Every cultured person should know the history of his people, especially since it repeats itself periodically. The cyclical nature of history has been proven and argued. Therefore, it is important to know what happened on our native land and how it affected economically.
Unfortunately, history has often been changed or rewritten, so it is no longer possible to find out reliable facts. Let's talk briefly about the most important thing in the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' and its consequences in the formation of the state. The article briefly outlines the most important events of those times. We’ll tell you where to find all the nuances at the end of the article.
Mongol-Tatar yoke
In 1206, Genghis Khan was recognized as ruler by all Mongols. He was quite a talented leader, as in a short time he assembled a strong invincible army. The army conquered the East (China and neighboring countries), and then rushed to Rus'.
On May 31, 1223, a terrible, crushing battle took place on the Kalka River, in which the united army of the South Russian and Polovtsian princes was defeated. However, a year later Genghis Khan died, and his eldest son Jochi also died. As a result, until 1236 there was neither a rumor nor a breath about the Mongols in Rus'. However, Batu soon decided to continue to implement his grandfather’s plan and conquer land from sea to sea (from the Pacific to the Atlantic)
As soon as the army of thousands of the Golden Horde set foot on Russian soil, pogroms and devastation of the land began. The Horde immediately began burning villages and killing civilians. After the pogroms, only ashes remained instead of cities or villages. Thus began the Mongol invasion of Rus'.
Looking at the historical map for grade 10, you can see that the Mongol army reached Poland, the Czech Republic, and then stopped and settled in place. Russian princes received letters allowing them to manage their estates.
In fact, the country continued to live its own ordinary life, but now it was necessary to regularly pay tribute to the khan. During the entire period of subordination to the Golden Horde, there were several significant events. One of the key ones is. The official end of the Mongol-Tatar yoke dates back to 1480. Read more about the beginning and end dates of this historical phenomenon.
Reasons for the capture of Rus'
The main reason for the spread of the Horde's power was that the Russian principalities were disunited. Each of them pursued their own interests. This led to division, and a unified strong army was not created.
The conquerors had a fairly large army, which was equipped with the best weapons, which they borrowed, among other things, from Northern China. Also, the Mongols had sufficient experience in conquering lands.
In the Horde army, each soldier was raised from childhood, so they had discipline and skill high level. It was not difficult for the Mongols to obtain Russian lands.
Stages of the Mongol invasion:
Batu's campaigns
- 1236 – conquest of Volga Bulgaria.
Batu's first campaign December 1237 to April 1238
- In December 1237, a victory was achieved over the Cumans near the Don.
- Later the Ryazan principality fell. After six days of assault, Ryazan was wrecked.
- Then the Mongol army destroyed Kolomna and Moscow.
- In February 1238, the siege of Vladimir took place. The prince of this city tried to adequately repel the armyBatu, but four days later the city was taken by storm. Vladimir was burned, and the prince's family burned alive in their shelter.
- In March 1238, the Mongols changed tactics and split into several units. Some went to the Sit River, and the rest to Torzhok. Before reaching Novgorod, the Mongol-Tatar army turned back, but in the city of Kozelsk it met strong resistance. The townspeople bravely resisted the army for seven weeks, but were soon defeated. The invaders razed the city to the ground.
Batu's second campaign 1239 - 1240
- In the spring of 1239, the Mongol-Tatar army reached the southern part of Rus'. Pereslavl was defeated in March.
- Then Chernigov fell.
In the fall of 1240, the main forces of Batu's army began the siege of Kyiv. However, under the wise leadershipDaniil Romanovich Galitsky, managed to hold the Mongol army for about three months. The conquering troops nevertheless captured the city, but suffered heavy losses.
In the spring of 1241, Batu's army was going to march on Europe, but turned to the Lower Volga. The army no longer decided to make new campaigns.
Consequences
The territory of Rus' was completely devastated. Cities were plundered or burned, and residents were taken prisoner. Not all cities were able to be restored after the invasion. The captured Russian territories did not become part of the Golden Horde. However, tribute had to be paid annually.
The Khan had the right to leave control to the Russian princes, issuing them his charters. The development of the economy and culture of Rus' slowed down significantly. This happened due to destruction, pogroms, and a reduction in the number of craftsmen or artisans.
Considering the century in which these events took place, we can conclude that the development of the Russian state is significantly behind European countries. Economically, the country was thrown back several hundred years. This affected the further history of the country.
Mongol yoke - fact or fiction?
Some literate scholars believe that the Mongol-Tatar yoke is just a myth. They believe that it was invented for a specific purpose.
It is impossible to imagine that the Mongols, who were accustomed to living in a warm environment, could withstand the harsh Russian winters well. It is interesting that the Mongols themselves Tatar-Mongol yoke learned from Europeans. Theory, archaeological data and guesses say that something completely different could be hidden behind the Mongol-Tatar invasion.
For example, the mathematician Fomenko argued that Mongol yoke was invented in the 18th century. But this is all from the realm of fantasy. The city of Sarai-batu is currently an archaeological site and it is safe to say that there was a Mongol yoke.
True, the assessment of this yoke is very different among all historians. For example, academician Lev Gumilyov argued that the yoke is not a decline, but rather a cultural dialogue, a symbiosis of Russian Orthodox and Mongolian civilizations, that the Mongols, they say, enriched Russian culture. This does not take into account the obvious campaigns of the Mongol armies against Rus' as punishment for the uprisings.
History says that Rus' fought many wars and battles. There was an invasion of the Crusaders, the fight against them by Alexander Nevsky, other wars or tragic events. But the Mongol-Tatar yoke was one of the most tragic and lengthy incidents in history. It is an example of the fact that disunity within a country always leads to the victory of the invaders.
Knowing the historical past of your people, in what century the invasion took place, you can be sure that Russia will no longer repeat mistakes that lead to tragic or fatal events that bring grief to the people and economic decline to the state.
In conclusion, I would like to say that in this article we have only touched upon this broad topic. Our training courses have an hour-long video lesson in which we examine all the nuances of this serious topic. 90 points for history is the average result of the guys after our courses. .
In 1237 - 1241 Russian lands were attacked by the Mongol Empire, a Central Asian state that conquered in the first half of the 13th century. a vast territory of the Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe. In Europe, the Mongols began to be called Tatars. This was the name of one of the Mongol-speaking tribes that roamed near the border with China. The Chinese transferred its name to all Mongolian tribes, and the name “Tatars” as a designation for the Mongols spread to other countries, although the Tatars themselves were almost completely exterminated during the creation of the Mongol Empire.
The term “Mongol-Tatars”, widespread in historical literature, is a combination of the self-name of the people with the term by which this people was designated by its neighbors. In 1206, at the kurultai - a congress of the Mongolian nobility - Temujin (Temuchin), who took the name of Genghis Khan, was recognized as the great khan of all Mongols. Over the next five years, Mongol troops, united by Genghis Khan, conquered the lands of their neighbors, and by 1215 they conquered Northern China. In 1221, the hordes of Genghis Khan defeated the main forces of Khorezm and conquered Central Asia.
Battle of Kalka.
First encounter Ancient Rus' happened to the Mongols in 1223, when a 30,000-strong Mongol detachment for reconnaissance purposes marched from Transcaucasia to the Black Sea steppes, defeating the Alans and Polovtsians. The Polovtsy, defeated by the Mongols, turned to the Russian princes for help. At their call, a united army headed by the three strongest princes of Southern Rus' set out in the steppe: Mstislav Romanovich of Kyiv, Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov and Mstislav Metis-lavich of Galicia.
May 31, 1223 in the battle on the river. Kalka (near the Sea of Azov), as a result of uncoordinated actions of its leaders, the allied Russian-Polovtsian army was defeated. Six Russian princes died, three, including the Kiev prince, were captured and brutally killed by the Mongols. The conquerors pursued the retreating right up to the Russian borders, and then turned back to the Central Asian steppes. Thus, for the first time in Rus', the military power of the Mongol hordes was felt.
Invasion of the Mongol-Tatars in Rus'.
After the death of the founder of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan (1227), according to his will, at the kurultai of the Mongol nobility in 1235, it was decided to begin an aggressive campaign against Europe. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Batu Khan (called Batu in Russian sources), was placed at the head of the united army of the Mongol Empire. The prominent Mongol commander Subedei, who participated in the Battle of Kalka, was appointed its first military commander.
Campaign to North-Eastern Rus' (1237 - 1238).
A year after the start of the campaign, having conquered Volga Bulgaria, the Polovtsian hordes between the Volga and Don rivers, the lands of the Burtases and Mordovians in the Middle Volga in the late autumn of 1237, Batu’s main forces concentrated in the upper reaches of the Voronezh River to invade North-Eastern Rus'.
The number of Batu's hordes, according to a number of researchers, reached 140 thousand soldiers, and the Mongols themselves numbered no more than 50 thousand people. At this time, the Russian princes could gather no more than 100 thousand soldiers from all lands, and the squads of the princes of North-Eastern Rus' amounted to no more than 1/3 of this number.
Inter-princely strife and strife in Rus' prevented the formation of a united Russian army. Therefore, the princes could only resist the Mongol invasion individually. In the winter of 1237, Batu's hordes ravaged the Ryazan principality, whose capital was burned and all its inhabitants exterminated. Following this, in January 1238, Mongol troops defeated the army of the Vladimir-Suzdal land near Kolomna, led by the son of the Grand Duke Vsevolod Yuryevich, captured Moscow, Suzdal, and on February 7 - Vladimir. On March 4, 1238, on the City River in the upper Volga, the army of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodich was defeated. The Grand Duke himself died in this battle.
After the capture of the “suburb” of Veliky Novgorod, Torzhok, which bordered the Suzdal land, the road to North-Western Rus' opened before the Mongol hordes. But the approach of the spring thaw and significant human losses forced the conquerors to turn back to the Polovtsian steppes. An unprecedented feat was accomplished by residents of the small town of Kozelsk on the river. Zhizdre. For seven weeks they held the defense of their city. After the capture of Kozelsk in May 1238, Batu ordered that this “evil city” be wiped off the face of the earth and all its inhabitants destroyed.
Batu spent the summer of 1238 in the Don steppes, restoring his strength for further campaigns. In the spring of 1239 he destroyed the Pereyaslavl principality, and in the fall the Chernigov-Seversk land was devastated.
One of the most tragic events in Russian history was the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' under the leadership of Genghis Khan’s grandson, Batu. Until a certain time, no one imagined that the tribes of nomadic people, once considered savage, would unite and begin to pose a serious threat to everyone. The Mongols themselves had no idea that they would soon gain power over one part of the world, and the other part would pay them tribute.
Historiography about the Mongol-Tatar invasion
Domestic historians began to study in detail the campaigns led by Batu to Russian lands in the 18th century. Not only scientists, but even writers in their writings tried to tell their version of these events. Among the people involved in the study of the Mongol invasions, the most famous works of the following scientists:
- The famous historian V.N. Tatishchev, in the book “Russian History” he wrote, for the first time examined in detail the topic of the Mongol-Tatar invasion. In his work, Tatishchev took ancient Russian chronicles as a basis. Subsequently, the work itself and the conclusions drawn by the author were used by many historians in their works.
- N.M. Karamzin, the writer, studied the invasion just as closely. Having emotionally described the conquest of Russian lands by tumens (large tactical units of the Mongol army), Karamzin concluded why the Mongol invasion is the main reason, and not the second (minor) backwardness of Russia in comparison with advanced European countries. Karamzin was the first among researchers to consider this invasion a separate page of historical heritage.
During the 19th century, researchers paid more and more attention to the issues of Batu's invasion of Rus'. The phrase “Mongol-Tatars”, which appeared in 1823, is due to scientific circles P. N. Naumov. In subsequent years, historians focused their attention on the military details of the invasion, namely the strategy and tactics of the Mongol army.
The topic was discussed in M. S. Gastev’s book “Discourse on the reasons that slowed down civic education in the Russian state,” published in 1832. M. Ivanin’s work “On the Art of War and the Conquests of the Mongols,” published in 1846, is devoted to the same issue. I. Berezin, a professor at the University in Kazan, made a significant contribution to the study of the Mongol invasions. The scientist studied many sources that had not been considered until that time. The data he took from the works of the authors of the East Juvaini, Rashid ad-Din, were applied in the works of Berezin: “The First Mongol Invasion of Russia”, “Batu’s Invasion of Russia”.
The Russian historian also made his own interpretation of those events S. M. Soloviev. In contrast to the views expressed by N. M. Karamzin and the Russian orientalist H. D. Frehn about the strong influence Mongol invasion into the life of Rus', he was of the opinion that this event had an insignificant influence on the life of the Russian principalities. V. Klyuchevsky, M. Pokrovsky, A. Presnyakov, S. Platonov and other researchers had the same point of view. In the 19th century, the Mongolian theme became important stage Russian history, studying the Middle Ages.
How the Mongol-Tatars unification began
Three decades before the invasion of Russian territory, an army was formed near the Onon River from among the feudal lords and their warriors, arriving from different parts of the Mongolian steppe. The unification was headed by the Supreme Ruler Temujin.
The All-Mongolian congress of local nobility (kurultai) in 1206 proclaimed him the great Kagan - the highest title of nomads - and named him Genghis Khan. He gathered many tribes of nomads under his leadership. This unification put an end to internecine wars and led to the formation of a stable economic base on the path of development of the new emerging state.
But despite favorable circumstances and prospects, the authorities turned the people they governed towards war and conquest. The result of this policy in 1211 was the Chinese campaign, and a little later an invasion of Russian lands was carried out. The Mongol invasion itself, its causes, course, and consequences have been studied and analyzed many times by various researchers: from historians to writers. The main reason that caused the repeated campaigns of the Tatar-Mongols to other countries was the desire for easy money and the ruin of other peoples.
In those days, raising local breeds of livestock brought little profit, so it was decided to enrich themselves by robbing people living in neighboring countries. The organizer of the tribal association, Genghis Khan, was a brilliant commander. Under his leadership, the conquest of Northern China, Central Asia, and the steppes from the Caspian Sea to the Pacific Ocean took place. Their own territories, large in area, did not stop the army: new campaigns of conquest were planned on foreign lands.
Reasons for the success of the Mongol army
The main reason for the victories won by the Mongols was the superiority of their military strength, thanks to a well-trained and organized army and its iron discipline. The army was distinguished by its maneuverability, the ability to quickly cover significant distances, since it mainly consisted of cavalry. Bows and arrows were used as weapons. In China, the Mongols borrowed weapons that made it possible to successfully attack a large enemy fortress.
The success of the Mongol-Tatars was accompanied by a well-thought-out strategy of action and the political inability of the conquered cities and countries to offer worthy resistance to the enemy. The tactical actions of the Mongol-Tatars consisted of a surprise attack, creating fragmentation in the ranks of the enemy and his further destruction. Thanks to the chosen strategy, they were able to maintain influence in the territories of the occupied lands for a long time.
First conquests
The years 1222−1223 were written into history as the period of the first wave of conquests, which began with the invasion of the territories of the Eastern European steppes. The main Mongol troops, led by the talented and cruel commanders Jebe and Subedei, beloved by Genghis Khan, set out on a campaign against the Polovtsians in 1223.
Those, in order to expel the enemy, decided to turn to the Russian princes for help. The combined troops of both sides moved towards the enemy, crossed the Dnieper River and headed towards the East.
The Mongols, under the guise of retreat, were able to lure the Russian-Polovtsian army to the bank of the Kalka River. Here the warriors fought a decisive battle on May 31. There was no unity in the coalition squads; there were constant disputes between the princes. Some of them did not participate in the battle at all. The logical result of this battle was the complete defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian army. However, after the victory, the Mongol troops did not set out to conquer Russian lands due to the lack of sufficient forces for this.
4 years later (in 1227) Genghis Khan died. He wanted his fellow tribesmen to rule the whole world. The decision to launch a new aggressive campaign against European lands was made by the Kurultai in 1235. Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, headed the cavalry army.
Stages of the invasion of Rus'
The Mongol-Tatar army invaded Russian land twice:
- Hike to the northeast of Rus'.
- Trek to Southern Rus'.
First, in 1236, the Mongols destroyed Volga Bulgaria - a state that at that time occupied the territory of the middle Volga region and the Kama basin, and went towards the Don to once again conquer the Polovtsian lands. In December 1937, the Polovtsians were defeated. Then came the invasion of Batu Khan into northeastern Rus'. The army's route lay through the Ryazan principality.
Mongol campaigns in 1237-1238
Events in Rus' began to develop precisely during these years. At the head of the cavalry, consisting of 150 thousand people, was Batu, with him was Subedey, who knew Russian soldiers from previous battles. The Mongol cavalry, conquering all the cities along the way, quickly advanced across the country, as evidenced by the map reflecting the direction of movement of the Mongols on Russian soil.
Ryazan held a siege for six days, was destroyed and fell at the end of 1237. Batu's army set off to conquer the northern lands, primarily Vladimir. Along the way, the Mongols ravaged the city of Kolomna, where Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich and his retinue tried in vain to detain the enemies and were defeated. The siege of Moscow lasted 4 days. The city fell in January 1238.
The battle for Vladimir began in February 1238. The Vladimir prince, ruling the city, tried in vain to organize a militia and repel the enemies. The siege of Vladimir lasted 8 days, and then the city was captured as a result of the assault. It was set on fire. With the fall of Vladimir, virtually all the lands of the eastern and northern directions passed to Batu.
He took the cities of Tver and Yuryev, Suzdal and Pereslavl. Then the army split: some Mongols came to the Sit River, others began the siege of Torzhok. The Mongols won a victory in the City on March 4, 1238, defeating the Russian squads. Their further goal was to attack Novgorod, but a hundred miles away they turned back.
The foreigners ravaged all the cities they entered, but suddenly they met persistent resistance provided by the city of Kozelsk. The townspeople fought off enemy attacks for seven long weeks. Still, the city was defeated. Khan nicknamed it an evil city, eventually destroying it. Thus ended Batu’s first campaign against Rus'.
Invasion of 1239−1242
After a break that lasted more than a year, the Russian lands were again attacked by the Mongol army. In the spring of 1239, Batu went on a campaign to the south of Rus'. It began with the fall of Pereyaslav in March, and Chernigov in October.
The not too fast advance of the Mongols was explained by the simultaneous conduct of an active struggle with the Polovtsians. In September 1940, the enemy army approached Kyiv, which belonged to Prince Galitsky. The siege of the city began.
For three months the people of Kiev fought, trying to repel the enemy's onslaught. Only through colossal losses did the Mongols take control of the city on December 6th. The enemies acted with unprecedented brutality. The capital of Rus' was almost completely destroyed. According to chronology, the completion of the conquests and the establishment of the Mongol-Tatar yoke (1240−1480) in Rus' are associated with the date of the capture of Kyiv. Then the enemy army split in two: one part decided to capture Vladimir-Volynsky, the other was going to strike Galich.
After the fall of these cities, by the beginning of spring 1241, the Mongol army was on its way to Europe. But huge losses forced the invaders to return to the Lower Volga region. Batu’s warriors did not dare to start a new campaign, and Europe felt relieved. In fact, the Mongol army was dealt a serious blow by the fierce resistance of the Russian lands.
Results of the Mongol invasion of Russian lands
After enemy raids, the Russian land was torn to pieces. Foreigners destroyed and plundered some cities, while only ashes remained from others. The enemies captured the inhabitants of the defeated cities. In the west of the Mongol Empire in 1243, Batu organized the Golden Horde, the Grand Duchy. There were no captured Russian territories in its composition.
The Mongols made Rus' a vassal, but they could not enslave. The subordination of the Russian lands to the Golden Horde was manifested in the annual obligation to pay tribute. In addition, Russian princes could rule cities only after they were approved for this position by the Golden Horde Khan. The Horde yoke hung over Russia for two long centuries.
According to the official version of historians, the definition of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' is briefly as follows:
- Rus''s deep dependence on the Golden Horde.
- Annual payment of tribute to the invaders.
- A complete lack of development of the country due to the establishment of the yoke.
The essence of such views is that all the problems of Rus' were then to blame for the Mongol-Tatar yoke. The historian L.N. Gumilyov held a different point of view. He presented his arguments and pointed out some inconsistencies in the historical interpretation of the Mongol invasion of Rus'. There are still disputes over what impact the Mongol yoke had on the country, what the relationship was between the Horde and Russia, and what this event turned out to be for the country. One thing is certain: it played a significant role in the life of Rus'.
The Mongol-Tatar invasion is one of the most tragic events national history. Destroyed and plundered cities, thousands of dead - all this could have been avoided if the Russian princes had united in the face of a common threat. The fragmentation of the Russians made the task of the invaders much easier.
Conqueror forces
The army of Khan Batu invaded Russian lands in December 1237. Before that, it devastated Volga Bulgaria. There is no single point of view regarding the size of the Mongol army. According to Nikolai Karamzin, Batu had 500 thousand soldiers under his command. True, the historian later changed this figure to 300 thousand. In any case, the power is enormous.
A traveler from Italy, Giovanni del Plano Carpini, claims that 600 thousand people invaded Russian lands, and the Hungarian historian Simon believes that 500 thousand. They said that Batu’s army took 20 days of travel in length and 15 in width. And to completely bypass it would have taken more than two months.
Modern researchers are more modest in their estimates: from 120 to 150 thousand. Be that as it may, the Mongols outnumbered the forces of the Russian principalities, which, as historian Sergei Solovyov noted, all together (with the exception of Novgorod) were capable of fielding no more than 50 thousand soldiers.
First victim
The first Russian city to fall to the enemy was Ryazan. Her fate was terrible. For five days, the defenders, led by Prince Yuri Igorevich, heroically repelled attacks, shot arrows and poured boiling water and tar from the walls of the invaders. Fires broke out here and there in the city. On the night of December 21, the city fell. Using rams, the Mongols broke into the city and carried out a wild massacre - most of the inhabitants, led by the prince, died, the rest were taken into slavery. The city itself was completely destroyed and was never rebuilt. The current Ryazan has nothing to do with the past - it is the former Pereyaslavl-Ryazan, to which the capital of the principality was moved.
300 Kozelets
One of the most heroic episodes of resistance to the invaders is the defense of the small town of Kozelsk. The Mongols, having an overwhelming numerical superiority and having catapults and rams at their disposal, could not take the city for almost 50 days. wooden walls. As a result, the Mongol-Tatars managed to climb the rampart and capture part of the fortifications. Then the Kozelites completely unexpectedly came out of the gate and furiously rushed at the enemy. 300 brave men destroyed four thousand Batu warriors, and among them were three military leaders - descendants of Genghis Khan himself. The people of Kozel fought heroically, including 12-year-old Prince Vasily, and every single one of them died. Batu, enraged by the stubborn defense of the city, ordered it to be destroyed and the ground to be sprinkled with salt. Because of its disobedience, the invaders nicknamed Kozelsk “the evil city.”
Attack of the Dead
In January 1238, Batu moved towards Vladimir. At that moment, the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat, who was in Chernigov, having learned about the devastation of Ryazan, rushed to his native land and gathered there a detachment of 1,700 brave men. They rushed after the army of thousands of Mongol-Tatars. Kolovrat caught up with his enemies in the Suzdal region. His detachment immediately launched an attack on the numerically superior Mongol rearguard. The invaders were in panic: they did not expect an attack from the rear. The dead rose from their graves and came for us, Batu’s soldiers said in fear.
Batu sent his brother-in-law Khostovrul against Kolovrat. He boasted that he could easily deal with the daring Ryazan man, but he himself fell from his sword. It was possible to defeat Kolovrat’s squad only with the help of catapults. As a sign of respect for the people of Ryazan, the khan released the prisoners.
All-Russian catastrophe
The harm caused by the Horde at that time was comparable to the damage caused by the Napoleonic invasion in the 19th century and by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War in the 20th century. According to archaeologists, out of 74 cities that existed in Rus' by the middle of the 13th century, 49 did not survive Batu’s raids, another 15 turned into villages and hamlets. Only the northwestern Russian lands - Novgorod, Pskov and Smolensk - were not affected. The exact number of those killed and taken prisoner is unknown; historians talk about hundreds of thousands of people. Many crafts were lost, which is why the level of socio-economic development of Rus' sharply decreased. From the point of view of some historians, it was the damage from the Mongol-Tatar invasion that subsequently determined the catching-up model of Russian development.
Civil strife?
There is an assumption that in reality there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke. In the opinion of Yu. D. Petukhov, there was a large-scale civil strife among the Russian princes. As evidence, he refers to the absence of the term “Mongol-Tatars” in ancient Russian chronicles. The word Mongol supposedly came from “mog”, “moz”, which means “powerful”, thus the word “Mongols” then meant not a people, but a strong army. Supporters of this version point out that the backward nomads were unable to create a huge war machine and the Eurasian Empire, in addition, there is virtually no evidence of any semblance of a military industry among the Mongols, and the population of the Mongolian steppes was too small to conquer the huge Chinese Empire, Central Asia and other countries. The fact that the Russians also had a decimal system of organizing troops was also cited as an argument. In addition, V.P. Alekseev emphasizes in his work “In Search of Ancestors,” archaeologists did not find a Mongoloid element in the burial grounds of that period.
Empire on a planetary scale
The topic of the Tatar-Mongol yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or wasn’t it, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it all end? Here interesting article on the topic of Batu’s campaigns in Rus'. Let's get some more information about all this...
The historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) into Rus' goes back over 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innocent Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - “Synopsis”. According to this book, the Russians hammered home history for the next 150 years. However, so far no historian has taken it upon himself to make a “road map” of Batu Khan’s campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 in North-Eastern Rus'.
A little background
At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite them around himself. most. In 1206, he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogous to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) as the all-Mongolian khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious “state of nomads.” Without wasting a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.
In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued his conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu), had to lead this campaign. Here we need to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentrating for a campaign against the Russian principalities.
In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed to conquer Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsians (part of the Polovtsians went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The “Novgorod Republic” was never allies of either the Cumans or the Volga Bulgars.
Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)
Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational units), including from conquered peoples, the soldier was not paid anything for his service, and for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.
Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that, but each time it turned out quite funny. Although, ultimately, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications - could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of wonderful campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.
Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the then-traditional fantasy about steppe ubermenches who knew no fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with classical ritual in the field of the class-formational approach:
With a general recruitment into the army, each ten tents had to field from one to three warriors, depending on the need, and provide them with food. In peacetime, weapons were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each warrior was obliged to surrender his weapons. The soldiers did not receive a salary, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each warrior had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was reserved for serving the khan.
The organization of the army was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), headed by foremen, centurions and thousands. The commanders had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.
The main branch of the army was cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought with the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a battle, disrupting the enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of factory (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only the tents of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts...
Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled their horses and drank it. In this way they could be content for up to 10 days.
In general, the term “Mongol-Tatars” (or Tatar-Mongols) itself is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Subsequently, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also made their contribution to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) Tatarstan (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre constructions.
The French view of Russia in the mid-18th century
One way or another, society learned that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to of our times." Then Russian historians happily picked up the idiotic term.
Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has reached us, and the most ancient and unquestioningly trusted source among historians is the historical work of a team of authors under the leadership of the official of the Iranian state of the Hulaguids, Rashid ad-Din, “List of Chronicles”. It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published.
According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads consisted of 150 thousand Mongols themselves and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-forced” manner from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 near the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it was taken for granted that each nomad had 2-3 horses.
By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, reproaching pundits for fantasizing is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the range of fantasy researchers. We will use the now classic estimate of the size of Batu’s army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from thin air, to be very serious) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular, it is shared by the largest modern Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.
From Ryazan to Vladimir
In the autumn of 1237, Mongol troops, who had fought all spring and summer across vast areas from the North Caucasus, Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, converged on the general gathering place - the Onuza River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, some detachments of Mongols also gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols’ offensive against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with a herd of almost half a million horses decided to go camping in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.
Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the forested watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffective (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in a field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream of the Pronya, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, and burning Mordovian and Russian villages.
Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the number of people in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by low population density. For example, the largest city of the Ryazan land - Ryazan, numbered, according to V.P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, another 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of 20-30 kilometers). The remaining cities had a population of several hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.
Of course, for the conquest of such a “proto-state” 120-140 thousand warriors were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classical version.
On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily march here is up to 18-20 kilometers), reach Ryazan and begin its siege - they build wooden fence, build stone-throwing machines with which they shell the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in siege warfare. For example, historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to build any stone-throwing machines on the spot from available wood in literally a day or two:
There was everything necessary to assemble stone throwers - the united army of the Mongols had enough specialists from China and Tangut..., and Russian forests abundantly supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.
Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city’s defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did a gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls if the balance of forces was at least 100-150:1?
We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of rivers as a method of transportation (there was no other way to pass through wooded areas, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Rus' are documented only in the 14th century). century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), we can assume that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.
An important question is also what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that we were talking about very unpretentious, small horses - up to 110-120 centimeters tall at the withers - koniks. Their main diet is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to tear up snow in the steppe and eat last year’s grass.
Based on this, historians unanimously believe that thanks to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 against Rus' did not arise. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (thickness of snow cover, area of grass stands, as well as overall quality phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter training of steppe horses consists of the following: a herd of horses slowly, walking a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, during the campaign against Rus', these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were horses able to replenish their energy expenditure under such conditions? More interest Ask: if Mongolian horses dug through snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of their daily feeding grounds?
After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to advance towards the Kolomna fortress, which was a kind of “gate” to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having walked 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich probably equipped immediately after receiving news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with an offer to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince still agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).
According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9 and lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed like a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, it did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). However, near Kolomna the Mongols were pinned down for several days, and the intensity of the battle is shown by the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?
After the victory at Kolomna in either a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols are vigorously moving along the ice of the Moscow River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of an average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin - January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.
Again, Moscow at that time, if we take archaeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was an absolutely tiny town. Thus, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of the fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, approximately half the territory of the current Kremlin). The city had its own suburb - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What a huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.
It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. They say that the unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing lost arrowheads, etc.), and how they drove away prisoners. Since during the entire period of archaeological excavations on the territory of North-Eastern Rus' not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found, some historians even agreed to the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V. .V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will come up with the fact that they were eaten, a joke)...
However, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but steppe horses accepted grain very poorly), the Mongols moved along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow River) to Vladimir. Having covered over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of an average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads began the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it was at this transition that the Mongol army of 120-140 thousand people was “caught” by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat of either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - out of powerlessness - were forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( It is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).
Let’s ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a convoy?) moving on the ice of some Oka or Moscow river? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is significantly less), such an army under the most ideal conditions (everyone moves at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the gigantic army of Batu already stretches for almost... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? For 400-800 kilometers?
It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.
In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan’s invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, a conventional Mongolian horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.
It cannot be said that these are some kind of record paces of march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interesting thing here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such paces were maintained for quite a long time.
From Vladimir to Kozelsk
On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War XIII century
Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad for the Trans-Volga region - there, among the windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the arrival of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7th. But before this, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.
After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Then the army is divided - part goes exactly northwest to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.
Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line it’s a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it’s all 250- 300 kilometers).
The second part goes through the dense forests of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma watershed from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after its capture - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.
Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers in 15 days through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here you need to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which, nomads pass through forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment covers a total distance of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march pace of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for sieges of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.
Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced towards Novgorod another 150 kilometers, but then turned back.
The second detachment of the Mongol army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having walked 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the forested watershed between the lower Oka and middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is about another 170-180 kilometers, if the crow flies). Further, the Mongolian detachments along the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is the custom in Russian historiography), which gives about another 300-330 kilometers of travel.
In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having covered a little over three weeks to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers for the nomads, which is close to the performance of the Batu detachment.
The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then covered another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a forced march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. At the beginning of March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, Burundai's troops covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.
In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the minimum estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily journey ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of the assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, the five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the sieges of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses covered an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, taking into account the fact that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed from the peasants for their horses, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.
The Mongolian steppe horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911)
After the capture of Torzhok, the main part of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. They then moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south into the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moscow River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of fast-moving nomads - this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April this part of the Mongol army entered the steppe. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after entering the steppe; it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.
Small Mongol detachments, probably, as V.V. believes. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out into the steppe in the spring of 1238 is not known.
Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of taking the shortest route to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:
More is known about Batu’s route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south and, crossing watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (the chronicle Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols are no longer walking on river ice, but through dense forests on watersheds).
Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra and snow melting in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols necessarily needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that had no strategic significance is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.
Historians are still arguing on this topic; no sane argument has been given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the “Eurasian persuasion” L.N. Gumilev, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It’s funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav the Old was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk...
Logically, Batu had to quickly leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with the complete loss of, at a minimum, “transport” - that is, horses.
None of the historians was puzzled by the question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate while besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines). Finally, it is simply difficult to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks...
As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was finally taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it is worth saying that former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the services of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of “City of Military Glory.” The humor was that archaeologists, after almost 15 years of searching, were unable to find unambiguous evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can talk about what passions were boiling over this issue in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk.
If we summarize the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), a conventional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1,700 to 2,800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily journey ranging from 15 to 23-odd kilometers. Since periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the scope of their average daily actual march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.
Simply put, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the Mongolian losses themselves.
For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that during the entire Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Rus' alone. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, Batu’s armies continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241 Europe was invaded by who knows what army - for example, Thomas of Splitsky reports that there were a huge number of... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples It is not really clear how many of them there were “Mongols” themselves.
