Every cultured person should know the history of his people, especially since it is periodically repeated. The cyclic nature of history has been proven and argued. Therefore, it is important to know what happened in the native land, how it affected economically.
Unfortunately, history has often been changed or rewritten, so it is no longer possible to find out reliable facts. Let's talk briefly about the most important thing in the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' and its consequences in the formation of the state. The article briefly outlines the most important events of those times. Where to find all the nuances, we will tell at the end of the article.
Mongol-Tatar yoke
In 1206, Genghis Khan was recognized as the ruler by all the Mongols. He was a rather talented leader, as in a short time he assembled a strong, invincible army. The army conquered the East (China and neighboring countries), and then rushed to Rus'.
On May 31, 1223, a terrible, crushing battle took place on the Kalka River, in which the united army of the South Russian and Polovtsian princes was defeated. However, a year later, Genghis Khan died, and his eldest son Jochi also died. As a result, until 1236 there was neither a rumor nor a spirit about the Mongols in Rus'. However, soon Batu decided to continue to implement his grandfather's plan and conquer the same land from sea to sea (from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic)
As soon as the thousands of troops of the Golden Horde set foot on Russian soil, pogroms and devastation of the land began. The Horde immediately began to burn villages and kill civilians. After the pogroms, only ashes remained, instead of cities or villages. Thus began the Mongol invasion of Rus'.
Looking at the historical map for grade 10, you can see that the Mongol army reached Poland, the Czech Republic, and then stopped, settled in place. Russian princes received charters allowing them to manage their estates.
In fact, the country continued to live its own ordinary life, but now it was necessary to regularly pay tribute to the khan. Throughout the entire period of subjugation to the Golden Horde, there are several significant events. One of the key is. The official end of the Mongol-Tatar yoke dates back to 1480. More about the dates of the beginning and end of this historical phenomenon.
Reasons for the capture of Rus'
The main reason for the spread of the power of the Horde was that the Russian principalities were disunited. Each of them pursued their own interests. This led to division, there was no single strong army.
The conquerors, on the other hand, had a fairly large army, which was equipped with the best weapons, which they borrowed, including from Northern China. The Mongols also had sufficient experience in conquering lands.
In the army of the Horde, each soldier was brought up from childhood, so their discipline and skill were at a high level. It was not difficult for the Mongols to get Russian lands.
Stages of the Mongol invasion:
Campaigns of Batu
- 1236 - the conquest of the Volga Bulgaria.
The first campaign of Batu December 1237 to April 1238
- In December 1237, a victory was made over the Polovtsians near the Don.
- Later, the Ryazan principality fell. After six days of assault, Ryazan was wrecked.
- Then the Mongol army destroyed Kolomna with Moscow.
- In February 1238, Vladimir was besieged. The prince of this city tried to adequately repulse the armyBatu, but four days later the city was taken by storm. Vladimir was burned, and the prince's family burned alive in their shelter.
- In March 1238, the Mongols changed tactics, they were divided into several detachments. Part went to the river Sit, and the rest to Torzhok. Before reaching Novgorod, the army of the Mongol-Tatars turned back, but in the city of Kozelsk they met strong resistance. The townspeople bravely resisted the army for seven weeks, but were soon defeated. The invaders razed the city to the ground.
The second campaign of Batu 1239 - 1240
- In the spring of 1239, the Mongol-Tatar army reached the southern part of Rus'. Pereslavl was defeated in March.
- Then Chernigov fell.
In the autumn of 1240, the main forces of Batu's army began the siege of Kyiv. However, under the wise guidanceDaniil Romanovich Galitsky, for about three months the Mongol army managed to be held. The conquering troops still captured the city, but suffered heavy losses.
In the spring of 1241, Batu's army was about to march on Europe, but turned towards the Lower Volga. The army no longer dared to make new campaigns.
Consequences
The territory of Rus' was completely devastated. Cities were plundered or burned, the inhabitants were taken prisoner. Not all cities were restored after the invasion. The captured Russian territories were not included in the Golden Horde. However, tribute had to be paid annually.
Khan had the right to leave control to the Russian princes, giving them his letters-labels. The development of the economy and culture of Rus' slowed down significantly. This happened due to destruction, pogroms, a reduction in the number of craftsmen or artisans.
Given the century in which these events occurred, we can conclude that the development of the Russian state lags significantly behind European countries. Economically, the country was thrown back several hundred years ago. This was reflected in the further history of the country.
The Mongol yoke - fact or fiction?
Some literate scholars believe that the Mongol-Tatar yoke is just a myth. They believe that it was invented for a specific purpose.
It is impossible to imagine that the Mongols, who were accustomed to living in a warm environment, could withstand the harsh Russian winters well. It is interesting that the Mongols themselves about Tatar-Mongol yoke learned from Europeans. The theory, archaeological data and conjectures say that something completely different could be hidden behind the Mongol-Tatar invasion.
For example, the mathematician Fomenko argued that Mongolian yoke was invented in the 18th century. But this is all in the realm of fantasy. The city of Sarai-batu is currently an archaeological site and it is safe to say that there was a Mongol yoke.
True, the assessment of this yoke is very different for all historians. For example, academician Lev Gumilyov argued that the yoke is not a decline, but rather a cultural dialogue, a symbiosis of Russian Orthodox and Mongolian civilization, that the Mongols, they say, enriched Russian culture. This does not take into account the obvious campaigns of the Mongol troops against Rus' as a punishment for the uprisings.
History says that Rus' fought many wars and battles. There was an invasion of the Crusaders, Alexander Nevsky's struggle with them, other wars or tragic events. But the Mongol-Tatar yoke was one of the most tragic and lengthy incidents in history. It is an example of the fact that disunity within a country always leads to the victory of the invaders.
Knowing the historical past of its people, in what century the invasion took place, you can be sure that Russia will no longer repeat the mistakes that lead to tragic or fatal events that bring grief to the people and economic decline to the state.
In conclusion, I would like to say that in this article we have only touched on this vast topic. Our training courses have an hour-long video tutorial in which we analyze all the nuances of this serious topic. 90 points for the story is the average result of the guys after our courses. .
In 1237 - 1241. The Russian lands were attacked by the Mongol Empire - the Central Asian state, which conquered in the first half of the 13th century. vast territory of the Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe. In Europe, the Mongols began to be called Tatars. This was the name of one of the Mongol-speaking tribes that roamed near the border with China. The Chinese transferred its name to all the Mongol tribes, and the name "Tatars" as a designation of the Mongols spread to other countries, although the Tatars proper were almost completely exterminated during the creation of the Mongol Empire.
The term “Mongol-Tatars”, common in historical literature, is a combination of the self-name of the people with the term that this people was designated by its neighbors. In 1206, at a kurultai - a congress of the Mongol nobility - Temujin (Temuchin), who took the name of Genghis Khan, was recognized as the great khan of all Mongols. In the next five years, the Mongol detachments, united by Genghis Khan, conquered the lands of their neighbors, and by 1215 conquered Northern China. In 1221, the hordes of Genghis Khan defeated the main forces of Khorezm and conquered Central Asia.
Battle on Kalka.
First Encounter Ancient Rus' with the Mongols happened in 1223, when a 30,000-strong Mongol detachment with reconnaissance purposes passed from Transcaucasia to the Black Sea steppes, defeating the Alans and Polovtsians. The Polovtsy defeated by the Mongols turned to the Russian princes for help. At their call to the steppe, a united army led by the three strongest princes of South Rus': Mstislav Romanovich of Kyiv, Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov and Mstislav Metislavich of Galich.
May 31, 1223 in the battle on the river. Kalka (near the Sea of Azov), as a result of uncoordinated actions of their leaders, the allied Russian-Polovtsian army was defeated. Six Russian princes died, three, including the Kiev prince, were captured and brutally killed by the Mongols. The conquerors pursued the retreating as far as the Russian borders, and then turned back to the Central Asian steppes. Thus, in Rus', for the first time, the military power of the Mongol hordes was felt.
Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'.
After the death of the founder of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan (1227), according to his will, at the kurultai of the Mongol nobility in 1235, it was decided to start an aggressive campaign against Europe. Genghis Khan's grandson Batu Khan (called Batu Khan in Russian sources) was placed at the head of the united army of the Mongol Empire. The prominent Mongol commander Subedei, who took part in the Battle of Kalka, was appointed his first commander.
Campaign to North-Eastern Rus' (1237 - 1238).
A year after the start of the campaign, having conquered the Volga Bulgaria, the Polovtsian hordes in the interfluve of the Volga and Don, the lands of the Burtases and Mordovians on the Middle Volga in the late autumn of 1237, the main forces of Batu concentrated in the upper reaches of the Voronezh River to invade North-Eastern Rus'.
The number of Batu hordes, according to a number of researchers, reached 140 thousand soldiers, and the Mongols proper numbered no more than 50 thousand people. At this time, the Russian princes could collect no more than 100 thousand soldiers from all the lands, and the squads of the princes of North-Eastern Rus' amounted to no more than 1/3 of this number.
Inter-princely strife and strife in Rus' prevented the formation of a united Russian rati. Therefore, the princes could resist the invasion of the Mongols only one by one. In the winter of 1237, the hordes of Batu ravaged the Ryazan principality, the capital of which was burned, and all its inhabitants were exterminated. Following this, in January 1238, the Mongol troops defeated the rati of the Vladimir-Suzdal land near Kolomna, led by the son of the Grand Duke Vsevolod Yuryevich, captured Moscow, Suzdal, and on February 7 - Vladimir. On March 4, 1238, the army of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodich was defeated on the City River in the upper Volga. The Grand Duke himself died in this battle.
After the capture of the "suburb" of Veliky Novgorod - Torzhok - which bordered on Suzdal land, the road to North-Western Rus' opened before the Mongol hordes. But the approach of spring thaw and significant human losses forced the conquerors to turn back to the Polovtsian steppes. An unprecedented feat was accomplished by the inhabitants of the small town of Kozelsk on the river. Zhizdra. For seven weeks they held the defense of their city. After the capture of Kozelsk in May 1238, Batu ordered to wipe this "evil city" off the face of the earth, and to destroy all the inhabitants.
Batu spent the summer of 1238 in the Don steppes, restoring his strength for further campaigns. In the spring of 1239, he defeated the Principality of Pereyaslav, and in the autumn the Chernigov-Seversk land was devastated.
One of the most tragic events in Russian history was the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' led by the grandson of Genghis Khan - Batu. Until a certain time, no one imagined that the tribes of the nomadic people, once considered wild, would unite and begin to pose a serious threat to everyone. The Mongols themselves had no idea that they would soon gain power over one part of the world, and the other part would pay tribute to them.
Historiography about the Mongol-Tatar invasion
Russian historians began to study in detail the campaigns led by Batu to Russian lands from the 18th century. Not only scientists, but even writers tried to tell their version of these events in their writings. Among the people involved in the study of the Mongol invasions, the works of the following scholars are most famous:
- The well-known historian V. N. Tatishchev in his book “Russian History” for the first time considered in detail the topic of the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars. In his work, Tatishchev took the Old Russian chronicles as a basis. In the future, the work itself and the conclusions made by the author were used by many historians in their works.
- N.M. Karamzin, the writer, studied the invasion just as intently. Emotionally describing the conquest of Russian lands by tumens (large tactical units of the Mongol army), Karamzin concluded why the Mongol invasion is the main reason, and not the second (secondary) backwardness of Russia compared to the advanced European countries. Karamzin was the first among researchers to consider this invasion a separate page of historical heritage.
During the 19th century, researchers paid more and more attention to the issues of Batu's invasion of Rus'. The phrase "Mongol-Tatars", which appeared in 1823, scientific circles owe P. N. Naumov. In subsequent years, historians focused their attention on the military details of the invasion, namely, on the strategy and tactics of the Mongol army.
The topic was considered in the book by M. S. Gastev “Discourse on the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state”, published in 1832. The work of M. Ivanin “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongols”, published in 1846, is devoted to the same issue. I. Berezin, a professor at the University of Kazan, made a significant contribution to the study of the Mongol invasions. The scientist studied many sources not considered until that time. The data taken by him from the works of the authors of the East Juvaini, Rashid ad-Din, were applied in the works of Berezin: “The first invasion of the Mongols on Russia”, “Invasion of Batu on Russia”.
The Russian historian also made his own interpretation of those events. S. M. Solovyov. In contrast to the views expressed by N. M. Karamzin and the Russian orientalist Kh. D. Fren about the strong impact of the Mongol invasion on the life of Rus', he was of the opinion that this event had an insignificant impact on the life of the Russian principalities. The same point of view was held by V. Klyuchevsky, M. Pokrovsky, A. Presnyakov, S. Platonov and other researchers. In the 19th century, the Mongolian theme becomes an important stage in Russian history, studying the period of the Middle Ages.
How did the unification of the Mongol-Tatars begin?
Three decades before the invasion of the territory of Rus' near the Onon River, an army was formed from among the feudal lords, their warriors, arriving from different parts of the Mongolian steppe. The association was headed by the supreme ruler Temujin.
The All-Mongolian congress of the local nobility (kurultai) in 1206 proclaimed him the great Kagan - the highest title of nomads - and named him Genghis Khan. He gathered under his command many tribes of nomads. This association put an end to internecine wars, led to the formation of a stable economic base on the path of development of a new emerging state.
But despite the favorable circumstances and prospects, the authorities turned the people they ruled towards war and conquest. The result of such a policy in 1211 was the Chinese campaign, and a little later an invasion of Russian lands was made. The Mongol invasion itself, its causes, course, and consequences have been studied and analyzed many times by various researchers: from historians to writers. The main reason that caused the repeated campaigns of the Tatar-Mongols in other countries was the desire for easy money, the ruin of other peoples.
In those days, the cultivation of local breeds of livestock brought little profit, so it was decided to enrich themselves by robbing people living in neighboring countries. The organizer of the tribal association - Genghis Khan was a brilliant commander. Under his leadership, the conquest of Northern China, Central Asia, the steppes from the Caspian Sea to the Pacific Ocean took place. Own territories, large in area, did not stop the army: new conquest campaigns were planned on foreign lands.
Reasons for the success of the Mongolian army
The main reason for the victories won by the Mongols was the superiority of their military strength, thanks to a well-trained and organized army, its iron discipline.. The army was distinguished by maneuverability, the ability to quickly overcome considerable distances, since it mainly consisted of cavalry. Bows and arrows were used as weapons. In China, the Mongols borrowed weapons that made it possible to successfully attack a large enemy fortress.
The success of the Mongol-Tatars was accompanied by a well-thought-out strategy of action, the political inability of the conquered cities and countries to offer worthy resistance to the enemy. The tactical actions of the Mongol-Tatars consisted in a surprise attack, creating fragmentation in the ranks of the enemy and further destroying it. Thanks to the chosen strategy, they were able to maintain influence in the territories of the occupied lands for a long time.
First conquests
The years 1222−1223 were inscribed in history as the period of the first wave of conquests, which began with an invasion of the Eastern European steppes. The main troops of the Mongols, led by the talented and cruel commanders Jebe and Subedei, beloved by Genghis Khan, set off in 1223 on a campaign against the Polovtsians.
Those, in order to expel the enemy, decided to seek help from the Russian princes. The combined troops of both sides moved towards the enemy, crossed the Dnieper River and headed towards the East.
The Mongols, under the guise of a retreat, were able to lure the Russian-Polovtsian army to the banks of the Kalka River. Here the soldiers met in a decisive battle on May 31. There was no unity in the squads of the coalition, there were constant disputes between the princes. Some of them did not participate in the battle at all. The logical outcome of this battle was the complete defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian army. However, after the victory, the Mongol troops did not set off to conquer the Russian lands due to the lack of sufficient forces for this.
After 4 years (in 1227), Genghis Khan died. He wanted his tribesmen to rule the world. The decision to start a new aggressive campaign against European lands was made by Kurultai in 1235. Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, stood at the head of the cavalry.
Stages of the invasion of Rus'
The army of the Mongol-Tatars twice invaded the Russian land:
- Campaign to the North-East of Rus'.
- Campaign to South Rus'.
First, in 1236, the Mongols ravaged the Volga Bulgaria, a state that at that time occupied the territory of the middle Volga region and the Kama basin, and went towards the Don to conquer once again the Polovtsian lands. In December 1937, the Polovtsians were defeated. Then Batu Khan invaded northeastern Rus'. The path of the troops lay through the Ryazan principality.
Mongol campaigns in 1237-1238
Events in Rus' began to develop precisely in these years. At the head of the cavalry, consisting of 150 thousand people, was Batu, with him was Subedei, who knew Russian soldiers from previous battles. The cavalry of the Mongols, conquering all the cities along the way, quickly moved across the country, as evidenced by the map, reflecting the direction of the movement of the Mongols on Russian soil.
Ryazan kept the siege for six days, was destroyed and fell at the end of 1237. The army of Batu went to conquer the northern lands, especially Vladimir. On the way, the Mongols ravaged the city of Kolomna, where Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich and his retinue tried in vain to detain the enemies and were defeated. The siege of Moscow lasted 4 days. The city fell in January 1238.
The battle for Vladimir began in February 1238. The prince of Vladimir, ruling the city, tried in vain to organize a militia and repulse the enemies. The siege of Vladimir lasted 8 days, and then, as a result of the assault, the city was taken. He was set on fire. With the fall of Vladimir, virtually all the lands of the eastern and northern directions passed to Batu.
He took the city of Tver and Yuriev, Suzdal and Pereslavl. Then the army split up: some Mongols came to the Sit River, others began the siege of Torzhok. On the City, the Mongols won on March 4, 1238, defeating the Russian squads. Their further goal was to attack Novgorod, but a hundred miles from it they turned back.
Foreigners ravaged all the cities they entered, but suddenly they met a persistent rebuff from the city of Kozelsky. The townspeople fought off enemy attacks for a long seven weeks. Yet the city was defeated. Khan called it an evil city, destroying it in the end. Thus ended the first campaign of Batu to Rus'.
Invasion 1239-1242
After a break that lasted more than a year, the Russian lands were again attacked by the Mongol army. In the spring of 1239, Batu went on a campaign to the south of Rus'. It began with the fall of Pereyaslav in March and Chernigov in October.
The slow advance of the Mongols was explained by the simultaneous active struggle against the Polovtsians. In September 1940, the enemy army approached Kyiv, which belonged to Prince Galitsky. The siege of the city began.
For three months, the people of Kiev fought, trying to repel the onslaught of the enemy. Only through colossal losses on December 6 did the Mongols take possession of the city. The enemies acted with unprecedented brutality. The capital of Rus' was destroyed almost completely. According to chronology, the completion of the conquests and the establishment of the Mongol-Tatar yoke (1240−1480) in Rus' are associated with the date of the capture of Kyiv. Then the enemy army split in two: one part decided to capture Vladimir-Volynsky, the other was going to strike at Galich.
After the fall of these cities, by the beginning of the spring of 1241, the Mongol army was on its way to Europe. But huge losses forced the invaders to return to the Lower Volga region. The warriors of Batu did not dare to start a new campaign, and Europe felt relieved. In fact, the Mongol army was dealt a serious blow by the fierce resistance of the Russian lands.
The results of the Mongol invasion of Russian lands
After enemy raids, the Russian land was torn to pieces. Foreigners destroyed and ruined some cities, only ashes remained from others. The inhabitants of the defeated cities were captured by the enemies. In the west of the Mongol Empire in 1243 Batu organized the Golden Horde, the Grand Duchy. There were no captured Russian territories in its composition.
The Mongols put Rus' in vassalage, but could not enslave. The subordination of the Russian lands to the Golden Horde was manifested in the annual obligation to pay tribute. In addition, the Russian princes could rule the cities only after they were approved for this position by the Golden Horde Khan. The Horde yoke hung over Russia for two long centuries.
According to the official version of historians, the definition of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' is briefly as follows:
- Deep dependence of Rus' on the Golden Horde.
- Annual payment of tribute to invaders.
- The complete lack of development of the country due to the establishment of the yoke.
The essence of such views lies in the fact that the Mongol-Tatar yoke was then to blame for all the problems of Rus'. A different point of view was held by the historian L. N. Gumilyov. He gave his arguments, pointed out some inconsistencies in the historical interpretation of the Mongol invasion of Rus'. Until now, there are disputes about what impact the Mongol yoke had on the country, what were the relations between the Horde and Russia, what this event turned out to be for the country. One thing is certain: it played a significant role in the life of Rus'.
The Mongol-Tatar invasion is one of the most tragic events national history. Destroyed and plundered cities, thousands of dead - all this could have been avoided if the Russian princes had united in the face of a common threat. The fragmentation of the Russians greatly facilitated the task of the invaders.
The forces of the conquerors
The army of Batu Khan invaded Russian lands in December 1237. Prior to that, it ruined the Volga Bulgaria. There is no single point of view regarding the size of the Mongolian army. According to Nikolai Karamzin, under the command of Batu were 500 thousand soldiers. True, later the historian changed this figure to 300 thousand. Either way, the power is great.
A traveler from Italy, Giovanni del Plano Carpini, claims that 600 thousand people invaded Russian lands, and the Hungarian historian Simon believes that 500 thousand. It was said that Batu's army took 20 days of travel in length, and 15 in width. And it would take more than two months to completely bypass it.
Modern researchers are more modest in their assessment: from 120 to 150 thousand. Be that as it may, the Mongols outnumbered the forces of the Russian principalities, which, noted the historian Sergei Solovyov, all together (with the exception of Novgorod) were able to field no more than 50 thousand soldiers.
First victim
Ryazan was the first Russian city to fall under enemy attack. Her fate was terrible. For five days, the defenders, led by Prince Yuri Igorevich, heroically repelled attacks, shot arrows and poured boiling water and resin from the walls of the invaders. Fires broke out here and there in the city. On the night of December 21, the city fell. With the help of battering rams, the Mongols broke into the city and carried out a wild massacre - most of the inhabitants, led by the prince, died, the rest were taken into slavery. The city itself was completely destroyed and never rebuilt. The current Ryazan has nothing to do with the past - it is the former Pereyaslavl-Ryazansky, to which the capital of the principality was transferred.
300 goats
One of the most heroic episodes of resistance to the invaders was the defense of the small town of Kozelsk. The Mongols, having an overwhelming numerical superiority and having catapults and rams at their disposal, could not take the city for almost 50 days. wooden walls. As a result, the Mongol-Tatars managed to climb the rampart and capture part of the fortifications. Then the Kozeltsy quite unexpectedly went out of the gate and furiously rushed at the enemy. 300 brave men destroyed four thousand warriors of Batu, and among them were three commanders - the descendants of Genghis Khan himself. The Kozeltsy fought heroically, including the 12-year-old Prince Vasily, and they all died to the last man. Batu, furious with the stubborn defense of the city, ordered to destroy it and sprinkle salt on the ground. For their disobedience, the invaders called Kozelsk the "evil city".
attack of the dead
In January 1238, Batu moved towards Vladimir. At that moment, the Ryazan boyar Yevpaty Kolovrat, who was in Chernigov, having learned about the ruin of Ryazan, rushed to his native land and gathered a detachment of 1,700 daredevils there. They rushed after the thousands of Mongol-Tatar army. Kolovrat caught up with the enemies in the Suzdal region. His detachment immediately went on the attack on the numerically superior Mongol rearguard. The invaders were in a panic: they did not expect a strike from the rear. The dead rose from their graves and came for us, the warriors of Batu said in fear.
Batu sent his brother-in-law Khostovrul against Kolovrat. He boasted that he would easily deal with the impudent Ryazan, but he himself fell from his sword. It was possible to defeat the Kolovrat squad only with the help of catapults. As a sign of respect for the people of Ryazan, the khan released the prisoners.
All-Russian catastrophe
The harm caused by the Horde for that time was comparable to the damage caused by the Napoleonic invasion in the 19th century and the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War in the 20th century. According to archaeologists, out of 74 cities that existed in Rus' by the middle of the 13th century, 49 did not survive the raids of Batu, another 15 turned into villages and villages. Only the northwestern Russian lands - Novgorod, Pskov and Smolensk - did not suffer. The exact number of dead and captured is unknown, historians speak of hundreds of thousands of people. Many crafts were lost, because of which the level of socio-economic development of Rus' dropped sharply. From the point of view of some historians, it was precisely the damage from the Mongol-Tatar invasion that further conditioned the catching up model of Russia's development.
Civil strife?
There is an assumption that in reality there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke. In the opinion of Yu. D. Petukhov, there was a large-scale civil strife among the Russian princes. As proof, he refers to the absence of the term "Mongol-Tatars" in the ancient Russian chronicles. The word Mongol supposedly came from “could”, “mozh”, which means “powerful”, thus, the word “Mongols” then meant not a people, but a strong army. Proponents of this version point out that the backward nomads were not able to create a huge war machine and the Eurasian empire, in addition, there is practically no evidence of even a semblance of a military industry among the Mongols, and the population of the Mongolian steppes was too small to conquer the huge Chinese empire, Central Asia and other countries. As an argument, the fact is also given that the Russians also had a decimal system of organizing troops. In addition, V.P. Alekseev emphasizes in his work “In Search of Ancestors”, archaeologists did not find a Mongoloid element in the burial grounds of that period.
Empire on a planetary scale
The topic of the Tatar-Mongolian yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or was it not, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it all end? Here interesting article on the theme of Batu's campaigns in Rus'. Let's get some more information on this...
Historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or the Tatar-Mongols, or the Tatars and the Mongols, and so on, as you like) on Rus' has more than 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innokenty Gizel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - "Synopsis". According to this book, the Russians hollowed out their native history for the next 150 years. However, until now, none of the historians has taken the liberty of making a "road map" of Batu Khan's campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 to North-Eastern Rus'.
A little background
At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite them around him. most. In 1206, he was proclaimed at a kurultai (an analogue of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) a general Mongol khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious "state of nomads." Then without wasting a minute, the Mongols set about conquering the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of the commanders of Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.
In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued their conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Polovtsy and their allies, the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. This campaign was led by the grandson of Genghis Khan - Khan Batu (Batu). Here we must make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began a concentration for a campaign against the Russian principalities.
In general, why the nomads from the banks of the Kerulen and Onon needed the conquest of Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such a agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsy (partially the Polovtsy went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The "Novgorod Republic" were never allies of either the Polovtsians or the Volga Bulgars.
Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)
Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of the formation of their armies, the principles of their management, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational formations), including from the conquered peoples, nothing was paid for the service of the soldier, for any fault they were threatened with the death penalty.
Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that way, but each time it came out quite funny. Although, in the end, the level of organization of the army of the Mongols - from intelligence to communications, could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (although after the end of the era of miraculous campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of the Mongolian intelligence, the commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.
Moreover, the Mongols, of course, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communication, railways, road transport and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the traditional by that time fantasy about the steppe aubermenshes, who do not know fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with the classic shamanism in the field of the class-formational approach:
With a general recruitment into the army, each ten wagons had to put up from one to three soldiers, depending on the need, and provide them with food. Weapons in peacetime were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from a campaign, each soldier was required to hand over his weapons. The soldiers did not receive salaries, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other cattle (one head from a hundred heads). In the war, each warrior had an equal right to use booty, a certain part of which he was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was set aside for the service of the khan.
The decimal system was used as the basis for the organization of the troops. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), at the head of which were foremen, centurions and thousandths. The chiefs had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.
The main branch of the army was the cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. Heavy cavalry fought with the main enemy forces. Light cavalry carried guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a fight, upsetting the enemy ranks with the help of arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. The light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of clockwork (reserve) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongolian army was the complete absence of a wheeled convoy. Only the wagons of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on wagons ...
Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or filtering muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled the horses and drank it. In this way, they could be content with up to 10 days.
In general, the very term "Mongol-Tatars" (or Tatar-Mongols) is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negroes, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. In the future, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. The Europeans also contributed to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) as Tatar (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre designs.
The view of the French on Russia in the middle of the 18th century
One way or another, the fact that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols, the society learned only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to our times." Then the idiotic term was happily picked up by Russian historians.
Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army have come down to us, and the most ancient and unquestioningly trusted source among historians is the historical work of a team of authors led by an official of the Iranian state Hulaguid Rashid-ad-Din "List of annals". It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, although it only surfaced at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published at all.
According to Rashid-ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of the death of Genghis Khan), the total number of the army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads amounted to 150 thousand Mongols proper and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-compulsory” order from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of the Batu army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 at the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it seemed self-evident that each nomad had 2-3 horses.
By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look absolutely monstrous and implausible, we have to admit. However, to reproach pundits for fantasy is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the run-up of fantasy researchers. We will use the already classical estimate of the strength of the Batu army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from the finger, if we speak with the utmost seriousness) in historiography, however, is prevailing. In particular, it is shared by the largest contemporary Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.
From Ryazan to Vladimir
In the autumn of 1237, the Mongol detachments, who fought throughout the spring and summer in the vast expanses from the North Caucasus, the Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, were drawn to the place of general assembly - the Onuz River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, also some detachments of the Mongols gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols' performance against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with almost half a million herd of horses decided to go on a campaign already in the winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.
Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or more columns, passes through the wooded watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be unsuccessful (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in the field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream the Pronya, robbing and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, burning Mordovian and Russian villages.
Here it is necessary to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the population in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by a low density of settlement. For example, the largest city of the Ryazan land - Ryazan, totaled, according to V.P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, about 10-14 thousand more people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of up to 20-30 kilometers). The rest of the cities had a few hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan Principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.
Of course, 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than an excess number to conquer such a “proto-state”, but we will stick to the classical version.
On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the rate of the average daily transition here is up to 18-20 kilometers), go to Ryazan and begin to besiege it - they are building around the city wooden fence, build stone-throwing machines, with the help of which they shell the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in the siege business. For example, the historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously considers that the Mongols were capable of literally a day or two to bung up any stone-throwing machines on the spot from the available wood:
There was everything necessary for the assembly of stone throwers - in the united army of the Mongols there were enough specialists from China and Tangut ..., and the Russian forests supplied the Mongols with wood in abundance for the assembly of siege weapons.
Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an uncomfortable question arises: we know that the total length of the city's defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did the gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls, if the ratio of forces was at least 100-150: 1?
We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were like in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of the rivers as a way of transportation (there was no other way to go through the wooded area, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Russia are documented only in XIV century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), it can be assumed that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.
Also important is the question of what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that it was about very unpretentious, small horses, growing at the withers up to 110-120 centimeters. Their main food is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). Under natural habitat conditions, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to break snow in the steppe and eat last year's grass.
On the basis of this, historians unanimously believe that due to these properties, the question of feeding horses during a campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 did not arise in Rus'. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of grass stands, as well as overall quality phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter tebenevka of steppe horses is the following: a herd of horses slowly, passing a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, in the campaign against Rus', these horses had to travel 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were the horses able to replenish their energy costs under such conditions? More interest Ask: if Mongolian horses dug snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of their daily fodder land?
After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to move towards the fortress of Kolomna, which is a kind of "gateway" to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having traveled 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid-ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even January 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which, probably, the Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich equipped immediately after receiving the news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with a proposal to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince nevertheless agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).
According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle near Kolomna began no later than January 9 and it lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 or more thousand people seemed to be a huge army. It is unlikely that the Prince of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). Nevertheless, near Kolomna, the Mongols were shackled for several days, and the intensity of the battle shows the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?
After the victory near Kolomna, either in a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols cheerfully move along the ice of the Moskva River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of the average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin, on January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.
Again - Moscow of that time, if we take archeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was a completely tiny town. So, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, about half of the territory of the present Kremlin). The city had its own settlement - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What the huge army of the Mongols, who supposedly have unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.
It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. Say, unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it is not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing the loss of arrowheads, etc.), how they stole prisoners. Since during the entire period of archaeological excavations in the territory of North-Eastern Rus' not a single burial place of “Mongol-Tatars” was found, some historians even agreed on the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V. .V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will think of the fact that they were eaten, a joke) ...
Nevertheless, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but the steppe horses perceived grain very poorly), the Mongols moved already along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow-river) to Vladimir. Having traveled over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of the average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads begin the siege of the capital of Vladimir land. By the way, it is at this crossing that the Mongolian army of 120-140 thousand people is "caught" by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Yevpaty Kolovrat, either 700 or 1700 people, against which the Mongols - out of impotence - are forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( it is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so ... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).
Let's ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it's not clear if there is a convoy?), moving on the ice of some river Oka or Moscow? The simplest calculations show that even moving along a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is much less), such an army in the most ideal conditions (everyone moves at the same speed, observing a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then Batu's gigantic army stretches for almost ... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone is walking at the same speed, keeping the minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? At 400-800 kilometers?
It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years has even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.
In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan's invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, the conditional Mongolian horse traveled about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.
It cannot be said that these are some kind of record march rates (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interest here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such rates were maintained for quite a long time.
From Vladimir to Kozelsk
On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War 13th century
Prince Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad in the Trans-Volga region - there, in the middle of windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up camp and expected reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by the sons of Yuri - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7. But before that, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.
After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest part under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impenetrable forests of the watershed of the Klyazma and the Volga. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Further, the army is divided - part goes exactly to the north-west to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.
Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about 100 more kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it turns out all 250- 300 kilometers).
The second part goes through the dense forests of the watershed of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (in a straight line about 170 kilometers), then after taking it - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok already on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.
Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers through dense forests and along the Volga in 15 days. True, from here it is necessary to throw out several days of the siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of the march. For each of which nomads pass through the forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment travels a total of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march rate of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for the siege of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.
Under Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols got stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced another 150 kilometers towards Novgorod, but then turned back.
The second detachment of the Mongolian army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having traveled 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the wooded watershed between the lower Oka and the middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is still about 170-180 kilometers, if in a straight line). Further, the Mongolian detachments on the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, we recall once again, this is customary in Russian historiography), which gives about 300-330 more kilometers of travel.
In the first days of March, Kadan and Buri were already at Uglich, having covered 1000-1100 kilometers in a little over three weeks. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers among the nomads, which is close to the indicators of the Batu detachment.
The third detachment of the Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he marched on Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then overcame another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. In early March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Volga forests, which he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The passage from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. Together, Burundai's detachments traveled about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.
In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the lowest estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongolian army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily transition ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of storming Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, a five-day siege of Vladimir, and also another 6-7 days for the siege of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses traveled an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, given that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed for their horses from the peasants, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.
The steppe Mongolian horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911)
After the capture of Torzhok, the bulk of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. Then they moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front to the south in the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the watershed of the Klyazma and the Volga, then went to the upper reaches of the Moskva River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line, this is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of swift nomads, this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April, this part of the Mongolian army went to the steppes. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppes moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after leaving the steppe, it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.
Small Mongolian detachments, probably, as V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, robbing and burning Russian settlements. How they came out in the spring of 1238 in the steppe is not known.
Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of the shortest path to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:
More is known about Batu's route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuz (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south, and crossing the watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably, some detachments went in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Tentatively, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (annalistic Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of a daily march (moreover, the Mongols are no longer on the ice of the rivers, but through dense forests on the watersheds).
Near Kozelsk, where the ice drift on Zhizdra and the melting of snow in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town, which has no strategic significance, is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Sleep, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk, were not even touched by the nomads.
Historians are still arguing on this topic, no sane argument is given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the "Eurasian persuasion" L.N. Gumilyov, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It's funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav Stary was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk ...
Logically, Batu had to hastily leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with a complete loss of at least "transport" - that is, horses.
The question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate, besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines), none of the historians was puzzled. Finally, it is corny hard to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering in the tens of thousands of soldiers, and allegedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks ...
As a result, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people near Kozelsk, and only the arrival of the Buri and Kadan detachments in May 1238 saved the situation from the steppes - the town was nevertheless taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it is worth saying that the former President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the merits of the population of Kozelsk before Russia, awarded the settlement the title of "City of Military Glory". The humor was that archaeologists, for almost 15 years of searching, could not find unequivocal evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. About what passions about this boiled in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk, you can.
If we sum up the estimated data in the first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), the conditional Mongolian horse traveled on average from 1700 to 2800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily transition ranging from 15 to 23 kilometers. Since the periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the framework of their average daily real march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.
Simply put, this means more than intense workloads for horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the actual Mongolian losses.
For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that for the entire time of the Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while the historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses only during the campaign against North-Eastern Rus'. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of ... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, Batu’s armies continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241, I don’t understand what kind of army invaded Europe at all - so, Thomas of Split reports that it had a huge number of ... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples. How many "Mongols" themselves were among them is not really clear.
