Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)
The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - military actions between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
In the fall of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Organs Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.
The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) of regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and the North Caucasus republics and etc.
On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.
On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.
(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)
The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops; the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the assigned task.
Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.
From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.
Illegal armed groups (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).
On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.
On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.
On May 12, 1997, a Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.
The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took the line towards the immediate secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally the population of other North Caucasian republics around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis intensified.
Counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)
In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants.
Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.
On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.
Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct military operation to destroy militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.
In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.
On February 25-27, 2000, units of the “West” blocked Kharsenoy, and the group “East” closed the militants in the area of Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.
The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelayev’s group in the area of the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, hostages were taken in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, hostages were taken at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.
By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.
From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources
22 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the Russian President “On measures to ensure law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” Russian regular army forces entered the territory of Chechnya. The document from the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of events that preceded the start of the war and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.
The first Chechen war lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995 In Chechnya, a total of about 26 thousand people died, including 2 thousand people - Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand - militants, and the rest of the losses were civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and among federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.
Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control
The turn of the 1980-1990s. in the post-Soviet space was marked by a “parade of sovereignties” - Soviet republics of different levels (both the USSR and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) one after another adopted declarations of state sovereignty. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.”
On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (later transformed into the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKCHN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.
During the August 1991 putsch, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Council and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, OKCHN, which was in opposition, opposed the State Emergency Committee and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between supporters of the OKCHN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).
On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree “On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.” In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures for its implementation failed - two planes with special forces landing at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.
Already in November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military camps, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and internal troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving a large number of equipment, weapons and ammunition.
In the fall of 1992, the situation in the region sharply deteriorated again, this time in connection with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny region. Dzhokhar Dudayev declared the neutrality of Chechnya, but during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, and the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.
In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev intensified. The emerging disagreements ultimately led to the dissolution of parliament and the consolidation of opposition political figures in Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov grew into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.
At dawn on November 26, 1994 Large forces of Dudayev’s opponents entered Grozny . The tanks reached the city center without any problems, where they were soon shot down from grenade launchers. Many tankers died, dozens were captured. It turned out that they were all Russian military personnel, recruited Federal Counterintelligence Service. Read more about these events and the fate of the prisoners in the information of the "Caucasian Knot" "November assault on Grozny (1994)".
After an unsuccessful assault, the Russian Security Council decided on a military operation against Chechnya. B.N. Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya stops, or Russia will be forced to “take extreme measures.”
Preparing for war
Active military operations on the territory of Chechnya have been carried out since the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out targeted bombing of military targets on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which had no identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the Air Force command and the command of the Army Aviation of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.
On November 30, 1994, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed secret decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” which provided for “disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
According to the text of the decree, from December 1 it was prescribed, in particular, “to implement measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the Chechen Republic,” to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed groups, and to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.
On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev stated that “an operation has begun to forcefully transfer Russian army officers fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition to the central regions of Russia.” On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Russian Minister of Defense and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on the “immunity of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya.”
On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was held regarding the Chechen events. At the meeting, a resolution was adopted “On the situation in the Chechen Republic and measures for its political settlement,” according to which the activities of the executive branch in resolving the conflict were recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” By this decree, the President instructed the Russian government to “use all means available to the state to ensure state security, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, protection of public order, the fight against crime, disarmament of all illegal armed groups." On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360 "On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus", which assigned a number of ministries and departments the responsibility for introducing and maintaining a special regime similar to an emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without formally declaring a state of emergency or martial law.
The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were supposed to begin on December 12 in Vladikavkaz.
Beginning of a full-scale military campaign
On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” repealing decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: “Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism.”
On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through areas of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).
Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located approximately 10 km north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired at from a Grad installation by a detachment field commander Vahi Arsanova. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian soldiers were killed and 12 wounded, and more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The Grad installation was destroyed by return fire.
On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and installed fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of shelling of populated areas by Russian troops, numerous casualties occurred among civilians.
Another column of Russian troops moving from Dagestan was stopped on December 11 even before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where mainly Akkin Chechens live. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of military personnel were captured and then transported to Grozny.
A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three armored personnel carriers and four cars were damaged. As a result of the return fire, the first civilian casualties occurred. The Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt was shelled from helicopters. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. There were killed and wounded among the Russian military personnel; in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. Further advance of Russian troops would lead to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with a militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These units were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI, which had heavy weapons, were based.
As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces consolidated along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - New Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.
On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first failures in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire “before the start of a major military operation that could entail great sacrifices among the civilian population" to receive a written order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General A. Mityukhin.
On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it invited the President of the Russian Federation to immediately stop hostilities and the deployment of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his forces.
On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister of Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign a document about the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, read verbatim: “I suggest you immediately meet with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok.” At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2200 “On the restoration of federal territorial executive authorities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
Siege and assault of Grozny
Starting from December 18, Grozny was bombed and bombed multiple times. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on areas where residential buildings were located and there were obviously no military installations. As a result, there were large casualties among the civilian population. Despite the Russian President's announcement on December 27 that the bombing of the city had ceased, air strikes continued to strike Grozny.
In the second half of December, Russian federal troops attacked Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages of Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.
On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and gained a foothold in the area of the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.
On December 26, bombing of populated areas in rural areas began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.
On December 26, it was announced for the second time about the creation of a government of national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it, without putting forward demands for the withdrawal of troops.
On the same day, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Before this, no specific plans were developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.
On December 27, B.N. Yeltsin made a televised address to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. B.N. Yeltsin stated that N.D. Egorov, A.V. Kvashnin and S.V. Stepashin were entrusted with conducting negotiations with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that this is not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.
On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian army units began. It was planned that four groups would launch “powerful concentric attacks” and unite in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment, advancing from the northwestern direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, were almost completely destroyed. More than 100 military personnel were captured.
As stated by deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and artillery shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke through to the city center. The armored columns were cut into pieces by the defenders of Grozny and began to be systematically destroyed. Their crews were killed, captured or scattered throughout the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat."
The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year's offensive on Grozny.
On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital was “completely controlled by federal troops” and the “presidential palace” was blocked.
The war in Chechnya lasted until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist attacks outside Chechnya ( Budennovsk, Kizlyar ). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov . As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on “deferred status” (the issue of the status of Chechnya was supposed to be resolved before December 31, 2001). Chechnya became a de facto independent state .
Notes
- Chechnya: ancient turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
- How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
- The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
- Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict."
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- 1994: War in Chechnya // Obshchaya Gazeta, 12/18.04.2001.
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Grozny: bloody snow of New Year's Eve // Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.
The first Chechen war officially began with the introduction of federal troops in December 1994, and ended with their withdrawal from the region in August 1996. This conflict became the largest internal Russian armed confrontation since the Great Patriotic War and caused significant resonance in the domestic and international community.
First Chechen War: causes
The North Caucasus region has always been a “powder keg” within Russia. Conquest
These territories in the first half of the 19th century took place through bloody battles and thorough cleansing of fanatical paramilitary forces of the highlanders. The weakening of Soviet power at the turn of the eighties and nineties logically led to a weakening of control over local separatist elements. However, before perestroika they were not so strong, but on the eve of the collapse of the Union, Chechnya was overrun by radical Wahhabi preachers from Arab countries, who incited secession and the forcible cleansing of Chechen territories from the non-Muslim population. The teaching confessors did their job by eliminating the influence of the previous Sunni clergy and instructing the youth accordingly. As a result, by the fall of 1991, a significant military group was formed here, headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev. In September 1991, his guards captured the building of the Supreme Council of Ministers of the Republic and other strategic objects in Grozny, and later in other cities. In October, the previous government was dissolved, which was effectively a coup d'etat. Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the creation of a sovereign Ichkeria, which in practice actually enjoyed independence for more than three years. However, officially it remained part of the Russian Federation, and was not recognized by any country in the world. Three years of separatist rule have turned Chechnya into the most impoverished region of Russia. The number of murders was several times higher than in 1990. The state infrastructure was completely destroyed. The unemployment rate has reached its peak. All this was complemented by large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Slavic population, the slave trade, and the seizure of trains. The outrages took place not just with consent, but also with support new government. In 1994, the state of affairs in the region provoked the formation of an anti-Dudaev opposition, which resulted in a civil war between the local population. This was the last straw, which forced the government in Moscow to take specific measures.
Main episodes of the conflict
Federal troops entered the republic on December 11, 1995. However, a significant underestimation of the enemy's forces led to the fact that the first Chechen war became an unexpectedly long confrontation. According to Moscow's preliminary estimates, Dudayev had only a couple of hundred armed militants. In practice, there were about 13 thousand of them, moreover, the Chechen forces were generously sponsored from abroad and were able to invite a large number of mercenaries. The assault on Grozny lasted from December 1994 to early March 1995. By the summer of the same year, control was established over the lowland and mountainous regions of Chechnya. Negotiations began, which resulted in a truce and an agreement to hold elections. Such elections were carried out in December 1996, but they did not suit the militants, who continued the war with a terrorist attack in Kizlyar in January 1996, as well as an attempt to recapture Grozny in March. The first Chechen war continued. However, already in April it was possible to track down Dzhokhar Dudayev’s motorcade via radio signal, which was immediately destroyed by aircraft. Negotiations with the remnants of the separatists continued until August and ended with the Khasavyurt
agreements.
The first Chechen war: losses of both sides and consequences
According to the agreement, Russia withdrew its troops from the republic, but the decision on the status of Chechnya was postponed for five years. The agreements demonstrated Moscow's desire to avoid further escalation and resolve problems peacefully. However, they also returned the Chechen Republic to lack of control, an increase in crime and Wahhabi sentiments. This situation was corrected only as a result of the next deployment of troops. According to the Russian military, the number of those killed on their side was more than 4 thousand, more than 1 thousand missing, and there were almost 20 thousand wounded. According to Russian data, the number of militant losses is about 17 thousand, while the Chechens cite the figure at 3 thousand. But the first Chechen war brought about 50 thousand dead to the civilian population.
After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army, Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons of the Soviet troops in Chechnya, including aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.
Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in 1994 in something like civil war. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. Storm of Grozny in New Year's Eve, which killed hundreds of Russian military personnel, was a disaster.
The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.
As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.
1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.
2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.
3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering”.
Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.
First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.
A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.
Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.
Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.
In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.
Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.
After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. Russian population Chechnya suffered discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.
After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.
Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. Study was introduced Arabic, and this was not provided with personnel, methodological manuals and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.
Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.
The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.
She appeared completely different in all major indicators:
By nature and method of conduct;
In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;
In relation to citizens towards the army;
By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;
Media behavior, etc.
The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.
60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.
At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.
The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.
By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces Special attention began to focus on intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.
By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most organized separatist military formations and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.
However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.
Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand died Russian soldiers and officers and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen.
The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.
Stage one. How it all began.
The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.
Just a few months after Yeltsin’s statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Even though in essence it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first signal had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who was never a Muslim and had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too fast. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that behind Dudayev there were serious people sitting in Moscow offices.
Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.
The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoy, it was he who tried to declare a State of Emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. During these days, Yeltsin was at his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR never accepted the document on the emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who literally stated the following during the discussion of the document: “these black-assed people must be crushed.” This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.
True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.
Stage two. War becomes inevitable.
After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.
In January 1992, there was practically not a single soldier left in the training center, and this entire mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50/50, and already in June the last one left the republic Russian officer. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to Dudayev’s extremely nationalistic policies in Chechnya, there is a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border every day.
But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. Thus, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, and about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they also received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.
It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. It is after this assault that Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that Russian army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.
Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, entirely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Egorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar reports. Egorov stated that the situation for sending troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic’s population will undoubtedly support this decision and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, emphasized in his report that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed postponing the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan for the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and stated that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin’s demand to prepare an operation plan for the deployment of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.
On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.
One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...
