boldushev.

In May 1925, during peace negotiations, both sides managed to find a common language. M.K. Artemyev became convinced that Yakutia was headed by communists who were not involved in the politics of terror; A national revival is taking place in the republic, and the issue of annexing Tungusia to the YASSR is under discussion30. As a result of successful negotiations, a peace agreement was concluded on May 9, and the detachment of M.K. Artemyev “unanimously decided to lay down his arms.” On July 18, detachment P.V. Karamzin in the area of Medvezhya Golova, located 50 km from Okhotsk, also capitulated. A total of 484 rebels from the M.K. unit surrendered. Artemyev and 35 rebels of the group P.V. Karamzina31.

On June 22, 1925, at the regional party conference in Yakutsk, K.K. Baikalov expressed the opinion that the regional committee made mistakes: it attracted amnestied rebels to Soviet work, gave them financial assistance, and extended the amnesty to Russian White Guards. M.K. Ammosov disagreed and said that recruiting former rebels with close ties to the natives would Sovietize them and gain the trust of the natives. The method of class stratification in relation to backward people is inappropriate. The amnesty of the Russian White Guards was caused by the release of white generals A.N. Pepelyaev and Slashchev. P.A. Oyunsky gave a certificate that the YACI gave 50 rubles to the former rebels. for travel and a certificate with which they could get a loan of up to 100 rubles. for starting a household. These measures were determined by the fact that the participants in the movement were impoverished Tungus and Yakuts, without a stake or a yard. Providing assistance contributed to their transition to peaceful life. E.G. Pestun noted that not a single merchant, policeman or White Guard officer has yet been granted amnesty.

Officership requires a personal approach. In 1923, a group of white officers was released in Abye; as a result, it was possible to eliminate the hotbed of insurgency in a remote and inaccessible area, “where no army could take them.” In 1924, the former White Bochkarev rebels no longer led rebel detachments; in particular, Colonel Gerasimov in Oymyakon refused to head the rebel headquarters32.

On August 10, 1925, a congress of Tungus of the Okhotsk coast, organized by the Dalrevkom, opened in Okhotsk, which was attended by representatives of 21 Tungus clans and three Yakut regions. They adopted a resolution on trade, hunting and fishing, health care, public education; They paid special attention to the organization of clan councils33. On August 23, at a meeting of Nelkan residents, the chairman of the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee K.K. Baikalov, F.G. Sivtsev and T.S. Ivanov. The meeting participants noted the strengthening of the international position of the USSR, the achievement of pre-war levels by industry and agriculture and the peaceful elimination of the insurgency by the government of Yakutia. It was emphasized that the Soviet government is the only defender of the oppressed masses. The “Main Tunguska National Administration” resigned its powers, and a revolutionary committee was formed in Nelkana. Its members included P.S. Zhergotov, I.N. Borisov and Yu.M. Trofimov.

On August 25, a meeting of Nelkan citizens was held, at which K.K. spoke. Baikalov. He promised that the demands of the Tungus people would be implemented and announced an amnesty for the rebels. But at the same time he added that all armed protests against the Soviet regime would be suppressed by force without any negotiations with the rebels34. The “Main Tunguska National Administration” adopted an act that the national self-determination of the Tunguska people would be consolidated by decisions made by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The adoption of such a resolution would make it possible to stop the fragmentation of the single Tungus ethnic group into various administrative units, such as the Yakut ASSR, Primorsky and Kamchatka regions. They consider their fragmented state

or as a “product of monarchical policy.” The main goal of the participants in the movement was to unite the Tungus people around a single national-territorial unit, which was to become part of Yakutia35.

1 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 170-169, 140, 150-149, 114.

2 Ibid. L. 1bb-165.

3 ON RS (Y) F. 50, op. 7, d. 6, l. 110, l. 77; d. 10, l. 105-106.

4 Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising: mistakes could have been avoided... // Ilin. Yakutsk, 1995. P. 94.

5 ON PC (YA). F. 50, op. 7, d. 10, l. 83-84; d. 5, l. 70.

6 Ibid. D. 6, l. 4, 7-8.

7 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 110, 115.

8 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings in 1924-1925 and 1927-1928. //Scientific communications. Vol. 6. Yakutsk, 1961. P. 25; Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. P. 94.

9 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 115.

10 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. P. 25; Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. pp. 94-95.

11 Ibid. P. 25.

12 Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. P. 94.

13 ON RS (Y). F. 50, op. 7, d. 6, l. 57, 10, 28.

14 Argunov I.A. Social sphere of lifestyle in the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Yakutsk, 1988. P. 68.

15 ON RS (Y). F. 50, op. 7, d. 6, l. 7; d. 3, l. 164, 57.

16 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 170-171.

>7 Ibid. Op. 3, d. 270, l. 33.

18 ON RS (Y). F. 459, op. 1, d. 72, l. 2.

19 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 147.

20 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. P. 26.

21 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 20, d. 32, l. 147.

22 Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. P. 95.

23 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. P. 26.

24 ON RS (YA). F. 50, op. 7, d. 3, l. 162-163.

25 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. P. 26.

26 Basharin G.P. Social and political situation in Yakutia in 1921-1925. Yakutsk, 1996. P. 267.

27 Pesterev V.I. Historical miniatures about Yakutia. Yakutsk, 1993. P. 108.

28 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. P. 26; Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. P. 25.

29 ON RS (Y). F. 50, op. 7, d. 3, l. 250; d. 5, l. 18.

30 Antonov E.P. Tunguska uprising. P. 96.

3> Basharin G.P. Socio-political situation. P. 268.

32 FNA RS (Y). F. 3, op. 3, d. 271, l. 55-56, 58.

33 Gogolev Z.V. The defeat of anti-Soviet uprisings. pp. 27-28.

34 ON RS (Y). F. 50, op. 7, d. 10, l. 15-16.

35 PFA AN (St. Petersburg branch of the archive of the Academy of Sciences). F. 47, op. 1, d. 142, l. 7.

SUMMARY: The author of the article Candidate of Historical Sciences E. Antonov tells about 1924-1925 and thinks that the main reasons of the Tungus Uprising was the policy of terror of the epoch of military communism against aborigines that was led by party Soviet leaders in Okhotsk coast.

In 1924-1925 The civil war in Russia has effectively ended. The Soviet Union already existed, the foundations of a new Soviet statehood were being laid. But many of the country's national outskirts remained restless. This was due to the socio-economic and political processes that took place in national regions against the backdrop of the establishment of Soviet power. First of all, we are talking about opposition to numerous innovations that the Bolshevik victory in the revolution and civil war. The course towards the creation of national autonomies, which, as it seemed, was supposed to play an important role in increasing the sympathy of national regions for the central government of the Soviet Union, in fact contributed to the growth of national self-awareness even of those peoples who were not considered at all as serious political actors in Tsarist Russia . Soviet nationality policy in general was distinguished by its inconsistency, and the opinions of researchers - historians and modern political figures - still differ radically about whether the reform of its political and administrative division in the first years of Soviet power brought positive or negative consequences to the country.

Causes of the uprising

For several years, armed resistance to Soviet power was provided by rebel groups operating in Eastern Siberia. The reasons for the uprisings that broke out in Eastern Siberia were most often not related to ideological confrontation with communist power. As a rule, the dissatisfaction of the population with the policies of the Soviet government in the sphere of economic relations and, in particular, abuse of official position, which was typical for many bosses and “bosses” at the local level, played a role. Although, of course, there were attempts to give the protest movements a deeper ideological background. As for the social base of the movement, in the first years of Soviet power the traditional social structure of many peoples of Eastern Siberia had not yet been violated, who retained their tribal structure and, accordingly, it was on this basis that they could consolidate to resist the new regional authorities.

Mid-1920s was marked by a major uprising of the indigenous population of the Okhotsk coast and the southeastern regions of Yakutia. The vast region of Yakutia, which included the Aldan, Verkhoyansk, Vilyui, Kolyma, Olekminsky and Yakut districts, was inhabited by the Tungus. It should be noted that Tungus in Tsarist Russia and in the first years of Soviet power were traditionally called Evenks, Evens and part of the Yakuts who lived in close contact with the Evenks. The Tungus population in this region reached 13 thousand people. At the same time, during the period under review, the Tungus, for the most part, retained their traditional way of life and their characteristic social structure. However, according to a number of researchers, in reality the Tungus population of the region under consideration was more likely Yakut. Those Evenks who lived in the region were largely Yakutized and used the Yakut language.

The discontent of the indigenous population of the region was caused by the separation of the Okhotsk Territory from Yakutia, which followed in April 1922. As a matter of fact, the Okhotsk Territory was assigned to the Kamchatka region back in 1910-1911, but until 1922 there were no real borders between Yakutia and the Okhotsk Territory. The Tungus quietly roamed the territory of both the Okhotsk Territory and Yakutia. At the same time, schools and churches were subordinate to Yakutsk, and Cossacks arrived from Yakutia (Lena Territory) to the Okhotsk Territory to serve as law enforcement officers. The situation changed in 1922, after the actual separation from Yakutia. This led to increased tension due to the disdainful attitude towards the local population on the part of the authorities. If a transition to autonomy was gradually carried out in Yakutia, as a result of which the development of a nationally oriented system of education and culture began, and the Soviet leadership behaved more restrained, then the small Tungus population of the Okhotsk Territory became, in literally, a victim of tyranny.

Firstly, unlike Yakutia, there were no national educational institutions in the Okhotsk Territory, the language was not studied, and the appointed Soviet leaders did not speak it, and the majority of the Tungus did not know Russian or spoke it with difficulty. In turn, the Tungus were isolated from participation in the activities of government and government bodies: as historian E.P. notes. Antonov, not a single Tungus was involved in the service of law enforcement agencies or government bodies (Antonov E.P. Tunguska national uprising of 1924-1925 // Russia and the Asia-Pacific region. 2007, No. 4. P. 42). The new Soviet leaders inherited the worst traditions of the Russian pre-revolutionary authorities in the region in terms of impunity for abuses and crimes against local residents. Thus, local authorities engaged in open robbery of the indigenous population, taking away deer and dogs and imposing colossal taxes.

The confiscation of reindeer actually ruined the once prosperous Tungus clans that roamed the territory of the Okhotsk Territory. Many Evenks lost their livelihood - from a herd of 40-70-100, or even a thousand deer, people had 10-20 deer left. The deterioration of material wealth was accompanied by constant harassment and bullying from government officials, which, as even the Soviet authorities that investigated the situation in the Okhotsk Territory later admitted, included criminal elements. Among them were not only self-interested people and bribe-takers, but also outright bandits who, before the revolution, were engaged in the fraudulent acquisition of furs from the local population. Among the workers of local Soviet authorities were even participants in the White Partisan movement, who were subsequently rehabilitated and entered Soviet service. It is significant that not all of the representatives of the local Soviet authorities participated in the robbery of the local population - some tried to protest, but they themselves risked becoming victims of lawlessness. Therefore, when the indignation among the indigenous population escalated the situation to the extreme, a social explosion occurred. An uprising against local authorities began.

The beginning of the uprising. Mikhail Artemyev

On May 10, 1924, a detachment of 25-30 rebels captured the village of Nelkan. On the night of June 6, 1924, a detachment of 60 rebels managed to defeat the Soviet garrison of the port of Ayan and capture the village and port. It is significant that the Tungus did not demonstrate bloodthirstiness towards Soviet managers - for example, Soviet employees captured in Nelkana were released, and the rebels also released the surrendered garrison of the port of Ayan to Yakutia, having previously disarmed them. The rebels did not kill any of the Soviet employees.

Also in June 1924, the initially spontaneous insurgent movement began to take on more organized forms. In Nelkana, captured by the rebels, a congress of the Ayan-Nelkan, Okhotsk-Ayan and Maimakan Tungus was convened, at which its delegates elected a Provisional Central Tungus national government. K. Struchkov was elected chairman of the department, N.M. was elected deputy. Dyachkovsky, management members - T.I. Ivanov and E.A. Karamzin. As for the military leadership of the rebel detachments, it was carried out by P.V. Karamzin and M.K. Artemyev. Pavel Karamzin was a representative of the Tungus princely family, which was extremely influential in the local areas, and therefore was a kind of symbol of the uprising - the Tungus still had very strong traditional components in their social life, so the presence of people from the princely family at the head of the rebels automatically attracted the broad masses of the Tungus to the side of the latter population. However, in many ways, Mikhail Artemyev should be considered one of the most active initiators of the uprising - he commanded the detachment that took Nelkan and the port of Ayan, and also participated in the direct development of the programmatic foundations of the insurgent movement. Among other local residents, Artemyev was distinguished by his literacy and life experience, which was atypical for reindeer herders.

Mikhail Konstantinovich Artemyev was born in 1888 in the Betyunsky nasleg of the Boturussky ulus into a peasant family. Unlike many other “foreigners,” as local residents were called in tsarist times, Artemyev was lucky - he was able to get an education, graduating from four classes of the Yakut real school. Literacy allowed Mikhail to take the position of clerk in the Bethune nasleg, and then become the foreman of the Uranai and Bethune clan administrations. Artemyev also managed to work as a teacher in the Amga settlement. Like many educated representatives of national minorities in Siberia, Artemyev initially supported the establishment of Soviet power. On March 17, 1920, he took the post of volost commissar and was also chairman of the revolutionary committee. However, Artemyev quickly turned from an active supporter of Soviet power into a participant in the rebel movements. He fought against the Bolsheviks in the rebel detachments of Korobeinikov, then served with General Pepelyaev. The defeat of the Pepelyaevites forced Artemyev to flee to the taiga, where, being in an illegal position, he led the rebel detachment.

About 600 Evenks and Yakuts took part in the Tunguska uprising, and there were also a few representatives of the Russian population of the region. From the very beginning of the movement, it took on a political character, since it put forward very clear political demands - the creation of a national state entity. In the economic field, the participants in the uprising demanded the restoration of the Yakutsk-Okhotsk, Nelkan-Ayan and Nelkan-Ust-Maya highways, which indicated their desire to improve the financial situation of the Okhotsk region and revive its trade and economic ties with Yakutia. At the same time, these requirements would also be beneficial for the economic development of Yakutia, since if these routes were recreated, Yakutia would have the opportunity to trade by sea from the Okhotsk coast. The seriousness of the rebels' intentions was confirmed by the adoption of their own tricolor flag, on which the white stripe meant Siberian snow, the green stripe meant taiga forests, and the black stripe meant their native land.

Thus, the ideology of the insurgency most likely satisfied the interests of the Yakut population, since the rebels sought to transform Yakutia into a region with access to the sea through the Okhotsk region. If the Soviet government had agreed to satisfy the demands of the rebels to unite Yakutia and the Okhotsk region, a new union republic would actually have been formed, which would have strengthened its position many times over. Naturally, the plans of the country’s central leadership did not include such a national formation, covering a significant part of Eastern Siberia with access to the sea, since the danger of separatist tendencies emerging was obvious. Especially during that difficult period when lobbyists for Japanese interests were active in the Far East and Eastern Siberia.

Rebel fighting and surrender

After the movement declared its political positions, the Soviet authorities of Yakutia were very concerned about the events taking place. The insurgency was characterized as a manifestation of banditry and criminality; at the same time, the rebels were accused of collaborating with Japanese intelligence services interested in destabilizing the situation in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The Yakut district executive committee issued an appeal “To all working Yakuts and Tungus. Towards the National Intelligentsia,” which stated the criminal nature of the insurgent movement in the Okhotsk region. In September 1924, the head of the OGPU of the Okhotsk district, Kuntsevich, sent an OGPU detachment of 45 people under the command of V.A. to the village of Ulya. Abramova. “Abramov’s men” shot three Russian fishermen, three Tungus and one Yakut.

The conflict entered its most active phase at the beginning of 1925. In early February, a cavalry detachment under the command of the famous Strode was sent against the rebels. Thirty-year-old Ivan Yakovlevich Strod (1894-1937) was considered one of the most experienced Red Army commanders in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. A former anarchist and then a supporter of Soviet power, Strode replaced the deceased legendary Nestor Kalandarishvili as commander of a cavalry detachment. Although Strode gained combat experience even before the start of the Civil War - he participated in the First World War, was awarded the St. George Cross and received the rank of ensign. During the first half of the 1920s. Strode commanded the Kalandarishvili cavalry detachment and led the defeat of the White Partisan formations of Pepelyaev, Donskoy, and Pavlov. It was assumed that an experienced commander, who knew partisan tactics very well and had crushed white detachments of professional military men, would easily cope with the Evenki rebels. Indeed, on February 7, 1925, Strode’s detachment occupied Petropavlovsk. On the bank of Aldan there was a clash between the Evenks, commanded by I. Kanin, and Strode’s cavalrymen. The rebels retreated to Nelkan.

However, on the night of February 21-22, 1925, a detachment of 150 Evenks under the command of P.V. Karamzin managed to capture Novye Ustye. Although the Evenks were opposed by a Red Army garrison of 317 soldiers and commanders armed with seven machine guns, the rebels managed to gain the upper hand and capture the village. After this, the rebels seized goods stored in warehouses with a total value of 100 thousand rubles in Novy Ustye, and 25 thousand rubles in Oymyakon. Naturally, the rebels appropriated furs stored in the warehouses of Soviet organizations. In relation to the local population, however, many of the rebels behaved no better than the Soviet leaders against whom they rebelled. Thus, fighters of the rebel groups seized food from the civilian population and took away horses.

Continuing raids across the Okhotsk region, on March 4, 1925, the rebels invaded Ust-Maiskoye. A detachment of 50 Red Army soldiers failed to drive them out of the village, after which the Red Army soldiers were forced to retreat, losing nine soldiers killed and eight wounded. But the repeated operation of the Red Army detachment, this time consisting of 80 soldiers and commanders, turned out to be more successful - the rebels retreated from Ust-Maisky. At the beginning of April, the Red Army soldiers of Ivan Strod managed to surround a detachment of rebel S. Kanin of 13 people. Only three rebels managed to escape, two were killed, and the remaining eight, including the commander of the detachment, Kanin, were captured.

Insurgent detachment, in the center - Pavel Karamzin

Meanwhile, having seen that forceful methods of suppressing the rebel movement in the Okhotsk region only entailed further embitterment of the indigenous population and did not contribute to a fundamental solution to the problem, the governing bodies of the Soviet government decided to change policy towards achieving a compromise. A significant role in resolving the conflict situation was played by Ivan Strod, who for many years of life and service in the taiga of Eastern Siberia and the Far East had well studied the psychology and customs of the local population.

Mikhail Artemyev, who lived with his rebels in Myryla, met with a delegation of the Central Election Commission of Yakutia led by R.F. Kulakovsky. A truce agreement was signed, and on April 30, a delegation of the Yakut Central Executive Committee, which included E.I., arrived to Artemyev. Sleptsov, F.G. Sivtsev and N. Boldushev. They promised Artemyev that the issue of reunifying the region with Yakutia would be resolved in the near future. The consequence of the negotiations was the formation of the M.K. detachment. Artemyev May 9, 1925. Two months later, on July 18, the detachment of another authoritative commander P.V. laid down arms. Karamzin. Thus, 519 Evenki and Yakut rebels laid down their arms. Since the central Soviet leadership at this time was extremely cautious in resolving issues in the field of interethnic relations, local authorities also focused on soft methods in relation to the rebels.

On August 10, 1925, the Dalrevkom organized a congress of the Tungus of the Okhotsk coast in Okhotsk, in which delegates from 21 Tungus clans and three Yakut regions took part. On August 23, 1925, a congress of the Main Tunguska National Administration was held in Nelkana, at which representatives of the Soviet government F.G. spoke. Sivtsev, T.S. Ivanov and Chairman of the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee K.K. Baikalov. As a result of the reports of Soviet leaders, the Tunguska Directorate announced the resignation of its powers and self-dissolution. The importance of resolving the conflict situation peacefully was emphasized. At the same time, K.K. Baikalov, who headed the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as a result of an investigation into the causes of the uprising of 1924-1925, concluded that the uprising was provoked by the criminal activities of the authorities of the Okhotsk region and employees of the local OGPU.

At the same time, the chairman of the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee also denied accusations of collaboration between the rebels and Japanese and American agents, which had previously been spread by the Yakut Soviet press.

The representative of the Okhotsk-Yakut military expedition of the OGPU Andreev made the following conclusion about the real reasons for the uprising that took place: “The main reason for the dissatisfaction of the Tungus with the existing government is their terrible impoverishment. The death of deer due to hoofing, the invasion of wolves, the pestilence of dogs, the lack of loans from economic authorities, illness and high mortality of the Tungus due to the complete lack of medical care, the inability to purchase basic necessities - these reasons together ruined the already low-standing primitive economy of the Tungus. The mistake of the local authorities lies in the following: there was no connection with the native population, they were not co-workers, but were officials who treated their duties in a formal manner; all the circular orders of the center were written for the majority of the provinces of Soviet Russia, but were unsuitable for the Okhotsk Territory , they were blindly implemented” (Quoted from: Fonova T.V. Administrative-territorial definition of the village of Nelkan in the 20s - 30s of the last century. Report of the 2nd scientific and practical conference “Meet the Sun!” August 2, 2008).

The participants of the Tunguska uprising were amnestied by the Soviet authorities. Moreover, many rebels were provided with loans to start a household. This step by the Soviet government was explained by the fact that people who were truly impoverished and who could hardly be accused of kulaks or bourgeois sentiments took part in the uprising. Therefore, the Soviet leadership tried to hush up the conflict and help those Evenks and Yakuts who were in dire financial situation. Some of the leaders of the uprising were even accepted into service in Soviet administrative institutions. In particular, Mikhail Artemyev is the most prominent field commander Tunguska uprising - he even worked as secretary of the Nelkan volost, then was a translator and guide.

"Confederalists". Second revolt

However, later many former participants in the uprising again became dissatisfied with the policies of the Soviet government. Despite the fact that the Soviet leadership made promises to satisfy the interests of the indigenous population, in reality the situation has changed little. Most likely, this is what forced Mikhail Artemyev in 1927 to join the next uprising, which took place in Soviet Yakutia and entered Eastern Siberia as “Xenophonism,” or “Confederalist movement.” The Tungus also took part in the “Confederalist movement,” although for the most part it was oriented toward the Yakuts in both composition and goals of the movement. The essence of the confederalist movement was the desire to transform the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into a union republic, which meant increasing the representation of the Yakuts in the Council of Nationalities of the USSR, government bodies in Yakutia, as well as increasing self-government in the republic. In addition, there was a nationalistic overtone - the Confederalists opposed the settlement of Yakutia by settlers from the European part of Russia, as they saw them as a threat to the economic well-being of the Yakut population. The peasants who occupied agricultural lands thereby deprived the Yakuts of pastures.

At the origins of the confederalist movement in Yakutia in 1925-1927. stood Pavel Vasilievich Ksenofontov (1890-1928). Unlike Artemyev, although literate, but with only four classes of a real school behind him, Ksenofontov could be called a real representative of the Siberian intelligentsia. Coming from a noble Yakut family, Ksenofontov graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University and in 1925-1927. worked at the People's Commissariat of Finance of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. When armed uprisings of the local population began in Yakutia in April 1927, Ksenofontov created the Young Yakut National Soviet Socialist Confederalist Party. In fact, it was her views that determined the main line of the Yakut uprising of 1927. In addition to Ksenofontov, Mikhail Artemyev also led the rebels.

Initially, the Confederalists planned to set out on September 15, but the plans were thwarted by the counterintelligence operations that had begun - P.D. informed the Soviet leadership about the impending uprising. Yakovlev, who served as Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Trade of Yakutia. However, on September 16, a rebel detachment was created led by Ksenofontov, Mikhailov and Omorusov. In October 1927, the rebels under the command of Artemyev occupied Petropavlovsk, including a detachment of 18 local Tungus. Olmarukov’s detachment occupied the village of Pokrovsk.

The detachments of Ksenofontov and Artemyev occupied the villages of Ust-Maya, Petropavlovsk, Nelkan, Oymyakon and a number of others. In two months, the uprising covered the territory of five Yakut uluses, and the number of rebels increased to 750 people. At the same time, the occupation of populated areas was carried out virtually without real clashes with the Red Army soldiers or the police. To counter the rebels, at the beginning of October 1927, the Soviet leadership convened an Extraordinary Session of the Yakut Central Executive Committee. It was decided to assign responsibilities for suppressing the uprising to the North-Eastern expedition of the OGPU. On November 18, Mikhailov’s detachment clashed with an OGPU unit.

In the village of Mytatsi on December 4, 1927, the rebels elected the Central Committee of the Young Yakut National Soviet Socialist Confederalist Party and the general secretary of the party, who became Ksenofontov. The Central Committee of the party included P. Omorusov, G. Afanasyev and six other rebels, the Central Control Commission of the party included I. Kirillov, M. Artemyev and A. Omorusova. On December 16, 1927, the rebels split into several detachments. A detachment of 40 rebels under the command of Mikhailov moved to the East Kangalassky ulus, a detachment of Kirillov and Artemyev of seventy people - to the Dyupsinsky ulus. As they advanced, the rebels gathered residents of the occupied villages and read out appeals to the people in the Yakut and Russian languages. In the meantime, OGPU detachments were following in the footsteps of the rebels. The operation against the Confederalists was commanded by the same Ivan Strod, who two years earlier suppressed the Tunguska uprising.

Confederal surrender

Like the Tunguska uprising of 1924-1925, the confederalist movement in Yakutia was relatively peaceful. Only ten times during the entire uprising did skirmishes take place with Soviet units; serious battles never followed. The leadership of Soviet Yakutia tried to resolve the conflict situation peacefully and offered Ksenophon an amnesty to him personally, all leaders and participants in the movement in exchange for laying down arms. Ultimately, Ksenofontov, convinced that main task party is a statement about existing problems and its point of view on their solution, on January 1, 1928 he laid down his arms. A number of his supporters preferred to “run” with weapons for some time, but on February 6, 1928, the last rebels capitulated. Although the uprising as a whole was not very large-scale, and its leaders agreed to voluntary surrender, the Soviet leadership broke their promises of amnesty.

Ksenophontov and other leaders of the uprising were arrested. On March 27, 1928, the OGPU “troika” sentenced Pavel Ksenofontov to death, and the next day, March 28, 1928, he was shot. Mikhail Artemyev was shot by the “troika” on March 27, 1928. The total number of those arrested in the case of the Ksenofontov uprising was 272 people, of which 128 people were shot, 130 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and the rest were released. At the same time, the purges also affected the leadership of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which, according to the central authorities, was unable to establish full order on the territory of the republic. In particular, the chairman of the Central Election Commission of Yakutia, Maxim Ammosov, and the secretary of the Yakut regional party committee, Isidor Barakhov, were removed from their posts.

The Confederalist uprising is one of the most famous examples of organized resistance to Soviet power and its policies on the territory of Yakutia. But even later, in the 1930s, there were numerous protests by the indigenous population of Eastern Siberia and the Far East against Soviet power. Local residents were not happy with the results of collectivization; they were also not satisfied with the policy of the Soviet government, aimed at eliminating traditional religious cults and the usual way of life. On the other hand, the Soviet government acted more and more harshly when suppressing such protests, since the increasingly complex situation in the country and in the world required increased attention to respecting the national security interests of the state. Moreover, in the immediate vicinity of Soviet Siberia and the Far East, on the territory of Korea, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, hostile Japan was active, striving to establish hegemony in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The People's Army consisted of the Northern Volunteer Group, commanded by Oshiversky, who arrived from Okhotsk, the Lena Volunteer Detachment and the Left Bank Vanguard Group. The Northern Volunteer Group included three companies with a total number of up to 300 mounted soldiers. The commander of the 1st company was Second Lieutenant Protasov, the 2nd company was Lieutenant Semenov. The Left Bank vanguard group included 320 mounted soldiers, led by N.F. Dmitriev. The Lena volunteer detachment consisted of 440 fighters, led by the cornet Kharkov, the chief of staff was A. Ryazansky. The detachment included 3 small detachments:

1 detachment - 200 mounted soldiers under the command of Lebedev;

2nd detachment - 180 mounted soldiers under the command of Kharlampiev;

3rd detachment - 80 mounted soldiers under the command of the cornet A. Ryazansky.

In total, the people's army operating near Yakutsk numbered 1000 - 1200 fighters. The northern anti-Bolshevik detachment, operating in the Verkhoyansk and Kolyma districts, numbered 100 - 200 people. In the Vilyuisky district there were about 300 fighters from six partisan detachments, which merged into one “Southern Anti-Bolshevik Detachment” under the command of P.T. Pavlova. All anti-Bolshevik detachments had among themselves good connection and, although the Bochkarev officers of the northern anti-Bolshevik detachment did not recognize the VYaONU, they also kept in touch with Okhotsk. They had 2 infirmaries, where the wounded were treated by two doctors and 7 nurses. There were 25 Russian officers in the people's army; there were 80 Russians in total.

They were armed with three-line rifles, the main weapons being hunting Berdans with 30 rounds of ammunition for each fighter and 4 light machine guns (3 Shoshas, 1 Colt). Officers wore military uniforms; ordinary rebels had shoulder straps with company numbers and emblems on the sleeves.

Shoulder straps of officials of the Yakut People's Army. No. 1 – officer’s shoulder straps cut from church vestments; No. 2 – shoulder strap of a private of the Lena volunteer detachment (which was part of the 1st Yakut partisan detachment); No. 3 – shoulder strap of a private of the Northern Volunteer Group (2nd company); No. 4 – shoulder strap of a private of the Southern Anti-Bolshevik detachment.

Vishnevsky E.K. Argonauts of the White Dream Description of the Yakut Campaign of the Siberian Volunteer Squad. Harbin, 1933. http://lib.rus.ec/b/232061/read#t26

The following units were formed: three battalions of riflemen, a separate cavalry division, a separate battery, a separate sapper platoon and an instructor company.

Upon arrival in Ayan, a commissariat was formed. Lieutenant Colonel Maltsev was appointed quartermaster. In the village of Nelkan, the position of chief of supply and chief of logistics was established, to which position Colonel Shnaperman was appointed, with the rights of assistant to the commander of the squad for economic matters; A. G. Sobolev was appointed his supply assistant.

The squad in Vladivostok was supplied with food for 4–5 months, winter uniforms (fur coats, felt boots and hats) for only 400 people, and summer uniforms for the entire squad.

Distinctive insignia and shoulder straps of the ranks of the Siberian volunteer squad.

In three famous photographs of the Pepelyaev detachment, published in the book “Yakutia. Historical and cultural atlas" (M.: Feoriya, 2007. pp. 357-368), as well as on the website: http://natpopova.livejournal.com/353326.html?page=1 it is clear that all ranks wear shoulder straps, and on some, white piping is clearly visible, white gaps for officers and white breeches for non-commissioned officers. Considering the initial desire of A.N. Pepelyaev to completely abolish shoulder straps and their subsequent preservation under pressure from colleagues, it is logical to assume that only their protective version was used in the squad.

The same is with the cockades: according to the literature, it can be seen that after the start of the expedition they were replaced by white and green ribbons, however, in the above-mentioned photographs taken in the autumn of 1922 in Ayan, the cockades on the caps are clearly distinguishable by their characteristic oval. Presumably, here too A.N. Pepelyaev had to compromise, returning to the version intertwined with a white and green ribbon.

A white and green armband with a militia cross is presumably the distinctive symbol of the 3rd Druzhina battalion, formed from the remnants of the Yakut rebel units. The cross is made using the applique technique, the encryption is drawn with a chemical pencil. The original bandage is kept in the Museum of Anti-Bolshevik Resistance in Podolsk.

After landing on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, it was planned to occupy Yakutsk, uniting the forces of the rebels, capture Irkutsk, form a Provisional Siberian Government there and begin preparing for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Taking into account the mood of the Yakuts and Siberians in general, Pepelyaev decided to perform not under the white-blue-red Russian flag, but the white-green Siberian flag, the flag of the Siberian Autonomy, which existed in 1918. The detachment, called the “Tatar Strait Militia,” received 1.4 thousand rifles. different samples, 2 machine guns, 175 thousand rounds of ammunition and 9800 hand grenades. Warm uniforms were received in Vladivostok, partly purchased by representatives of the Yakut authorities. The core of the detachment was the 1st Siberian Rifle Regiment under the command of Major General Evgeniy Vishnevsky. Many Siberian volunteers began to join the detachment: officers and riflemen. From Primorye the detachment included 493 people, from Harbin - 227. Three battalions of riflemen, a separate cavalry division, a separate battery, a separate sapper platoon and an instructor company were formed. Battalions and companies were commanded by colonels and lieutenant colonels, as young as their commander.

Figures 1 and 2 are officers of the Siberian volunteer squad; figure 3 – Yakut rebel in national dress and with an armband; figure 4 is an officer of the Yakut People's Army (for the period of his stay in Druzhina), dressed in a fur Yakut kukhlyanka and a fur hat with earflaps purchased on the coast.

Yuzefovich L.A. General A.N. Pepelyaev and anarchist I.Ya. Strod in Yakutia. 1922-1923. M., 2015.

P. 49. Korobeinikov and his headquarters coordinated the actions of individual detachments, headed by white officers. Yakut commanders were awarded officer ranks. The son of the Amga toyon, Afanasy Ryazansky, promoted to ensign by Korobeinikov, cut his shoulder straps from church vestments embroidered with gold.

P. 78. In order to solder the volunteers with an animating sense of equality, Pepelyaev wanted to abolish shoulder straps, but the officers were indignant and he had to retreat. The protest was led by Colonel Arkady Seyfulin. A nobleman, for some reason he ended up on the German front as a private and, according to Pepelyaev, served his colonel’s rank with the blood of 27 wounds. For people like Seifulin, who worked hard to earn a living in the artels created by Pepelyaev, officer's shoulder straps remained the only visual confirmation of their success in life.

P. 81. Half of the detachment received winter uniforms, but Pepelyaev was eager to sail to Ayan as quickly as possible. He hoped to capture Yakutsk before the onset of frost.

pp. 85-86. In the elevated atmosphere that usually accompanies the start of a voyage, an order was read out on the ships to rename the Militia of the Northern Territory into the Siberian Volunteer Squad. After this, the cockades on the caps were replaced with white and green ribbons - the old distinctive sign of the Siberian Army.

P. 134. (August 1922, Ayan) ... He wrote something else to Kulikovsky: “People are hungry, lightly dressed and taking off their shoes. For shoes, there are a hundred pairs of ichigs; you have to wrap your feet in skins.”

P. 138. (September 1922, Ayan, from a letter from Pepelyaev to his wife) Winter clothes arrived from Ayan yesterday and are now being distributed: mittens, warm underwear, fur hats are being given out. The fur coats haven't arrived yet. We’ll get everything, save up food, Vishnevsky will come up, and we’ll move on.

P. 166. Loneliness, confusion - everyone felt it. The new situation required new relationships between people, and in its published under New Year In the order, Pepelyaev prescribed in a special clause: from January 1, 1923, “to consolidate the cohesion” of the squad, when addressing each other, use the word “brother” before the rank - brother-volunteer, brother-colonel, brother-general... The innovation quickly took root, although at first it was approved not all officers.

P. 175. (Yakut rebel groups). Soon... an unknown rider arrived. “Having tied his horse in the yard,” Strode recalled, “he went into the yurt and took off his old, short reindeer coat with shabby hair. On his tunic he had shoulder straps, on which was written in ink pencil: 1. Y.P.O., that is, “1st Yakut partisan detachment.”

P. 181. From Amga, having talked with Baikalov on the phone, Strod sent to him Vychuzhanin with Nakha and an accidentally captured Pepelyaevite in a tunic with soldier’s shoulder straps, on which everything that is usually present in the form of stencils or stripes was drawn and written in chemical pencil.

P. 214 (Defense of Sasyl-Sysy). There were five people sitting at the table wearing clothes without shoulder straps. When asked which of them was Pepelyaev, the sixth responded, whom the envoys did not notice at first... He was wearing reindeer kamus (fur stockings) and a “knitted red sweatshirt” clearly of home origin.

P. 228. There were no shamans at the headquarters of the Siberian squad; Pepelyaev did not turn to them for predictions, like Ungern did to the Mongol lamas. He barely knew a dozen Yakut words, did not try to introduce national symbols into military uniforms or put national symbols on banners, did not have the slightest idea about Yakut mythology and did not appeal to it in his manifestos. He was disgusted by any ideological eccentricity...

pp. 241-242. (Defense of Sasyl-Sysy, presence of readable insignia on the uniform). The non-commissioned officer, having received a mortal wound in the temple, fell face down into the snow... The huge, clumsy body of Pepelyaev’s sergeant lies near the Colt machine gun...

P. 265. (Capture of Amga by the Reds). Its garrison consisted mainly of officers. Many shot back to the end and only in a hopeless situation raised the rifle with the butt up. It meant being ready to give up. Attempts to deal with them were stopped, but right on the spot they killed three Red Army soldiers who were captured, joined the Siberian squad and did not have time to rip the green and white ribbon from their cap in time. The ferocity of the battle was taken out on the unfortunate “traitors.”

Strod I.Ya. In the Yakut taiga. M., Military Publishing House, 1961// http://libatriam.net/book/922068

Pepelyaev’s former colleagues from other places, as well as White Guards who had fled from the ranks of the coastal army, began to flock to Second River, seven miles from Vladivostok, where Pepelyaev’s former colleagues from other places, as well as White Guards, who had fled from the ranks of the coastal army, were housed in the barracks set aside for them. Soon a detachment of 750 people gathered there, half consisting of officers. According to the general’s plan, such a large number of officers was needed for the future “people’s army,” which he dreamed of developing from the rebels against Soviet power kulaks. For purposes of secrecy, the detachment was formed under the guise of the Northern Region militia.

The leader of the Siberian regionalists, Narodnaya Volya member Sazonov, “the grandfather of the Siberian counter-revolution,” who managed to become close to the Japanese General Fukuda, tried to lead Pepelyaev’s speech, but the general rejected these attempts. Nevertheless, he made a concession to the regionalists, allowing him to organize an information department during the Yakut expedition to work among the population. As a sign of ideological solidarity, the white and green banner was recognized as a symbol of Siberian autonomy. Pepelyaev, in turn, ordered his squad to wear white and green ribbons instead of cockades. And before sailing to Yakutia, as an order to the personnel, he definitely expressed his regionalist aspirations in relation to Siberia.

At the beginning of the formation of the squad in Harbin and Vladivostok, Pepelyaev intended to abolish shoulder straps. He thought by this to achieve the appearance of democracy and difference from the old army. For the most part, the officers were against this innovation. Pepelyaev had to come to terms with the shoulder straps. Before the occupation of Amgi, Pepelyaev tried to “democratize” his squad from the other end. He issued a long order in which he declined the word “people” in all cases and ordered to call each other “brothers,” without forgetting, however, ranks.

In Ayan, from the remnants of the “Yakut people’s army” that ingloriously ended its existence, the White Guards formed the 3rd separate Yakut battalion, consisting of about two hundred people. Under the leadership of several Pepelyaev officers, the battalion began intensive military training.

In the afternoon an unknown armed horseman arrived. Having tied his horse in the yard, he went into the yurt and took off his old, short reindeer coat with shabby hair. There were shoulder straps on his tunic. The white man who arrived was very surprised when he realized that there were Reds in the yurt. He said that he had been sent to the Amga region with Pepelyaev’s appeal and was now returning back.

Having received such a report, Vishnevsky ordered his chains to quickly move forward, surround the yurts, and take the soldiers prisoner. Ten minutes later, about a hundred white people approached the yurts. Some of them remained in the yard and began to examine the cargo in our convoy. Groups of ten people entered the yurts. There they first threw firewood into the fireplace and only then began to wake up their captives.

The red soldiers began to stir, the commanders woke up and began to rub their eyes in surprise:

What the hell is this! What kind of people? Eh, yes, they have shoulder straps!

They grabbed their rifles, but it was too late.

Drop your weapon, don't move! You are surrounded and all resistance is useless! We won't do anything bad to you. It's good that it all ended without bloodshed. Let's smoke, we have Harbin tobacco, first-class. Want to?

The door creaked, and the colonel entered the yurt along with clouds of cold air. The conversations stopped. Having glanced briefly at the inside of the yurt and lingering for a few seconds on the prisoners, the colonel turned to his subordinates:

Brothers! Shooting started on the right. About four people stay here, and the rest go out into the yard.

Returning after pursuing the whites, the first squadron made its way through the bushes and came across the motionless body of the colonel. At first they thought he was dead. We came closer, took a closer look - he was breathing. It turns out that the colonel is wounded and lies unconscious. They took it with them, brought it to the yurt and put it in the corner on the hay. A few minutes later, the released orderly asked the Red Army soldiers to bring the wounded man closer to the fire. They took off their jacket, unbuttoned their jacket - the shirt was covered in blood.

The door to the yurt creaked. Behind the cloud of frosty air that rushed in, it was impossible to immediately see the newcomer, who silently approached the fireplace and then only spoke:

I'm cold, let me warm up!

They gave way to him. The man who entered, of enormous height and powerful physique, was dressed in wide trousers and a jacket made of gray overcoat cloth. He was not wearing a coat or a sheepskin coat. It was not difficult to determine from the shoulder straps on the jacket that he was a sergeant major.

Only in the yurt were the bandages removed from the envoys. At the table they saw about five officers - obviously the headquarters.

Which one of you is General Pepelyaev? - Volkov asked.

“I,” responded a tall, black-bearded man standing by the crackling fireplace. He was wearing cloth trousers, reindeer camooses, and a knitted red sweatshirt without shoulder straps.

The pre-dawn silence was broken by the warning sound of our machine guns. The trench thundered towards the whites with a fiery flash of a volley. Then a fragmentary discord of shots began. People walking in front, dressed in short fur coats, fell, and others came to replace them. The forest edge threw more and more chains onto Fox Glade. Not paying attention to the losses, leaving behind the dead and wounded, the whites aggressively climbed, urged and encouraged by the officers.

90 years ago, the Tungus and Yakuts turned to the League of Nations with a request to save them from communism
Article by Arman Marashetsi with my abbreviations, editing and additions.

Exactly 90 years ago, on February 13, 1925, a forgotten historical event took place - a major battle between the Tunguska rebels and the Soviet regime. The armed uprising of the indigenous peoples of the North under the leadership of the Yakut Mikhail Artemyev and the Tungus Pavel Karamzin went down in history as the “Tunguska Uprising” and spanned the years 1924-1928. the entire Okhotsk coast and the eastern regions of Yakutia.

On the left photo is Mikhail Artemyev. On the right - group k commanders of the Tunguska detachments ( P.G. Karamzin - second from left in the top row). The biography of Pavel Gavrilovich Karamzin is almost unknown. However, the few surviving documents indicate that he came from an Evenki princely family, presumably from the Ayano-Maisky district of the Khabarovsk Territory.

This uprising of the Yakuts and Tungus (Evenks) against Soviet power was by no means the first.

Back in 1921, an uprising broke out in the Ayano-Maisky region. The uprising was led by the Yakut G.V. Efimov, but Russian White Guards also took part in it under the leadership of cornet Mikhail Korobeinikov. The rebels organized the Yakut Regional Administration, and the Yakut Insurgent Army was created. In 1922, YaOU appealed asking for helpto the Merkulov brothers, who ruled in Vladivostok (until October 1922, the Primorsky Territory was the last enclave of Russia unconquered by the Bolsheviks), but they did not receive help. However, whenThe Merkulovs were displaced by General M.K. Diterikhs, help was sent: Lieutenant General Anatoly Pepelyaev and Major General Vishnevsky by the summer of 1922 formed a detachment, which in the fall of the same year arrived on the ships “Zashchitnik” and “Battery” in the port of Ayan (then Yakutia also had access to the Sea of Okhotsk).

Generals M. Dietrichs (left) and A. Pepelyaev (right)

After the landing, Pepelyaev’s detachment went to Yakutsk. As a result of his defeat in March 1923, Pepelyaev was forced to retreat towards the coast. In the summer of 1923, Pepelyaev was defeated. Only parts of his army, led by Colonels Sivkov, Anders, Stepan and Leonov, survived. Part of the army (230 soldiers and 103 officers), led by Pepelyaev, surrendered.

In addition to Pepelyaev’s detachment, since 1920 there was a rebel detachment in Okhotsk under the leadership of Captain Yanygin. In 1921, reinforcements came to them - Bochkarev’s detachment arrived from Vladivostok. In the fall of 1922, the newly arrived General Vasily Rakitin took over the leadership of the detachment. In the same year, Rakitin’s detachment went to Yakutsk, with the exception of Captain Mikhailovsky’s detachment, which remained in the city. In the summer of the same year, Okhotsk fell. Yanygin managed to escape, General Rakitin died.

Now let's return to the Tunguska uprising of 1924-1925.

The main reasons for the uprising are considered to be the separation of the Okhotsk Territory from Yakutia in April 1922 with its transfer to the Primorsky and Kamchatka regions, as well as the closure of ports for foreign trade, interruptions in the delivery of goods from the mainland, confiscation of deer from private owners, confiscation of vast pastures for industrial purposes. new buildings and other arbitrariness of the Soviet authorities. On the Okhotsk coast, the local OGPU terrorized the local population, forcing them to pay exorbitant taxes, shamelessly robbing them for literally everything: game, weapons, firewood, dogs, stripped tree bark, etc. It got to the point that they began to take out old debts established by the White Guards in 1919-1923. In addition, representatives of the Soviet government did not know the Tungus language, life, or customs. There were no national schools, and there was not a single Aboriginal person in government institutions.

In May 1924, the rebels under the leadership of M.K. Artemyev occupied the village of Nelkan. On June 6, rebels numbering 60 people captured the port of Ayan after an 18-hour battle. During the battle, the head of the OGPU Suvorov and three Red Army soldiers were killed, and the surrendered garrison was liberated by the Tungus and sent to Yakutia.

A congress of Ayan-Nelkan, Okhotsk-Ayan and Maimakan Tungus and Yakuts was convened in Nelkana. It elected the Temporary Central Tunguska National Administration, which decided to separate from Soviet Russia and form an independent state. M.K. Artemyev was chosen as the chief of staff of the armed detachments, and P. Karamzin was chosen as the head of all Tungus detachments.

Flag of the Tunguska Republic

The rebels created the attributes of their national-territorial entity. They adopted the tricolor flag of the “Tunguska Republic”: white symbolized Siberian snow, green - forest, taiga, black - earth. It also adopted its own anthem.

All this refutes the assertions of Soviet authors that the said uprising was criminal. The leaders of the uprising were political oppositionists who rallied around specific socio-political ideas. The rebel leadership was well acquainted with legislative and philosophical sources.

This is evidenced by their demands for national self-determination, individual rights, the rights of small ethnic groups, the creation of an independent national-territorial entity, etc. The reason for the discontent of the rebels was the inequality of rights of large and small nations during the creation of a national-territorial federation.

The Tungus, finding themselves under the authority of the authorized V.A. Abramov, experienced the policy of terror of the era of “war communism”. In addition to political ones, the rebels made demands of an economic and cultural nature. For example, they proposed restoring the ancient routes: Yakutsk - Okhotsk, Nelkan - Ayan and Nelkan - Ust-Maya. That is, they sought to establish the same economic ties with Yakutia. In addition, a set of measures was developed for the economic and cultural development of the Okhotsk coast zone.

The Temporary Central Tunguska National Administration warned the Central Executive Committee of the USSR that: “In the event of a landing of military units of Soviet troops on our shores of the Sea of Okhotsk and an invasion across the borders of our neighboring republics of the Far East and the Yakut Autonomy, we, the Tunguska nation, have rebelled completely because of the intolerant Bolshevik politicians will have to offer armed resistance as proof of our deep indignation and we will be confident that for the possible victims, all responsibility for shed innocent blood before history and public opinion will fall on you as the highest body of Soviet power, which allowed violence.” Consequently, the participants in the movement did not at all want bloodshed and wanted to resolve the ongoing conflict through peaceful negotiations. This is also evidenced by the facts of the release of captured Red Army soldiers and Soviet employees."

The immediate cause of the uprising was the execution in September 1924 by a detachment of the Okhotsk OGPU in the area of the village of Ulya of three Russian fishermen, two Tungus and one Yakut. In response, armed self-defense units began to organize everywhere. According to various studies, the group M.K. Artemyeva captured the one located 315 km away without a fight. from Yakutsk in the village of Petropavlovsk, Ust-Maisky district. At the same time, pockets of insurgency intensified in the North of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: Oymyakon, Verkhoyansk, Abyi (Elget) and other uluses. On December 31, 1924, the rebels captured the village of Arka, and then Novoye Ustye, located 7 km away. from Okhotsk. A group of rebels under the command of G. Rakhmatullin-Bossooika rushed to Nelkan. Mikhailov’s detachment of 40 people went to the East Kangalassky ulus, reading appeals to the people in Yakut and Russian at rural gatherings.

On August 10, a congress of Tungus of the Okhotsk coast opened in Okhotsk, which was attended by representatives of 21 Tungus clans and three Yakut regions. They adopted a resolution on trade, hunting and fishing, health care, and public education. Particular attention was paid to the organization of clan Councils. The Tunguska Congress, through a peace delegation, presented demands to the Central Executive Committee of Yakutia for:

1) separation of the Okhotsk coast from the Far East and its reunification with Yakutia;
2) granting the Tungus the right to resolve political, economic and cultural issues themselves;
3) the removal from power of the communists who pursued a policy of terror.

In order to combat the rebels, the III Extraordinary Session of the Yakut Central Executive Committee was convened. On it, the secretary of the regional committee, Baikalov K.K., called the rebels bandits, and their leaders - “elements besotted with illusion.”

Stalin sent instructions to Baikalov, who headed the operation to “liquidate the Tunguska uprising,” which stated: “The Central Committee considers it expedient to peacefully liquidate the uprising, using military forces only if this is dictated by necessity...”.

In May 1925, during peace negotiations, the parties managed to find a common language. M.K. Artemyev became convinced that the leaders of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were not those communists who pursued the policy of terror; National revival is taking place in the republic and the issue of annexing Tungusia to the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is under discussion. As a result of successful negotiations, a peace agreement was concluded on May 9 and M.K. Artemyev “unanimously decided to lay down his arms.” On July 18, P. Karamzin’s detachment was in the area of Bear’s Head, located 50 km away. from Okhotsk, joined the peaceful surrender. In total, 484 rebels from the M.K. detachment laid down their arms. Artemyev and 35 rebels of P. Karamzin’s group. Considering that the main goal of the “military demonstration” - propaganda of the party’s political program - had been achieved and, at the same time, realizing the passivity of the bulk of the population, P. Ksenofontov surrendered to the authorities and was arrested in K. Baikalov’s apartment, believing in the word of amnesty given by the communists.

On August 25, 1925, the “Main Tunguska National Administration,” through an act, expressed the wish that the national self-determination of the Tunguska people be consolidated by decisions made by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR. The adoption of such a resolution would make it possible to stop the fragmentation of the single Tungus ethnic group between various administrative entities, such as the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Primorsky and Kamchatka regions. They viewed their fragmented state as “a product of monarchical policy.” The main goal of the participants in the movement was the unification of the Tungus people and their entry as an independent national unit into the autonomous Yakutia.

The last attempt of the Yakuts and Tungus to achieve independence was the Confederalist Uprising of 1927-1928.

The uprising was planned to begin on September 15, but the beginning of mass repressions provoked by the denunciation of P. D. Yakovlev (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Trade of the YASSR) prevented the plans of the leaders of the uprising. Despite the repression, many prominent rebels, including Artemyev, managed to elude the security officers. On September 16, the creation of a rebel detachment began under the leadership of Pavel Ksenofontov, S. Mikhailov and P. Omorusov.

Pavel Vasilievich Ksenofontov

Born into a wealthy Yakut family. Graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University.Like a number of other Yakut intellectuals, he advocated raising the status of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to a union republic, separating the Communist Party from the state, and providing greater self-government to local authorities. He protested against the resettlement of Russian peasants to Yakutia, which led to the deprivation of the Yakuts of land for grazing livestock.Attempts by Ksenofontov and his supporters in 1925-1927 to bring these issues up for discussion at district and republican party congresses were unsuccessful due to the opposition of the party leaders of Yakutia.Against the backdrop of armed uprisings that began in Yakutia in April 1927, Ksenofontov on September 28, 1927 in the village of Kudoma announced the creation of the “Young Yakut National Soviet Socialist Confederalist Party.” In response to this, the Yakut leadership declared Ksenofontov and his supporters bandits and headed for an armed suppression of the rebellion.

On September 28, at the first meeting of the Confederalists, it was decided, for the purpose of propaganda, to hold an “armed demonstration” - a campaign across Yakutia with a call to achieve independence.

In October, a detachment of Confederalists under the command of Artemyev occupied the village of Petropavlovsk. There, a detachment of 18 Tungus joined the confederalists, and soon Mikhailov’s detachment came to the village. Elections were held, as a result of which Mikhailov became the commander, and Artemyev became the chief of staff of the detachment. At the same time, fighting began throughout Yakutia: the village of Pokrovsk was occupied by Olmarukov’s detachment, fighting took place in the Yakutsk and Olekma districts, and the Confederalists began fighting in the Ust-Maisky, Mechinsky and Amginsky uluses.

In order to fight the Confederalists, the III Extraordinary Session of the YACI was convened on October 6. On it, the secretary of the Yakut regional committee, Baikalov K.K., proclaimed the confederalists as bandits, and their leaders as “elements besotted with illusion.” According to a decree from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, all responsibility for suppressing the uprising was assigned to the North-Eastern Expedition of the OGPU.

On November 8, Artemyev’s detachment tried to take the village of Abaga, but met resistance from the pioneers; not wanting to shed blood, Artemyev ordered a retreat. After this, the detachment went to the village of Tabalakh, where previously captured OGPU agents were released. On November 18, in the village of Dzharala in the Western Kangalassky ulus, a shootout took place between part of the OGPU and Mikhailov’s detachment.On November 22, in the village of Mytatsi, detachments of P. Omorusov and I. Kirillov, numbering 30 and 26 people, united.

On December 4, a meeting of Confederalists took place in the village of Bor, at this meeting Xenophontov was elected general secretary Party Central Committee. P. Omorusov, G. Afanasyev and six other Confederalists were elected members of the Central Committee. Members of the Central Control Commission (Central Control Commission) became cousin Ksenofontova I. Kirillov, as well as M. Artemyev and A. Omorusova. Then the Confederalists began to retreat to the village of Petropavlovsk.On December 16, the Confederal troops split up. Mikhailov’s detachment of 40 people went to the East Kangalassky ulus. Artemyev and Kirillov’s detachment of 70 people advanced to the Dyupsinsky ulus through the village of Namtsy.

Later in December, there was a shootout between Confederalists and Red Army soldiers, and one Red Army soldier was killed. In the village of Khariyalakh, in the East Kangalassky ulus, another skirmish occurred, as a result of which the Confederalists lost 7 people killed and retreated to the village of Maya. Then Mikhailov’s detachment walked through five uluses, reading appeals to the people in Yakut and Russian at rural gatherings. Kirillov’s detachment came under attack in the village of Khatyryk. The Confederalists were pursued by OGPU detachments under the command of Ivan Strode and other commanders. Having united in the Dyupsinsky ulus, the detachments of Mikhailov and Kirillov reached the mouth of the Amga River. Then they split up again: Mikhailov’s detachment went in the direction of the Gorny ulus to join Ksenofontov, and Artemyev and Kirillov’s detachment moved to the village of Ust-Aim.

The end of the uprising was tragic.
January 1, 1928 taking into account the fact that pThe leadership of the YASSR more than once turned to Ksenofontov and other leaders of the movement with a proposal to surrender, promising in this case an amnesty, as well asBelieving that the goal of the “armed demonstration,” which was to promote the party program, had already been achieved, and also believing the promises of the communists about amnesty, Ksenofontov went to negotiations, where he was treacherously arrested.At the same time, having received Ksenofontov’s letter, Mikhailov’s detachment surrendered on January 27 in the Amginsky ulus.On February 6, the detachment of Artemyev and Kirillov capitulated. The six-month “armed demonstration” was over.

Despite the promise of amnesty, Pavel Ksenofontov was shot on March 28, 1928, according to an extrajudicial verdict pronounced on March 27, 1928 by the “troika” led by the head of the Special Department of the OGPU S.V. Puzitsky.

The executioners of Yakutia are Janis Strods (left) and Sergei Puzitsky (right)... One is a former Latvian, the other is a former Pole.
The Marxist masters of these two watchdogs assessed their service accordingly; like many others like them, both were shot in 1937.

At the end of March, a special judicial commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks arrived in Yakutia under the leadership of Ya. V. Poluyan. 128 people were shot, 130 received various prison sentences, some of them were not related to the uprising. Among those repressed were prominent representatives of the intelligentsia, many of whom knew nothing about the uprising, and some knew, but at the same time condemned it.In particular, in June, members of the Sakha Omuk society were repressed,despite the fact that its members not only condemned the uprising, but even actively fought against the rebel detachments of P. Ksenofontov and M. Artemyev.
In addition, by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the situation in the Yakut organization of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", published in August 1928 in the newspaper Pravda, signed by V. Molotov, thepositions: Chairman of the YACI M.K. Ammosov, Secretary of the Yakut Regional Committee I.N. Barakhov and many othersparty and Soviet workers of Yakutia.

This is how the armed struggle of the Yakuts for independence and freedom ended in the 20th century.

On this day, February 13, Tunguska troops repulse an attempt to break through by Soviet units to Oymyakon. In 1924-1925, the so-called Tunguska uprising took place - an armed uprising of rebels from the indigenous peoples of the North in Yakutia and regions of the North-East, caused by the unjustified actions of local authorities.

Tunguska insurgency in 1924-1925. covered the Okhotsk coast and the eastern regions of the YASSR. The main reason for its emergence was the separation of the Okhotsk Territory from Yakutia in April 1922 and its transfer to the Primorsky and Kamchatka regions. As a result, at a time when a new military-political line was being pursued in Yakutia under the conditions of the NEP, on the Okhotsk coast the local party-Soviet leadership and the OGPU bodies continued to pursue a policy of terror against the local population. Forcing them to pay exorbitant taxes, the security officers dealt with peaceful hunters with machine-gun fire. The Aborigines were shamelessly robbed by imposing exorbitant “taxes” on literally everything: killed game, weapons, firewood, dogs, stripped tree bark, etc. It got to the point that they began to take out old debts established by the White Guards in 1919-1923. Representatives of the Soviet government did not know the Tungus language, life, or customs. There were no national schools, and there was not a single Aboriginal person in government institutions.

On May 10, 1924, the rebels under the leadership of M.K. Artemyev occupied the village of Nelkan. Captured Soviet workers A.V. Yakulovsky, F.F. Popov, Koryakin were released. On June 6, rebels numbering 60 people led by Tungus P. Karamzin and Yakut M.K. Artemyev, after an 18-hour battle, captured the port of Ayan. During the battle, the head of the OGPU Suvorov and three Red Army soldiers were killed, and the surrendered garrison was liberated by the Tungus and sent to Yakutia.

In June 1924, in Nelkan, the rebels convened a congress of the Ayan-Nelkan, Okhotsk-Ayan and Maimakan Tungus and Yakuts. It elected the Temporary Central Tunguska National Administration, which decided to separate from Soviet Russia and form an independent state. M.K. Artemyev was chosen as the chief of staff of the armed detachments, and P. Karamzin was chosen as the head of all Tungus detachments.

On July 14, 1924, the All-Tunguska Congress of the Okhotsk Coast and its adjacent regions took place in Ayan, declaring the independence of the Tunguska people and the inviolability of its territory with sea, forest, mountain wealth and resources. Leaders of the movement of different nationalities M.K. Artemyev, P. Karamzin, S. Kanin, I. Koshelev, G.Ya. Fedorov and others, 10 people in total, compiled an “Appeal” to the world community. It said that the Tungus, lagging behind “in all respects from the world progress of science and technology,” are turning to foreign states and the League of Nations, “as powerful defenders of small nationalities on a global scale” on the issue of saving them from “the common enemy of the world.” nationalism - Russian communism.” This formulation of the problem by the leadership of the movement indicates a fairly mature level of political self-awareness and socio-political views. It is interesting to compare the point of view of the leaders of the movement with the opinion of the modern American scientist D. Davids, who wrote that “nationalism, and only nationalism, is an effective barrier to communism.”

Flag of the Tunguska Republic

The rebels created the attributes of their national-territorial entity. For example, they adopted the tricolor flag of the “Tunguska Republic”. White color The flag symbolized Siberian snow, green - forest, taiga, black - earth. It also adopted its own anthem.

Thus, this movement was not criminal, since its leaders were political oppositionists who rallied around specific socio-political ideas. The rebel leadership was well acquainted with legislative and philosophical sources. This is evidenced by their demands for national self-determination, individual rights, the rights of small ethnic groups, the creation of an independent national-territorial entity, etc. The reason for the discontent of the rebels was the inequality of rights of large and small nations during the creation of a national-territorial federation. The Tungus, finding themselves under the authority of the authorized Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee for the Okhotsk district V.A. Abramov, experienced the politics of terror of the era of “war communism” at the height of the NEP.

In addition to political ones, the rebels made demands of an economic and cultural nature. For example, they proposed restoring the ancient routes: Yakutsk - Okhotsk, Nelkan - Ayan and Nelkan - Ust-Maya. That is, they sought to establish the same economic ties with Yakutia. In addition, a set of measures was developed for the economic and cultural development of the Okhotsk coast zone.

But in September 1924, a detachment of the Okhotsk OGPU near the village of Ulya shot three Russian fishermen, two Tungus and one Yakut. In response, armed self-defense units began to organize everywhere. Group M.K. Artemyeva captured the one located 315 km away without a fight. from Yakutsk in the village of Petropavlovsk, Ust-Maisky district. "Focuses of insurgency intensified in the North of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: Oymyakon, Verkhoyansk, Abyi (Elget) and other uluses. On December 31, 1924, the rebels captured the settlement of Arka, and then Novoye Ustye, located 7 km from Okhotsk. A group of rebels under the command of G. Rakhmatullin-Bossooika rushed to Nelkan.

The rebels confiscated the goods of the Nelkan branch of the Hudson Bay company and appointed Yu. Galibarov as head of the military-civilian warehouse. At Novy Ustye they received up to 10 thousand poods of food worth 100,000 rubles, in Oymyakon - various goods worth about 25 thousand rubles, in Abye - furs worth 25 thousand rubles. In the captured areas, the shops and warehouses of Yakutpushnina, the Kholbos cooperative, and other economic and trade organizations were in the hands of the rebels. There were cases of robberies of civilians, when horses, food supplies, and hay were taken.

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin sent instructions to the authorized representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee K.K. Baikalov, who led the liquidation of the Tunguska uprising. It said: “The Central Committee, taking into account all the above considerations, finds it expedient to peacefully liquidate the uprising, using military forces only if this is dictated by necessity...”. To conduct peace negotiations, a commission consisting of P.I. was sent from Yakutsk. Orosina, A.V. Davydov and P. Filippov, who attended the second Tunguska Congress in January 1925. This delegation informed those gathered about political life in Yakutia and about new Soviet construction in general, but the congress was very distrustful of their reports. This mistrust was explained by the fact that the Tungus did not see them as a legal entity that could have significance and weight in politics. Therefore, the population considered the members of the delegation to have little authority and quite reasonably asked: “Can yesterday’s rebel give anyone a firm amnesty?”

The Tunguska Congress, through a peace delegation, submitted to the YACK of the YASSR demands for: 1) separation of the Okhotsk coast from the Far East and annexation to Yakutia; 2) granting the Tungus the right to resolve political, economic and cultural issues themselves; 3) the removal from power of the communists who pursued a policy of terror. During the negotiations, hostilities were temporarily stopped, but under pressure from the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, the Aldan-Nelkan cavalry detachment I.Ya. Stroda suddenly captured Petropavlovsk, thereby breaking the truce.

In May 1925, during peace negotiations between M.K. Artemyev and I.Ya. Strodom, R.F. Kulakovsky, both sides managed to find a common language. M.K. Artemyev became convinced that the leaders of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were not those communists who pursued the policy of terror; National revival is taking place in the republic and the question of the accession of Tungusia to the YASSR is at the discussion stage. As a result of successful negotiations, a peace agreement was concluded on May 9 and M.K. Artemyev “unanimously decided to lay down his arms.” On July 18, P. Karamzin’s detachment was in the area of Bear’s Head, located 50 km away. from Okhotsk, joined the peaceful surrender. In total, 484 rebels from the M.K. detachment laid down their arms. Artemyev and 35 rebels of P. Karamzin’s group.

However, the center, and especially the organs of the OGPU-NKVD, did not share such views and constantly suspected the Yakuts and Tungus of “Japanophilism.” In 1925 M.K. Ammosov anxiously reported to his friends in Yakutsk that “in the depths of the Central Committee (Stalin and others) they are extremely distrustful of us, classifying us as communists degenerating into bourgeois revolutionaries.” F.G. spoke about the same thing. Sivtsev: “Sedition is not the property of the population, but it is created by unhealthy methods, excessive suspicion, party underdevelopment and national bad manners.”

The further fate of the rebels is tragic - after some time, starting in 1927 and until the beginning of World War II, they were subjected to repression, many of them were shot. Probably, the same tragic fate befell Pavel Gavrilovich Karamzin (in the photo, second from left in the top row).

The biography of Pavel Gavrilovich Karamzin before and after his participation in the rebel movement is unknown (probably classified by the OGPU authorities without a statute of limitations). From the few historical documents it is known that Pavel Karamzin came from an Evenki princely family, presumably from the Ayano-Maisky district of the Khabarovsk Territory.

Based on the publication of E.P. Antonova, Ph.D.

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