On December 20, 2005, the day when the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia turned 85, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, General of the Army Sergei Lebedev, "revealed the secrets of his profession." He shared these secrets in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in which he also spoke about the everyday life of intelligence officers, raised issues of cooperation with other special services and answered a number of questions. As the newspaper notes, Lebedev "rarely spoke frankly on the most closed topics."

Sergei Nikolaevich, we also have our own intelligence service in the editorial office, and it conveys something. For example, we know that this year is your personal anniversary - 30 years in foreign intelligence. What stages do you divide these 30 years of your biography into?

To be honest, I didn't think about it. You can probably start with the German period, when in 1975 I was assigned to the German department. This period stretched for 20 years. Then my functions and tasks expanded, I was assigned to supervise Central and Eastern Europe, I was the head of the department. The third stage, perhaps, is the American period of my work. Suddenly, I was suddenly offered to go to the USA. I worked there for two years. And the fourth stage - as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the most responsible, but, on the other hand, the most interesting.

It is clear that scouts are reluctant to talk about themselves. How long is the veil of secrecy, say, over illegal immigrants?

For life.

And relatives may not know?

Sometimes they don't know for the rest of their lives. These are the features of our work. My father died without knowing that I served in intelligence, although by that time I was already a general. He was very proud that I was a diplomat, he told everyone that his son works in the Foreign Ministry. And my mother found out that I was a scout when I was celebrating my 50th birthday. Colleagues prepared a photo montage where I am in military uniform. She saw the picture and says: "I actually guessed that you were somehow connected with intelligence."

Four years and four months - Primakov and Trubnikov worked for you as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service before you. With what mood did you overcome this time barrier of your predecessors?

Frankly, I forgot about this probation, which expired on September 20, 2004. I was just about to fly on a business trip, and suddenly in the morning they bring me one newspaper. On the first page - my portrait and it is written: "Today is a fateful day for the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service." I didn’t immediately realize what was the matter, I thought: maybe it’s better not to fly? Then I read further and it turns out that today is four years and four months of my work as a director, and then the question is raised: will they remove me today or not. The article turned out to be good in terms of mood, according to the assessment of my activities. At the end, there was a conclusion: apparently, they will not be removed.

This is all the more pleasant, because personnel reshuffling is especially destructive for special services. Moreover, the whole country survived the 1990s, which were devastating for law enforcement agencies. Although it was difficult at the beginning, when your Service was created in 1920. For a long time, Soviet intelligence was recognized as the best in the world. Now we are particularly pleased to congratulate you on professional holidays- Day of the worker of the security agencies of the Russian Federation and the 85th anniversary of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Do you have traditions for celebrating such dates?

We have a whole range of different celebrations planned. And it will end on December 20 with a gala evening in the Kremlin. We propose to hold a general meeting in our Service, where veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Russia, order bearers will be invited.

Now we are meeting with veterans. There are Americanists, experts on Europe, Arabists, Easterners, Westerners, and so on. Their atmosphere is very warm. We introduced a number of our employees to state awards- in connection with the holiday, but for specific cases. The orders have already been signed. Among those awarded there are those awarded the Orders of Courage and medals "For Courage".

Do you have all orders closed?

Why do they receive awards in intelligence?

For ingenuity, perseverance, courage.

Can you solve at least one case?

For example, one of our employees received the Order of Courage two years ago for his actions in ensuring the withdrawal of the Russian embassy convoy from Baghdad. You probably remember this incident, when the Americans fired on our convoy. The embassy column was accompanied by several of our employees from the special group for ensuring the security of the embassy. The ambassador told me that these guys really showed courage. After the shelling began, our officer covered the ambassador's car in his jeep. The ambassador was slightly wounded, but the officer was hit on a tangent in the head. But he, wounded, managed to pull the ambassador out of the car. This employee was operated on in Syria, several fragments were removed. Then there was a second operation in Moscow: an X-ray showed that fragments remained in the head.

Later, the ambassador told me, "The SVR officer saved my life."

By the way, on the eve of the execution of that embassy column in Iraq, a version appeared in the Russian press that the diplomats would take out the archives of the Iraqi special services. Was it really like this?

I can definitely say that this is complete nonsense. But the appearance of such a version, of course, created a stir around the column. And I am personally convinced that that provocative publication could serve as a basis for an attack on the convoy.

Do you think it is possible to unite the Russian special services? Here the border guards again returned under the wing of the FSB. Is it permissible to merge the SVR with the FSB or is it fundamentally impossible?

Discussions on this topic do not stop. There are both supporters of unification and opponents. I think that this is not the main thing. It's not about the form, it's about the content. Special services can quite effectively interact and cooperate actively, being in different departments. The closest interaction between the SVR, FSB, GRU, FSO is main principle. No competition - only constructive comradely cooperation.

I think it is necessary to preserve the existing structure of the separate existence of special services. The past 14 years have confirmed the effectiveness of the activities of the Russian special services in a separate version. The practice of the leading states of the world also speaks of the expediency of maintaining such a scheme.

What is the relationship between the Foreign Intelligence Service and foreign intelligence services? Who do you consider the main competitor among the world's special services? What could we learn and what could the relevant special services learn from us?

We maintain partnerships with the intelligence services of more than 70 states. We have good contacts both with the intelligence services and with the counterintelligence ones. First of all, of course, these are the special services of the leading states of the world: the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China, India, and the Arab states. We have a common task - the fight against international terrorism. And in contacts with the heads of Western intelligence services, I constantly say: look at what is happening in the world. Terrorists unite, create international terrorist groups. Organized crime unites. The drug business is united in international syndicates. Arms smuggling is again carried out by international groups. Therefore, God himself ordered the special services to unite their efforts to counter the listed threats. There are also new areas of cooperation. For example, the problem of environmental safety is now becoming increasingly important.

The recent man-made accident in China on the Songhua River is on everyone's lips. Did you have operational information about this incident?

In this particular case, no. We simply could not have such information, because it was not a sabotage, not a terrorist attack, but an unexpected accident.

But when we talk about environmental safety in a broad sense, do we also mean this kind of information from intelligence?

Certainly. If chemical or other weapons are being tested somewhere, or dangerous developments are being carried out that could lead to a serious environmental threat, of course, we are obliged to monitor these processes.

Do your foreign colleagues also report to their centers about how they are going to lay, for example, an oil pipeline along Lake Baikal in Russia?

Many foreign intelligence agencies are closely following our most important technical projects. This regular work special services.

These days all of Europe is agitated by the sensational news that there were secret CIA prisons in Poland and Romania. And what data does Russian intelligence have on this matter?

We have some information, but I would not say anything specific.

And yet, what do you personally think: is there any reason for such suspicions among the world community?

I believe there are reasons. It is not for nothing that leading European politicians discuss this topic with concern.

According to the Alma-Ata agreement of 1992, the special services of the CIS countries do not work against each other. But today, when Georgia and Ukraine are joining NATO, does this postulate remain relevant? The question is not idle, because today all unbiased observers understand that in Ukraine there was not a struggle of political technologists, but a struggle of special services. Under these conditions, your agreement remains in force?

Remains with all CIS countries. Both with Ukraine and Georgia. Moreover, it was updated in 2000. And cooperation with the special services of the CIS countries continues. We cooperate closely, primarily, of course, in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

Does this mean that political changes do not affect your relations with your former colleagues from the former USSR?

Of course, we cannot stand aside from political events that in a certain way affect our activities. For example, the active rapprochement of some CIS countries with NATO will force us, unfortunately, to reconsider certain aspects of our cooperation.

But you yourself said that your Service cooperates with intelligence agencies of NATO countries...

Yes, but not as deeply and confidentially as with the special services of the CIS countries.

And what does the experience of interaction or competition between the intelligence services of the youngest members of NATO - the Baltic states show? How dangerous competitors have the intelligence services of these states now become, have they become a springboard for the NATO intelligence services?

We do not consider them as adversaries. The intelligence services of these countries, of course, have stepped up their interaction with the intelligence services of the NATO countries and are operating in close contact with them. At the same time, I do not think that they pose any serious threat to Russia, although we know that they are working against us.

Serious problems also contribute to the conclusion of an important strategic, economic and political agreement on the construction of the Russia-Germany gas pipeline. Since the First World War, the Baltic bottom has been the world's dumping ground. Dump of sunken ships, submarines. And the saddest thing is chemical weapons. To what extent does the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service help ensure the future environmental safety oil pipeline along the Baltic seabed, who are your partners?

The Foreign Intelligence Service does not deal directly with this problem, although we are following this topic. According to our estimates, the allegations that there is a dump there and the whole bottom is strewn with chemical charges, bombs, and so on is an exaggeration. In addition, in anticipation of the laying of routes, the necessary surveys will be carried out. We believe that if all the required construction standards are observed, there is no environmental hazard when laying the route. There is a certain risk, but this risk is quite surmountable, it is predictable, and it can be avoided.

The topic of environmental threat is sometimes artificially promoted by opponents of the construction of this gas pipeline. It is no secret that, first of all, Poland and the Baltic states feel offended and deliberately exaggerate this threat. By the way, recently scientific institute in Rostock (Germany) conducted preliminary studies and published the results, which confirm our conclusions that if there is an environmental risk, then it is minimal.

Recently, the whole world watched, almost live, a loud scandal in the United States, when a high-ranking official of the presidential administration revealed to journalists the name of a CIA personnel officer. And how are we doing? Do we have a punishment for divulging the names of intelligence officers?

We have a law that criminalizes the disclosure of information about an intelligence officer. And about the source. But, unfortunately, this law has not yet been applied and not a single case has been brought to court. Although some intelligence officers were revealed just because of the chatter. And, frankly, when I learned about this situation in the United States, as the head of intelligence, I thought: why not properly use our legislation in our country?

Why do we need a special case law?

Don't tell. Calling the name of the intelligence officer, people cause enormous damage to both intelligence and the state.

Firstly, this person will no longer be able to properly perform his functions, often he becomes restricted to travel abroad and incapacitated as a scout. Secondly, foreign intelligence services instantly begin to check all his connections: where he worked, with whom he met. Link analysis can lead to sources, and therefore many other people can suffer. Thirdly, when revealing a scout, officials and journalists do not think about the fate of this person. After all, he has a family, children. He made his life plans. He was, as is often the case, a good and capable diplomat, businessman, and journalist. And suddenly the talker deals a blow to his career. We have been preparing a scout for a very long time. Before we hire a person, we study him for three or four years, evaluate his intellect, moral and volitional qualities, and sociability. Then we seriously prepare for several years. And suddenly, because of some chatter, the years of preparation, the money spent on training and education, down the drain.

Maybe sometimes people act out of good intentions or out of stupidity, and not at all out of a desire to annoy the special services?

What's the difference? I am sometimes surprised by the presentation of material about our intelligence officers. Yes, there are failures, failures, as in any profession. And it becomes a shame when the phrase "the Russian spy has been exposed again" appears in Russian newspapers. Why "spy"? After all, these are our intelligence officers, they work in the interests of our country. This is a matter of patriotism.

Some say: how is it, you are engaged in illegal activities, you are spies. By the way, in the West, when I worked in the USA, my American partners told me: “It’s time for you to stop intelligence activities in the USA. You distract a lot of FBI employees, and instead of fighting terrorists and criminals, we are forced to follow you .Stop." I always answered: "Gentlemen, I agree, but on a mutual basis. I know that there are significantly more American intelligence officers in Russia than ours here."

Everything, after that the conversation immediately curtailed. What happens, they can conduct intelligence activities against us, but we have no right?

Do you think it is possible today effective fight with terrorism only within the legal framework?

When there is a struggle not for life, but for death, then, unfortunately, all sorts of situations arise. If illegal methods are used against us, then as an exception, in self-defense, we are sometimes forced to respond to terrorists with their own weapons. I can assume that when the special forces freed the hostages at Dubrovka or Beslan, they had no time to think how legal their actions in relation to terrorists were.

Abroad, from time to time, campaigns of spy mania are unfolding with accusations against the Russian special services. Is there a reason for this?

Quite often, such campaigns are "custom-made", initiated by opponents of the development of relations with Russia, aimed at undermining bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, it has become a rule to frighten the layman abroad with "Russian spies" who allegedly penetrated all departments. There are cases when local counterintelligences deliberately exaggerate the "Russian spy threat" in order to show their need, expand staffing or improve funding. Here is one example. In 1992, I was working in Germany, and all of a sudden, the German secret services give us a list of Russian intelligence agents allegedly operating on German territory. By the way, I was in it too. But I made the list for good reason. And a good third of the accused had nothing to do with intelligence. For example, ambassadors were recorded there. But this is absurd! German intelligence officers, of course, knew that these people were not intelligence officers. And the list also included a number of journalists, businessmen, diplomats - a total of 162 people. And the explanation for that was then simple. The Soviet Union collapsed, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the GDR disappeared, and the German counterintelligence officers did not want staff cuts due to the disappearance of an external enemy. It was necessary to justify the necessity of its existence.

What about Iran? Does he have a military nuclear program? How likely is the use of US force against him?

We are closely watching what is happening around Iran. And report it to management. We are not indifferent to how events develop. But we do not yet have information that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there is no reason to use force against Iran.

Is that why we act as Iran's lawyer in the international arena?

We are not lawyers. We are just reporting the real situation. We were not lawyers for, for example, Saddam Hussein. We simply said that, unlike the Americans and the British, we have no information about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in this country. We had no information that Saddam Hussein was supporting international terrorists. And then we were right. We simply give an objective picture of the state of affairs.

Since we are talking about threats, I would like to summarize the topic of threats to Russia's national security. Name the main external threats to our country.

Today, the biggest threat to us is the threat of international terrorism against Russia both on our territory and against Russian citizens abroad. It also seems to me that we should seriously think about ensuring the economic security of Russia. Otherwise, we will not be masters in our own state. Fortunately, I can confirm that the president and the current leadership of the country are taking active steps to prevent key areas of our economy from falling under foreign subordination.

How has the mentality of foreign intelligence changed in market conditions? How do you cooperate with commercial structures, advise them when concluding contracts?

I want to say that there is a mutual change in mentality here. Many structures began to behave more solidly: in a state-like manner. And intelligence has changed its attitude towards them. In 2000-2001, the President of the Russian Federation repeatedly said at various meetings that we must change our attitude towards private business. Do not continue to consider businessmen as thieves, exploiters and robbers. If government departments protect national businesses abroad, then we should do the same. By the way, there should be a counter movement of business. I remember the 90s. I have worked abroad. Many business representatives did not want to have any contact with the embassies of their homeland. Moreover, they even hid their trips, mainly because the business was not entirely clean. And the businessmen were afraid that suddenly some of their meetings and deals would become the property of the special services. At the same time, domestic technologies were sold for a penny, which cost millions. Now the situation has changed, the business has become mature and solid, it no longer eschews either the special services or the Foreign Ministry. Accordingly, we protect and support our business, which demonstrates the state approach and acts in the interests of Russia.

Three years ago, you told our newspaper that $4 billion was generated from the sale of Russian weapons. An even larger amount is expected this year. What is the Service's role in arms deals?

I can confirm that the Foreign Intelligence Service is helping Rosoboronexport and the military-industrial complex. We give recommendations on where there is a need for certain types of weapons, where it is possible to sell which types of weapons more profitably and at what prices.

So you are entitled to your legal interest. What is the budget of the Foreign Intelligence Service?

Sufficient.

That is, now the intelligence officer does not choose between the Motherland and the dollar, as it was before? Are funding issues resolved?

Now we are funded enough. The salary is normal.

We just received a letter from a reader who is interested in the salary of a scout. Satisfy your curiosity?

In 2000, we experienced certain difficulties with financial support, especially young employees suffered. But now, in my opinion, we are getting enough so that the scout can support his family at the proper level, dress and eat normally. But if a candidate comes to us and immediately starts a conversation with money, then we tell him that he came to the wrong place.

And what if he's just a cynical professional who does a great job, but wants to get paid for it?

A cynical professional will work for us today. But tomorrow, just as cynically, he will be able to defect to another "employer" who will offer him more.

Are you uncomfortable among journalists or should a real intelligence officer feel good everywhere?

Frankly, I feel some internal tension from the presence of cameras here. Of course, this is due to the specifics of work in intelligence. In addition, one has to carefully think through the answers to questions that are sometimes too direct and uncomfortable for a scout. Although in general you are right: a scout must feel confident in any situation and in any environment.

We can hardly imagine an ignoramus scout. And what else should be a scout?

I always draw the attention of our young employees to the fact that you need to constantly work on yourself. We cannot stand still. It is necessary to read a lot every day, to be aware of affairs and events. It is necessary to be able to present in conversations the broad information that the intelligence officer has in an accessible form, so that it would be interesting to talk with him. When intelligence officers are trained in our academy to work abroad, they are told: the main thing is to find an interesting foreigner who would have and share information. And I always add that an equally important task is to become an interesting interlocutor for a foreigner. Because no one will date you if you are not interested in him.

A scout must be sociable, have self-control and quick reaction, and be capable of analysis. And, of course, he must be devoted to the Motherland and his intelligence.

Every profession has age limits. For example, you cannot become a good musician after 30 if you have not studied music before. Is there an age requirement for a scout? At what age can you not become a scout?

There is no qualification for employment with us. Although you are right that indeed a person acquires knowledge better at a young age. Therefore, we try to take young people.

Is it true that scouts are not sent on business trips abroad if they do not have their own apartment in their homeland?

Yes, there is such a rule. I think it should be done. I myself worked abroad and I know that it is very important for a person to feel that he has his own corner, there is where to return. This is an important psychological factor.

And yet how to become a scout? Where can a person come, what door can he knock on?

We have addresses. There is a website.

We found out that people come to you mainly not for a salary? And then for what?

First of all, it is a craving for interesting work, a sense of romance, a desire to serve the Motherland.

Are you really romantic?

Although it sounds a little pompous, but it is true. There are people who come to us after reading books about scouts. I urge department heads not to kill their sense of romance with the prose of everyday work that is present in every profession.

Accordingly, as a romantic, any intelligence officer, including you, should feel nostalgic for places of military glory? Do you often think of Germany?

There is nostalgia for the places where he started work. This is typical for all intelligence officers, and not just for the Germanists. Famous Scout Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, whom we saw off the other day on his last journey, told me about his first trip abroad to Yemen. Desert, hot. But he had very fond memories of Yemen. This is the first contact with foreign countries, with the profession of a scout. Yes, Germany was such a country for me. But I know colleagues who remember Ethiopia, Mongolia, other countries with the same warmth... Americanists love the USA very much. The country is very interesting, I can confirm.

Is it true that the film "Seventeen Moments of Spring" was shown at your academy as a teaching aid?

As a tutorial, no. Although scouts love this movie.

And then there's the matter of romance. Previously, there were patriotic films "Dead Season", "Shield and Sword", "Seventeen Moments of Spring". Are there plans now, when our cinema is emerging from stagnation, similar films with the participation of intelligence consultants?

Films are being made. And I would like those people who are going to make these films to invite consultants from the Foreign Intelligence Service. Because, to be honest, sometimes they show such nonsense about intelligence.

Let me ask you a few more blitz questions. Do you have a bust of Dzerzhinsky at your facility?

There is, I will not hide.

What intelligence do you consider the best in the world?

I can not single out any one as a standard. The more powerful the state, the more effective its intelligence. The leading countries of the world have strong intelligence services, each of them has its own achievements.

Does North Korea have a nuclear bomb?

We do not have such data.

Did you try to poison Berezovsky?

That's bullshit.

Stirlitz is a collective image. And if he existed in reality, who would he be - an employee of the GRU or the SVR?

I think he could be both an employee of the GRU and ours. In the history of both intelligence agencies, there are many talented intelligence officers who performed similar functions. The same Sorge was a GRU intelligence officer. And Abel is our scout.

The notorious Kalugin has now gone so far as to conduct tours in America worth $55 to the places of his "military glory." What do you think of it?

In intelligence, such people are treated not only with condemnation, but also with contempt. It is immediately clear that the man sold out. How can you treat a corrupt person?

A number of special services, for example, your colleagues from the CIA and the BND, have opened a store where they sell underwear with their emblem. Where can I buy a souvenir with the emblem of the SVR?

We have souvenirs with the emblem of the SVR. But they are not for sale. We donate them.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is a special service that performs the functions of the main body of the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation. The SVR of Russia was established on December 18, 1991. Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation - Fradkov Mikhail Efimovich. The official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service - http://svr.gov.ru/ - contains basic information about the agency, its structure, powers, and anti-corruption issues.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is one of the executive authorities of Russia. The activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service are headed by the President of the Russian Federation.

The main functions of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service are related to protecting the security of the state and society from threats from the outside. The methods and means by which the Foreign Intelligence Service carries out its activities are determined by federal legislation. At the same time, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is integral part forces that ensure the security of the state, as defined by federal law.

The Foreign Intelligence Service is authorized to conduct operational-search activities, and also provides for military service for employees in its ranks.

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service carries out activities to obtain especially important intelligence information, which the department reports to the President of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation bears personal responsibility for the accuracy of the information, the objectivity of the facts and data presented.

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to ensure state security sets the following goals:

- providing the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly and the Government with the intelligence information they need to make decisions in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific, technical and environmental fields;
- providing conditions conducive to the successful implementation of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of security;
- assistance to economic development, scientific and technological progress of the country and military-technical security of the Russian Federation.

Agreements with ARPOiS RF

Relations with state authorities and administration, other social institutions Association of workers law enforcement and special services built throughout the entire period of its existence. Given the significant socio-political weight of the ARPOiS of the Russian Federation, the huge potential of its leaders and the great business activity over the years, it was signed a large number of cooperation agreements with various ministries, departments, public organizations, unions, associations and other forms of organizations.

Agreements with relevant ministries and departments were concluded taking into account the strategy and tactics of the Association's development, clarify mutual interests and prescribe a specific program of action. These agreements do work, satisfying the mutual need for cooperation. Each large subject of relations (ministry, department, etc.) is assigned a specific curator from among the leadership of the Association, its vice-presidents, members of the Presidium.

Employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia have the direct right to be members of the ARPOiS RF, to receive legal, social and professional support from the Association, to enjoy all the rights provided for by its charter. Also, members of the ARPOiS of the Russian Federation from among the employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service have a unique opportunity to directly address the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation with questions relating to their professional interests and employment.

Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Forwarded from SVR RF) Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

(SVR of Russia)

Emblem of the SVR of Russia

Flag of the SVR of Russia

general information

Previous agency First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

The activity is managed by the President of Russia

Higher agency President of Russia

Headquarters 119034, Moscow, SVR Press Bureau, Ostozhenka, 51/10; main complex - Yasenevo

55°35′02″ s. sh. 37°31′04″ E d. (G) (O)

Number of employees Classified (according to some data in 1990-1992 - about 11 thousand people, today - over 13,000 people)

Annual budget Classified

Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia Mikhail Fradkov

The key document of the Federal Law "On Foreign Intelligence"

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR of Russia) is the main body of foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation.

The headquarters of the service is located in Yasenevo.

Since December 1991, the SVR proclaimed itself the official successor to the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (PGU) and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (CSR).

The SVR emphasizes its historical role as a successor to the traditions of the special services of Soviet Russia and the former Soviet Union: VChK SNK RSFSR-GPU NKVD RSFSR-MGB-KGB. As a result of the denunciation of the union treaty and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the question arose of a radical reorganization of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation on the basis of the abolished Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (CSR).

After the collapse of the USSR, on the basis of the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR, by decree of the President of the RSFSR Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin No. 293 of December 18, 1991, "in connection with the ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of the Agreement on the establishment of the CIS of December 8, 1991 and in order to ensure the security of the Russian Federation" the SVR was formed RSFSR.

According to the official version of the SVR of the Russian Federation, a fundamentally new special service was not created by the Decree of the President of the RSFSR of December 18, 1991 new Russia, and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR was only "renamed the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia."

On December 26, 1991, the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin signed Decree No. 316 of December 26, 1991 on the appointment of the first director of the SVR of the RSFSR. It was Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, who was instructed to submit proposals to the President on the Regulations on the newly created service, its structure and staff within a week.

On January 13, 1992, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin signed Decree No. 15 on the appointment of deputy directors of the SVR of the RSFSR. All deputy directors of the CSR of the USSR retained their posts in the new structure. Ivan Gorelovsky was added to them, who, with the rank of lieutenant general, became responsible for administrative and economic activities.

After that, the foreign intelligence service was reorganized several times: into the Federal Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (09/30/1992), into the SVR under the President of the Russian Federation (07.10.1992), and then into the SVR of the Russian Federation in its current form.

Decree No. 293 of December 18, 1991 on the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Service (page 1)

Decree No. 293 of December 18, 1991 on the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Service (page 2)

Decree No. 316 of December 26, 1991 on the appointment of the first director of the Foreign Intelligence Service

Decree No. 15 of 01/13/1992 on the appointment of deputy directors of the Foreign Intelligence Service (first team)

Legislative regulation

The first full-fledged federal law "On Foreign Intelligence" was adopted in July 1992.

At present, the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service are based on the federal law "On Foreign Intelligence" No. 5-FZ of January 10, 1996 (as amended by federal laws No. 135 of November 7, 2000, No. 86 of June 30, 2003, No. 122 of August 22. 2004 and No. 20 dated February 14, 2007.

To a lesser extent, the existence and activities of the SVR, its structures and personnel are built on the basis of:

Federal Law "On Defense" No. 61 dated May 31, 1996

Federal Law No. 76 of May 27, 1998 “On the Status of Servicemen” (as amended by federal laws of December 31, 1999, June 19, 2000, August 7, 2000 and December 21, 2000)

Federal Law "On State Secrets" No. 5485-1 of June 21, 1993 (as amended by Federal Law No. 133 of October 6, 1997)

Federal Law "On operational-search activity" No. 144 of 08/12/1995

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The place of the SVR in the system of state bodies of Russia

Decree No. 1185

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is a federal service, an executive body of Russia, which is managed not by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, but directly by the President of the Russian Federation

This status of the SVR was established by Decree No. 1185 of 07.10.1992 by President Boris Yeltsin.

Foreign intelligence is defined by law as “an integral part of the security forces of the Russian Federation”, which is “designed to protect the security of the individual, society and the state from external threats using methods and means” defined by federal law.

The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service is personally responsible for the objectivity and reliability of intelligence information obtained by the Foreign Intelligence Service and reported to the President.

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Goals and objectives of the SVR

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR of Russia) is designed to protect the security of the individual, society and the state from external threats. The SVR carries out intelligence activities in order to:

providing the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly and the Government with the intelligence information they need to make decisions in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific, technical and environmental fields;

providing conditions conducive to the successful implementation of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of security;

promoting economic development, scientific and technological progress of the country and military-technical security of the Russian Federation.

To do this, the federal law "On Foreign Intelligence" grants the Foreign Intelligence Service powers, including confidential cooperation with persons who have given their consent to this.

In the process of intelligence activities, the Foreign Intelligence Service has the right to use overt and covert methods and means, without causing harm to human life and health and causing damage to the environment. The procedure for using these methods and means is determined by the laws and other regulations of the Russian Federation.

Intelligence information is provided to the President of the Russian Federation, the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation and federal executive and judicial authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations designated by the President.

The heads of the Foreign Intelligence Service are personally responsible to the President of the Russian Federation for the reliability, objectivity of intelligence information and the timeliness of its provision.

In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On Measures to Counter Terrorism" dated February 15, 2006, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) was created, which included the Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

The general leadership of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation (including the Foreign Intelligence Service) is carried out by the President of the Russian Federation.

"Barrier"

In 1998, under the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, a new power unit was created - the formation was called "Barrier". It included almost three hundred people who were previously involved in the implementation of special actions abroad. According to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, “a similar unit already existed in the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, but during the Afghan war it began to perform tasks unusual for intelligence and in 1983 was withdrawn from the PSU, transferred to another department of the committee, and after a few years and completely fell apart.

Employees of the Zaslon group are constantly on duty around the clock. As expected, the "Barrier" is used to provide power support for operations carried out by intelligence, since due to the increased secrecy of its activities, sometimes there are inconsistencies with other Russian special services. Fearing a possible leak of information, the consequences of which are most severe for the SVR, intelligence officers may not inform other security officials about their plans.

According to NEWSru and other media, in 2003 the Zaslon was used in Iraq and Iran.

Director of the SVR Sergey Lebedev on December 20, 2002, in an interview with Interfax, denied the existence of reconnaissance and sabotage units in the SVR.

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Known failures Check neutrality.

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Exposure in 1994 of agent Aldrich Ames, who worked for the CIA.

Arrest in February 2001 of Robert Hanssen, an FBI officer who collaborated with the KGB and the SVR for more than 15 years.

Detention in June 2010 of eleven Russian illegal immigrants who were collecting information in the United States. The best of the illegals Juan Lazaro (Mikhail Vasenkov) Hero of the Soviet Union, photographer. The failure became possible as a result of the betrayal of a high-ranking employee of the SVR Shcherbakov (conditional surname) - the head of the “C” department of illegal intelligence, to the arrested M. Vasenkov in the United States, he brought a paper dossier of an illegal. The daughter has long lived in the United States. The son worked in Gosnarkokontrol and shortly before his father's flight, he went to his sister.

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Management

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Director

Main article: List of chiefs of Soviet and Russian foreign intelligence

Any full-fledged state should have special services that are engaged in intelligence activities outside their countries. There is such a service in Russia. It is called the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR RF). For obvious reasons, this service is strictly classified, and therefore it is possible to learn about its specific activities and results achieved only in general terms.

Stages of formation of the foreign intelligence service of Russia

It is generally accepted that the history of Russia's foreign intelligence service begins in the 1920s. It was then that a special unit was created in the structure of the Cheka, called the Foreign Department (INO). Its main task was to create residencies and agent networks outside Soviet Russia. At that time, domestic foreign intelligence officers considered the White Guards who had taken refuge in various foreign countries to be their main enemy.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet foreign intelligence, for obvious reasons, began to act differently. At that time, its activities could be divided into two areas. The first direction was that the employees acted in the rear and headquarters of fascist Germany and its allies, obtaining important military information, and thereby contributing to the common victory. The second direction of the Patriotic foreign intelligence in those years was the organization of sabotage behind enemy lines and the conduct of hostilities.

When did the Great Patriotic War and the Cold War broke out, Soviet foreign intelligence officers were active in Western countries, extracting valuable secret and operational information for the country. It was during this period that the country and the whole world were able to find out the names of some of the most prominent Soviet intelligence officers, such as, for example, Rudolf Abel.

In 1991, when the Soviet Union was living out its last days, and new sovereign states were formed in its place (including Russia), the Central Intelligence Service was formed, soon called the Foreign Intelligence Service. Simultaneously with the renaming, the tasks of the Russian foreign intelligence service also partly changed. It was announced that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service would no longer seek to infiltrate all countries, but would only work where the interests of the Russian Federation might exist. In addition, at the same time it was stated that the new Russian foreign intelligence should no longer enter into confrontation with similar services of Western countries, but, on the contrary, cooperate with them in every possible way.

To what extent and in what direction have the guidelines, tasks and goals of Russian foreign intelligence changed in given time, it is difficult to say due to the secrecy of this service. However, former SVR Colonel Stanislav Lunev recently openly stated that the SVR is currently working against the United States much more actively than it was during the Cold War. These words of a retired colonel can be found in the public domain. These same words were indirectly confirmed in 1996 by an employee of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who fled to England and gave the Western intelligence services the coordinates of more than a thousand secret Russian intelligence agents.

Who is in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Service

During the entire existence of the Russian SVR (starting from the 20s of the last century), a total of 33 people were at the head of this organization. History has preserved some names of leaders, other names are known only to the narrowest circle. Some of the leaders held on to their leadership positions for quite a long time, others - in literally several months or even weeks. Some of the leaders later went to other services or retired, some were arrested and shot.

At present, Sergey Evgenievich Naryshkin is at the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Officially, his position is called Director of the SVR. This position corresponds to the rank of General of the Army. Only the President of Russia has the right to appoint the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service is accountable to him for his service, he can remove the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service from his post. Army General Naryshkin is the thirty-fourth head of Russia's foreign intelligence. The headquarters of this federal service is located in the Moscow region, its press center is located in Moscow.

General information about the structure of the SVR

In its activities, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is guided by the federal law "On Foreign Intelligence". In accordance with the law, the structure of the SVR consists of:

Extraction apparatus. The employees of this unit are entrusted with the task of collecting information of interest;
analytical apparatus. Here employees are engaged in the analysis of the obtained information;
Operational and technical services;
support services;
In addition, the structure includes a system that deals with the training of personnel.

According to the assurances of the leaders of the Foreign Intelligence Service, such a structure is not frozen. On the contrary, it is quite flexible and can change in connection with new tasks and changing situations.

More about the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia

The political direction of Russian intelligence. The duty of the employees of this direction is to obtain all kinds of information relating to one or another aspect of the policy pursued by the governments of other countries. Foreign policy guidelines, intentions and draft laws of foreign governments are of interest to employees of this area first of all. In addition, Russian intelligence officers collect information about the plans and specific activities of foreign and international public and political structures (parties, social movements, etc.), and, in addition, the plans, intentions and specific deeds of leading foreign politicians and public figures. Of course, all this is done in order to ensure the interests of Russia;
Analytical and research direction. Here, the information received is processed, analyzed and summarized, analytical documents are prepared on this or that important issue, relating, first of all, to all kinds of global international processes and phenomena. After processing, analytical conclusions are presented to the highest officials of the Russian state;
Economic direction. Based on the name, the main interest of this service is everything related to the economy of other countries, foreign economic structures and financial institutions. Employees in this area are interested in what is happening in the commodity markets, in the currency and metal markets, etc. The task of economic intelligence officers also includes the creation of favorable conditions for Russia, under which Russia could achieve success in foreign economic activity;
Scientific and technical direction. Here, employees are called upon to find proactive information about all sorts of technical as well as scientific innovations. Of primary interest are various innovations associated with the invention of new weapons;
Foreign Intelligence Service. The first responsibility of this service is to ensure the safe stay of Russian officials and citizens abroad. The Foreign Intelligence Service counteracts the intelligence services of other countries, as well as criminal structures that can harm the country. IN Lately this service also opposes organized international criminal communities (drug business, terrorism, illegal distribution of all kinds of weapons, human trafficking, etc.).

Powers of the Foreign Intelligence Service

The SVR has many specific powers that federal legislation has given it:

The right to recruit agents, involving in the cooperation of persons who voluntarily agreed to this;
Encrypt your employees without disclosing where and by whom they actually work;
Issue special documents to encrypted employees, which indicate that they work in institutions and firms that are not related to the SVR;
Carrying out intelligence activities, the service interacts with the federal executive authorities of all levels, if necessary;
Ensures the safety of state secrets and prevents its leakage;
Ensures the safe stay of Russian officials and other citizens of the Russian Federation during their stay outside of Russia;
Maintains the security of persons admitted to state secrets during their foreign business trips;
The Service has the right to interact with similar services of other states. The procedure for such interaction is stipulated in Russian federal laws;
It has the right to create special educational institutions, institutions where the qualifications of its employees are improved, to establish research institutes, archives, to issue special printed publications;
Provides own security in accordance with applicable law;
The service can create all sorts of organizational structures if it believes that they will help it more effectively fulfill the duties assigned to the service.

All of these powers are legally enshrined in federal law"Foreign intelligence".

Protection of employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service by law

The state provides protection for all categories of SVR employees. No one, except for the immediate superiors, has the right to interfere with the official activities of the SVR employees or interfere with the performance of their official duties. This is stated in the mentioned law "On Foreign Intelligence".

The same applies to persons who confidentially cooperate with the Foreign Intelligence Service. Any information about such persons, as well as all the nuances associated with cooperation, are state secrets and are never subject to declassification. If necessary, such persons, as well as members of their families, may be taken under special protection.

How can you become an employee of the SVR

To become a scout, you need to graduate from a special educational institution - the Academy of Foreign Intelligence. Requirements for future scouts are as follows:

Age from 22 to 30 years;
Higher humanitarian or technical education;
Excellent physical health;
The absence of triples and "unsuccess" during the last year of study at an educational institution where the candidate for intelligence officers received higher education;
Outstanding ability to foreign languages;
Excellent knowledge of the Russian language;
High general educational, scientific, technical, political and general cultural training;
sincere patriotism;
Sincere and justified desire to work in intelligence;
The ability to think logically both orally and in writing, as well as the ability to clearly express thoughts on paper;
Lack of psychological shifts (extremism, adventurism, religious extremism).

After passing a medical and psychological examination, candidates for admission to the Academy appear before a special commission, which, as a result of an interview, determines how well the candidate speaks Russian, as well as what his abilities for foreign languages are. Based on the results of the interview, the commission issues a conclusion, which indicates the positive and negative aspects of the candidate. Then the candidate receives advice on how best to eliminate his negative properties, after which the decision of the commission on the admission of the candidate to study at the academy is announced, or the candidate is reasonably denied admission.

Current state of the Foreign Intelligence Service

According to domestic experts, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is currently at its best. In support of their words, they present the following arguments.

First, the SVR managed to avoid the reorganizations that other Russian power structures underwent. Secondly, the professionalism of Russian intelligence officers for last years rose to an extremely high level. At present, the SVR is a highly professional, law-abiding structure not influenced by any particular ideology, capable of performing tasks of the highest level.